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Abstract  
Overview and scrutiny (OS) is an integral and once statutorily required 
aspect of the new political management arrangements introduced by the 
Local Government Act 2000. Ten years on, the varied nature of local 
government has resulted in a diversity of governance arrangements. These 
incorporate OS functions that have implemented different elements of their 
general role, as it was originally envisaged, with varying degrees of emphasis 
and success. The thesis uses a grounded theory approach to analyse data 
arising from observation of OS processes and semi-structured interviewing of 
OS chairs, scrutiny officers and external stakeholders of four English local 
authorities. It makes an original contribution to knowledge by investigating 
the „external scrutiny‟ element and the extent to which external stakeholders 
are being involved in OS processes as a means to enhance local democracy 
and augment OS enquiry evidence bases. Over the years, various Acts of 
Parliament have consolidated and strengthened the „external scrutiny‟ role, 
which originally gave non-executive members a focus beyond their own local 
authority services and competencies. It has since developed into an 
enhanced and increasingly important aspect of core local authority business, 
which now sees local government OS empowered specifically to hold large 
scale service delivery partnerships to account to a greater extent than ever 
before. In an era of Total Place, local governance, joint commissioning, 
shared services and collaborative procurement, OS has been equipped to 
enable non-executive members, through influence, to effect genuine 
improvement in their localities. However, the research has shown that 
making this a success is problematic, as cultural differences, organisational 
resistance and issues of legitimacy confront external scrutineers. The 
theoretical contribution of the thesis states that a willingness to perform, and 
the practical undertaking of, external OS has enhanced the democratic 
component of local governance through a two-pronged approach that can be 
characterised as „monitoring / accountability‟ and „service improvement‟ . This 
enhancement is qualified by the fact that engagement in OS processes is 
generally of experts / professionals, typically from the public sector. As a 
corollary of this and the increasingly complicated cross-cutting issues facing 
policy makers, OS has developed into a highly technical exercise, which may 
add to the difficulties encountered in attempting to involve lay stakeholders:  
indeed, the general public has not been engaged consistently and 
systematically. It is theorised that „hard‟ and „soft‟ role delineations exist 
within OS processes that influence this – hard role delineation is seen as a 
barrier to general public engagement - and lend themselves most readily to 
„monitoring / accountability‟ and „service improvement‟ , respectively. The 
latter of these is found to have greatest potential for more substantive 
external stakeholder engagement and the use of innovative practices, and it 
is theorised that deliberative democratic approaches, which flexible OS 
arrangements are well equipped to implement, are key to strengthening OS‟s 
role as they enable inclusion, consensus building, triangulation and quality 
assurance of the findings of OS enquiries. This is in the pursuit of stronger 
recommendations for service improvement, built upon wide ranging, properly 
deliberated evidence bases.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Overview and scrutiny (OS) and developments around it raise age-old 
questions relating to representation and democratic legitimacy. These 
combine with more current debates on democratic renewal, particularly those 
on the desirability of a more participatory democracy, as a primary concern of 
the thesis. The ever-increasing emphasis on partnership working across 
sectors (which includes community groups), and where OS fits in the context 
is the second major concern of the thesis.  
 
OS brings together non-executive councillors in non-political party partisan 
committees to drive improvement and hold the council‟s executive – usually a 
leader / cabinet arrangement, but also elected mayors and executive 
committees - and its partners (NHS, etc.) to account. OS achieves this 
typically through the use of formal committee work but, in pursuit of their 
objectives, OS functions also:  
 
 Deploy committee working groups to investigate specific topics and 
make recommendations;  
 Commission external research by academics and others; 
 Hold public hearings; and 
 Work in partnership with other scrutiny bodies such as neighbouring 
councils‟ OS functions, NHS Local Involvement Networks (LINks) and 
Police Authorities.     
 
Some OS functions are able to draw upon dedicated scrutiny officers devoted 
solely to the support of OS, but others are reliant upon non-dedicated officers 
of the council with different full time roles. Usually these are democratic 
services or policy officers, but occasionally officer support from different 
professions are drawn in to support OS on a need basis. OS is described in 
far greater depth in chapter 3.  
 
 14 
 
In a post-recession public sector characterised by retrenchment and 
contraction, OS faces the challenge of proving its worth. One of the ways in 
which it can do so is by accessing the views of service users by using various 
methods. Councillors are seen to be particularly well placed to be able to do 
this, given their electoral mandate and their physical location in the 
community they represent, of which they have unique knowledge and insight 
into the concerns of residents. This is invaluable to the task of holding to 
account and contributing to the perpetual task of public service improvement.  
 
Figure 1: OS's role in local governance 
 
Also see Appendix C (p. 294) for a more in-depth depiction of the role of OS 
in local governance. 
 
There is a trend towards more participation, especially at the local level, 
which has exacerbated under New Labour (Aspden & Birch, 2005, p. 2) 
largely as an attempt to reengage people in their communities and 
governance. This accelerated further prior to the 2005 general election, 
which led to „a distinct blossoming of rhetoric about the importance of deep 
and genuine participation, from think tanks, lobbyists and politicians‟  
(Bowden, 2005, p. 60). The development of OS has taken place in this 
context and accompanies new roles for elected members, such as 
„community leader‟ (ODPM, 2004, p. 11) and „place-shaper‟ (Lyons, 2007). 
Overview and 
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(cross-party 
non executive 
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Local 
Authority 
Cabinet
(Executive 
councillors)
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Safety 
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OS has statutory powers 
allowing it to scrutinise a 
range of public service 
providers other its own 
local authority (external 
OS). 
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Both of these titles reflect the view that councillors can play unique and 
electorally mandated roles in relation to the public and council partners. The 
new roles exist alongside the aforementioned powerful imperative to involve 
citizens in the work of OS and, if properly realised, can make councillors an 
integral part of their communities, engaged in a form of public scrutiny which 
combines representative and participatory democracies in holding a wide 
range of partnerships and public service bodies to account.  
 
To achieve this enhanced accountability requires the active buy-in of a range 
of council partners. Whilst OS is a local government service, its reach is 
potentially wide-ranging, with elected members able to influence policy 
across a number of service providers. To fulfil the difficult task of effecting 
change via the exercise of influence, rather than executive power, councillors 
need to engage successfully the full spectrum of knowledge and expertise in 
today‟s public services. This is desirable for two reasons: firstly, to make 
intelligent contributions that are of value; secondly, to provide essential 
legitimacy and rigour to OS evidence bases, upon which effective 
recommendations for service improvement can be developed.  
 
When compared to other elected member arrangements, OS is seen by the 
thesis as a particularly useful means of accessing the knowledge and 
expertise needed to develop policy in a complex, multi-layered governance 
environment. This is due to its negation of party politics, allowing partners to 
engage with it without fear of politicisation; its potential for flexible working 
arrangements and its ability to engage with a range of external stakeholders, 
from PCT chief executives to children and young people. The value that 
elected members can bring in terms of the lay perspective, unrivalled local 
knowledge and „the common touch‟ can all be successfully utilised through 
effective OS. For this reason a main premise of the thesis is that OS is highly 
empowering for elected members, assuming a range of criteria are fulfilled. 
These relate principally to how well OS is practised, how well it is received 
and the extent to which it is resourced, all of which are elaborated later in the 
thesis.  
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As well as being empowering for non-executive members, OS can genuinely 
add value in the correct set of circumstances. This is the most important 
justification for a system of OS, and in local authority areas where it can be 
said to be doing so, there is no other arrangement which allows members to 
make a difference in such a systematic and genuine manner. OS endows 
non-executives with the tools to draw the most powerful figures in an area 
into the purview of the locally elected representative. Officials that are 
accountable directly to central government are now also subject to statutory 
requirements concerning their answerability to non-executive councillors.  
 
The fact that OS cannot force change does not dilute its capabilities; to 
suggest so is to misunderstand the nature of policy making in an era of local 
governance and partnership. To explain, even executive members control 
directly only a very limited proportion (the non-ring fenced amount controlled 
by the local authority they control) of what is spent in a locality by the state 
(see DCLG & Treasury, 2010). The totality of the public spend that is 
controlled locally is negotiated with other agencies in partnership. Therefore, 
it could be said that beyond the relatively small amount spent by the council, 
both executive and non-executive elected members stimulate change 
through influence rather than directive. The best OS functions have 
developed into formidable influencing mechanisms and, as such, are very 
well placed to develop local public policy in an „area-based‟ age. Using a 
grounded theory approach, the thesis makes an original contribution to 
knowledge by exploring this rapidly developing field of local authority external 
OS. The thesis situates OS within a broader context of democratic renewal, a 
policy agenda comprising devolutionary and governance measures with the 
aim of reinvigorating democracy.  
 
At the national level this involved the formation of a Scottish Parliament and 
Welsh Assembly, reform of the Lords and in local government the 
introduction of new political management arrangements (Morrison, 2001). 
The latter were intended to open up decision making and give a clear idea of 
where responsibility for decisions lay (DETR, 1998a). Other benefits were to 
include speedier and more efficient decision making and greater 
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accountability, due to the formation of powerful Overview and Scrutiny 
Committees (OSCs) as a democratic check.  
 
The thesis identifies some of the main concepts underpinning the democratic 
renewal agenda, namely social capital, communitarianism and deliberative 
democracy. The political management arrangements of which OS is a part 
owe much to these concepts, as social capital and communitarianism often 
go hand-in-hand with a desire to hold decision makers to account. More 
transparent formal political structures in both central and local government 
were intended to facilitate this alongside newer forms of participatory 
democracy, many involving substantive deliberation, rather than just token 
consultation. The thesis is particularly concerned with the extent to which 
deliberation is being used by OSCs to elicit and amalgamate the widest 
possible range of views into coherent evidence-bases. This follows from an 
assumption that flexibility of approach, as allowed by deliberation, is the most 
effective way to engage with the various external stakeholders that need to 
be engaged; including for example, the aforementioned PCT chief executives 
through to chi ldren and young people.   
 
Findings 
The research has revealed a clear trend towards the engagement of experts 
in OS processes. The trend is multi-layered, in that expert testimony is 
favoured, experts and their work are predominant focal points, and expert 
advice is privileged. „Experts‟ in the OS context are found, usually, to be 
public officials of mid- to senior rank, rather than local politicians or service 
users. Their position as the focal point of much OS work is viewed as a 
microcosm of the broader reality of public policy making and service delivery 
under a centralised and public management model which allows little space 
for local political leadership.  
 
The thesis explains the privileging of experts by reference to global and 
national phenomena, principally public management and centralisation, 
respectively. The former is viewed as a means by which public managers 
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and/or experts have come to the fore due to numerous influences such as 
the prevalence of increasingly complex „wicked issues‟ without an 
immediately obvious political solution. Democratic malaise has, in turn, 
contributed to a decline in perceived electoral legitimacy, posing particular 
problems for the local politician wishing to extend his or her influence over 
council partners, as required by the partnership scrutiny agenda. Extensive 
centralisation and overbearing external audit and inspection are also viewed 
by the thesis as a severe constraint on local political competency and 
leadership. 
 
A conclusion that is drawn is that public engagement in formal political 
processes, as promoted by the democratic renewal agenda, has not been 
well-served by OS across the case study authorities. However, what has 
emerged is a function that is beginning to engage successfully public sector 
partners and, to a more limited extent, those in the voluntary sector. Private 
sector engagement is almost non-existent and there is very little evidence of 
sustained general public involvement.  
 
To summarise, the thesis argues that building on the best of OS, its 
deliberative elements and ability to work in a non-party political manner, is 
the key to its ongoing success. Deliberation is seen as the principal way in 
which the wide ranging views of various stakeholders, with varying levels of 
personal and organisational competencies, can have their views heard. OS is 
the forum in which electorally mandated lay scrutineers can balance these 
views deliberatively, with a view to developing resilient evidence bases upon 
which recommendations can be built. 
 
1.1 A cross-disciplinary approach 
The thesis is a cross-disciplinary (political science / public administration), 
qualitative examination of OS and how it is engaging with local authority 
external stakeholders. The following briefly explores the thesis in ontological 
and epistemological terms with the intention of providing a better 
understanding of the underlying assumptions behind the research (Marsh & 
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Furlong, 2002). Methodology will be explored separately at a later stage in 
the text (see p. 129) as a means of framing and introducing the research 
findings.  
 
Political science 
The political nature of OS necessarily places any study of it within the realm 
of political science. Within the discipline the thesis reflects the anti -
foundationalist and broad view of what constitutes the political (Marsh & 
Stoker, 2002, p. 9). A vital part of this in the study is the delineation from the 
outset of two separate but inextricably linked concepts: politics and party 
politics. The (superficial) absence of party politics in OS certainly does not 
mean that politics in a broader sense is absent. Indeed, the research 
proceeds from the premise that, particularly in the context of greater 
partnership working, politics and policy-making takes place in a wide variety 
of settings, including, but not limited to OSCs, cabinets and council 
chambers. This is one of the main reasons for exploring the engagement of 
external stakeholders in OS. The anti-foundationalist view has in turn led to 
an interpretive approach to the research (Bevir & Rhodes, 2002), which is 
explored in depth in the methodology chapter. 
 
Public administration 
Lowndes (2002, p. 90-91) has described public administration as a sub-
discipline of political science, which could imply that the actual situation of the 
thesis is within the public administration field within the broader discipline of 
political science. However, it is argued here that the political elements of the 
study place it more generally within the field of political science, whilst the 
focus on service improvement and OS relationships with the public sector in 
general also places the work within the field of public administration. This 
consideration underpins the claim that the thesis is a cross-disciplinary 
concern.  
 
Public administration is part of „a profusion of words to describe the study of 
the public sector ... all referring essentially to the same thing, which is how 
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the administrative parts of government are organised, process information 
and produce outputs in policies, laws or goods and services‟ (Hughes, 2003, 
p. 7). OS is a fundamental part of how „administrative parts of government 
are organised‟, and a key part of its function is to influence outputs, policies 
and services of not only the council, but increasingly a broader range of 
public service providers. 
 
1.2 Structure 
The thesis moves from an introduction to the topic, to a review of the 
literature with an introduction to key concepts, then to the methodology 
employed in the research. Findings are then presented in the context of the 
existing literature and the methodology employed. Findings are presented 
firstly in a manner which best utilises the grounded theory method employed. 
Secondly, clear practical lessons from the research with implications for the 
operation of OS are incorporated into a separate sub-chapter.  
 
Literature review 
OS has been a source of much consternation amongst academics and 
practitioners. Whilst it has provided a considerable shift in the way local 
democracy and administration is and can be conducted, which in turn has 
raised political issues, criticism has emerged. The basis of this criticism and 
important concepts are explored in the literature review chapters which act as 
a preamble to the research that follows. Marshall and Rossman specify two 
main purposes of the li terature review:  
 
First, it provides evidence for the significance of the study for practice 
and policy and for its contribution to the ongoing discourse about the 
topic (often referred to as contributing to “knowledge”). Second, it 
identifies the important intellectual traditions that guide the study, 
thereby developing a conceptual framework and refining an important 
and viable research question (2006, p. 26). 
 
In outlining the relevant concepts and the debates around them, the 
approach in the introductory chapters roughly follows the first two stages of 
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„normative theorising‟ outlined by David Beetham (1996, p. 28-29); the final 
stages are addressed by the research. Normative theorising consists of:  
 
 „An analytical or conceptual component, addressing the question: 
What is the meaning of a given concept (democracy, freedom, justice 
and so on), and what are the criteria by which we can tel l whether, or 
how far, it has been attained in practice? 
 A justificatory component answering the questions: Why should we 
value it? Why is it important to us?  
 A critical component, answering the questions: How far are the criteria 
or principles entailed by the concept realised in a given situation or set 
of institutions? And how far does practice measure up to a justifiable 
normative standard or ideal? 
 A practical aspect, addressing two rather different questions: What 
institutional arrangements are, or might be, most effective in realising 
the principles in question? At what point does realising these 
principles bring us into conflict with other principles that we value?  
 Which social or political groups might plausibly act as the bearers, 
protagonists of beneficiaries of the values in question?‟  
 
Flick has also outlined the many uses of the theoretical literature, insights 
and information derived from which are described as „context knowledge‟ 
(2006, p. 58-59). The literature review also plays a particularly important role 
in the grounded theory research project (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 49-52), a 
role which is explored in greater depth in the methodology chapter.   
 
The literature review first sets the background by briefly describing British 
local government from an historical perspective. The emphasis then shifts 
onto the changes which have characterised local government; this 
necessarily involves a more detailed look at the post – 1974 situation, a new 
epoch for local government (Gyford, 1991). Classical political scientific 
concepts such as representation and participation are then examined, 
providing Beetham‟s „analytical or conceptual component‟  (1996, p. 28). A 
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vital part of this is realised in explaining some of the arguments (see point 2, 
above) for greater citizen participation. It is assumed that liberal democracy 
and representative politics have generally operated successfully enough to 
require no further justification in this text, although ideas to the contrary are 
explored in some depth.  
 
The headings are, therefore, broad, and provide introductions to the main 
concepts that they describe; the main purpose of this being to set the context 
in which the research will be conducted.  Some of the main concepts behind 
the Labour government‟s democratic renewal agenda, social capital, 
deliberative democracy and communitarianism, are then described to provide 
a context for the development of OS, itself a part of the agenda intended as a 
means to greater transparency and democratic accountability in local 
government.  
 
Methodology 
The methodology chapter discusses the grounded theory approach and the 
rationale behind its use. It also  
 Explains how the sample of case study local authorities was decided 
 Describes the research methods employed  
 Describes some of the main methodological risks and strategies 
employed to mitigate 
 
Findings 
The layout of the research findings is arranged according to the concepts that 
emerged from the data. Findings are also interspersed with direct quotations 
from interviewees and other sources. This is in keeping with the interpretive 
approach of the research and is intended to illustrate the main issues raised 
by the interviewee in as pure a form as possible. It also negates a key issue 
highlighted in Thomas and James‟ (2006) critical engagement of grounded 
theory, whereby the use of its procedures „relegates the original voice – the 
narrative – of both the respondent and the discussant in the research 
exercise‟ (Ibid., p. 24).  
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Separate sub-chapters deal with theoretical conclusions and practical 
lessons from the research. The former explicates a grounded theory of 
external stakeholder participation in OS processes, whilst the latter derives 
practical lessons from the research, intended for use by practitioners.  
 
1.3 The concept of ‘externality’ employed by the thesis 
Several concepts are employed by the thesis including, amongst others, a 
notion of „externality‟ that could usefully be explored in more depth. In the 
context of the thesis „external‟, when used to describe OS activity or 
stakeholders, is used with reference to anything or anyone not within the 
mainstream scope of the local authority concerned. For example, the term 
„external stakeholder‟ is used to denote any individual or organisation not 
directly employed by, or under the direct control1 of, the local authority. 
Similarly, „external OS‟ refers to OS of policy outcomes in the community, 
specific geographical areas, public policy themes, partnership working, etc: 
„“External scrutiny” is the term used to describe a political assembly applying 
the process of scrutiny to bodies outside the control of its own executive‟ 
(Sandford, 2005, p. 5). This is as opposed to a focus which would be solely 
concerned with the „host‟ local authority‟s own performance and policy in 
isolation. To illustrate this, the following are examples of items of business 
that may appear on OSC agendas, and would generally be considered 
„internal‟ OS:   
 Council directorate performance reports  
 Corporate restructures: the implications 
 Items relating to duties specific to the council in question: e.g. how the 
authority is fulfilling its statutory duty to provide a comprehensive 
library service 
 Items relating to specific systems or processes that the council uses or 
has responsibility for implementing across public services in an area: 
e.g. the Common Assessment Framework 
                                                 
1
 Commissioned services or services delivered at „arm‟s -length‟ would fall into the „external‟ 
category for the purposes of the thesis. 
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„External OS‟ is an intentionally broad definition and could include OS of:  
 A specific geographical location: e.g. reducing obesity in a specific 
ward 
 Specific partnership work: the production of a crime and disorder 
Strategic Assessment and resultant priority setting by the partnership 
(in this case Community Safety Partnership) concerned  
 
The broad definition of external was adopted to contrast the very specific and 
universally accepted definition of „internal‟ OS: OS focussed specifically on 
the host council‟s executive. Statutory powers enshrined in the following Acts 
introduced and then augmented external OS: 
 Local Government Act 2000 – introduces OS  
 Health and Social Care Act 2001 – introduces health OS and related 
external OS powers 
 Police and Justice Act 2006 – introduces OS of Community Safety 
Partnerships 
 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 – gives 
OS the power to scrutinise a range of organisations responsible for the 
delivery of „Local Improvement Targets‟.  
 
1.4 Research objective and questions 
The ever-changing system of public service delivery provides a challenge to 
democratically elected representatives. To exercise any level of influence 
over the multi-layered and highly complicated array of service providers and 
partnerships, they must use the systems and processes at their disposal. To 
those councillors not on the executive – a large majority – this involves the 
effective use of OS, an imperfect but potentially powerful way of provoking 
change. On this premise, the following research questions are based: 
 
 To what extent are councillors practising external rather than internal 
OS? 
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 To what extent are OS functions engaging external stakeholders in their 
work? 
 
 To what extent are aspects of OS practice representative of a more 
deliberative style of local democracy? 
 
 Is OS furthering the democratic renewal agenda? 
 
The objective of the research is: 
 
 To evaluate the OS role of the non-executive councillor in terms of 
democratic renewal in a local governance context. 
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2. Local government in the UK 
 
This chapter introduces local government and the main themes of interest 
that are prevalent in the literature. The history of local government is very 
briefly described before the focus shifts onto the changing role of the council, 
again, with relevant analyses from the literature. The chapter concludes with 
a description of New Labour‟s approach to local government with short 
discussions of the main features, such as partnership working. The role of 
councillors is then established, leading into the next chapter which reviews 
the literature on OS.  
 
2.1  Local government in the UK: a history 
The history of British local government is long. Boroughs have governed 
themselves under Royal Charter since mediaeval times (Elcock, 1994, p. 30). 
It was not until the 19th Century, however, that the „maze of parishes, 
commissions and other public bodies were almost completely replaced by 
multi-functional local authorities of the kind with which we are now familiar‟ 
(Ibid., p. 30-31). By 1888 and the Local Government Act (LGA) of that year, 
county councils were established „by a somewhat reluctant Conservative 
administration under Lord Salisbury‟ (Keith-Lucas & Richards, 1978, p. 12), 
and by 1894, wherever a borough council did not already exist, urban and 
rural district councils were established (Elcock, 1994, p. 31). The Municipal 
Corporations Act 1835 had standardised the electoral procedures in borough 
councils to replace the many different provisions outlined in respective 
charters. By 1894 the framework in place was largely that which existed until 
1974 (Ibid.). The LGA (1972) from 1974 abolished county boroughs and 
reduced the number of counties in England and Wales to 47, incorporating 
333 non-metropolitan district councils. Six metropolitan counties and 36 
metropolitan districts were established in urban England (Wilson & Game, 
2006, p. 52). According to Leach (2004, p. 77), the 1974 reorganisation also 
exacerbated the trend of party politicisation in local government.   
 
 27 
 
Central government reports and inquiries have had varying influence (this 
section is based on Wilson & Game, 2006, p. 98-100). Maud (1967) 
addressed criticisms of the committee system; namely those which claimed 
that councillors were too concerned with day-to-day administration at the 
expense of broader policy and strategy issues. Among the „radical‟ (Wilson & 
Game, 2006, p. 98) prescriptions of Maud, was that which stated all but the 
very smallest authorities should have a management board consisting of 
between five and nine senior counci llors with far-reaching delegated powers. 
Authorities should also appoint a chief executive officer, and committees and 
departments should be trimmed down. The proposals were met with hostility 
as counci llors feared becoming second-class members excluded from the 
board. Sentiments similar to those aired in response to the executive 
provision of the recent LGA (2000).                                                                                                               
 
The Bains committee (1972) advised on the new internal management 
structures of local authorities in England following the LGA (1972), and 
Paterson (1973) advised on the new arrangements in Scotland following the 
LGA (1973). Both reports essentially argued in favour of a corporate 
approach, rather than the departmental approach which had predominated. 
The elite management board of Maud was thus „left in the long grass‟ (Wilson 
& Game, 2006, p. 99). Stephanie Snape has stated that both Maud and 
Bains „produced a trend towards streamlining committees‟ (2004, p. 62); a 
trend which was to have far-reaching effects. Following the recommendations 
of these two reports, the majority of newly established authorities appointed 
chief executives, senior management teams and set up policy and resources 
committees. Whilst Maude, Bains and Paterson had focused on 
organisational structures, Widdicombe (1986) looked at elected members 
and the party political side of UK local government. Left wing Labour 
councillors, known as the Municipal, or New Urban Left had raised concerns 
within the Conservative government attributable to „radical, interventionist 
policies‟ (Wilson & Game, 2006, p. 99), providing the rationale for 
Widdicombe. Whilst the positive features of party politics, such as greater 
voter choice and better accountability were welcomed, the committee were 
concerned about the position of minority parties and non-affiliated members. 
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This was within the context of a Conservative government that „were able to 
remove functions and finance because local government was not greatly 
loved or respected by its electorates‟ (John, 2004, p. 47). The 
recommendations of the committee led to a number of checks and balances, 
namely, in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 the effective 
banning of one-party committees and sub-committees, and the forbiddance 
of public political activity for senior officers. These provisions did not seriously 
challenge the majority party prerogative to „determine and see implemented 
its policy proposals‟ (Wilson & Game, 2006, p. 100).  
 
Further moves away from the committee system were advocated in the 
1990s. Michael Heseltine‟s consultation paper Internal Management of Local 
Authorities in England (1991) introduced the idea of experimentation in 
creating executive models of local decision-making (Snape, 2004, p. 62). A 
Working Party in 1993 led a further, detailed examination of alternatives to 
the committee system; a report from the Commission for Local Democracy 
(1995) recommended directly elected leaders/mayors for councils; and Lord 
Hunt‟s select committee (1996) recommended freedom for innovation in 
political management (Snape, 2004, p. 62-63).  
 
Following the election of New Labour the movement towards alternatives to 
the committee system accelerated in light of the new government‟s belief 
„that the traditional committee system had become inefficient, too time-
consuming for members and too removed from local electorates‟ (Wilson & 
Morse, 2004, p. 23). Lord Hunt sponsored a private member Bill promoting 
freedom to innovate in executive arrangements, matching the „experimental 
and voluntary‟ (Snape, 2004, p. 64) approach advocated by Heseltine. The 
Bill faltered and the government intervened to set boundaries and the 
timetable for change. The government‟s proposals for executive 
arrangements were detailed in the White Paper, Modern Local Government: 
In Touch with the People (DETR, 1998a). The alternatives consisted of 
leader and cabinet, elected mayor and cabinet, or an elected mayor with a 
council manager. Adoption of either mayoral system would require a 
referendum in the locality concerned.  
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A concession in the passage of the ensuing LGA (2000) through the House 
of Lords resulted in the incorporation of a „fourth option‟ for smaller 
authorities with fewer than 85,000 residents, comprising a „streamlined 
committee system with integrated overview and scrutiny‟ (cited in Snape, 
2004, p. 64). By far the most popular option was the leader / cabinet model, 
with all but 3 percent of those that had to change adopting the system 
(Stoker, 2006b, p. 11). It has been speculated that this choice represented 
the „least change‟ option, indicative of the „dynamic conservatism‟ endemic in 
some authorities (Pollitt & Birchall, 1997).    
 
2.2 From ‘providing’ to ‘enabling’  
Gyford (1991, p. 21) traces a role shift back to a reappraisal which started in 
the mid 1970s concerning the function of local government in society. 
Significantly, this involved the recognition of new social groups creating their 
own demands for services. In addition to this there was an operational 
reappraisal which had taken two forms. Traditional methods of service 
delivery were reassessed; reassessment also took place regarding relations 
with other sectors. In the latter case, „multi-sector provision has been 
canvassed as a means of accommodating growing public pressure for the 
diversity and choice said to be thwarted by municipal monopoly‟ (Ibid.).  
 
The idea of the „enabling‟ authority had its roots in the Thatcherite „New 
Right‟ tendency. Then Secretary of State for the Environment, Nicholas 
Ridley (1988) made a notable contribution in his pamphlet The Local Right: 
enabling not providing; as his portfolio incorporated local government his 
work received some attention. In it he argued for increased value for money, 
efficiency and accountability, and reduced waste, duplication and 
unnecessary functions. He welcomed the introduction of the Community 
Charge to meet these goals but lamented the fact that the private sector role 
in local government had not increased. Ridley suggested that public sector 
provision should always be questioned in circumstances where the private 
sector could do the job itself, stating that if this approach were to follow, the 
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emphasis on the monopoly provider role would be supplanted by an 
emphasis on an „enabler‟ role (cited in Gyford, 1991, p. 153). The community 
charge itself was seen in part as a means of changing the relationship 
between service user and provider:  
 
The intention behind the community charge has been to make every 
adult feel as if they are in effect compulsory shareholders in the 
municipal enterprise, anxious to see their “investment” used prudently 
and sparingly and to protect themselves against any excessive calls 
upon their purse. The shareholder model of local government can thus 
be seen as one which envisages a more active protective role on behalf 
of those who are the funders of local government , in place of the rather 
more passive role of ratepayer (Ibid., p. 161). 
 
This approach illustrated not only the revised view of the community vis-à-vis 
the council, it was also indicative of the broader change of attitude regarding 
the „providing‟ role. No longer were the community to be seen as passive 
recipients of paternalistic services and welfare. The emphasis was now on 
the community as empowered shareholders, a role more in keeping with ever 
increasing levels of diversity and activism. 
 
The fundamental shift away from the providing role caused great 
consternation. Barron et al describe this controversy from two opposing 
perspectives:  
 
The “New Right” argues for an “enabling” authority (or alternatively a 
“community company”) which would provide very little itself but would 
contract with others (usually private companies) to provide services. 
The “New Urban Left” sees the solution in a systematic exposure of the 
local authority to the opinions and interests of the groups which 
comprise the local community (1991, p. 197). 
 
The New Labour approach fell between these two in taking a more pragmatic 
stance towards tendering for services to coincide with the abolition of CCT 
(DETR, 1998a, para. 17, p. 5 and para. 7.27, p. 56-57). The emphasis was 
on achieving best value regardless of who acted as service provider (DETR, 
1998b).  
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2.3 Social transformation 
The changes faced by local government were also brought about by 
numerous social transformations (Gyford, 1991, p. 23). In addition to this, 
contributing to the changing context of local government is what Stoker 
(Stoker, Unknown, p. 3-4) describes as the shift from „hard-wiring‟ challenges 
to the „soft-wiring‟ of society. This analysis refers to the move from a primary 
concern with, for example, the provision of infrastructure and the clean and 
reliable supply of utilities, to a concern with environmental, social and 
community-oriented issues against the backdrop of modern globalisation. 
Some of the societal changes highlighted have undermined the social 
geography not only of the „golden age‟  of local government (pre World War II 
- Gyford, 1991, p. 26, 56 & 86) but also of the post-war, „local arm of the 
national welfare state‟ period (Ibid., p. 28).  
 
The processes described by Gyford, de-industrialisation and counter-
urbanisation, „have left city authorities coping with an ebbing economy and 
their counterparts in the shires wrestling with the problems of a wave of 
development‟ (Ibid., p. 28-29). Of high importance in this regard was the 
move from an industrialised urban society to a population shift from the cities, 
de-industrialisation and new forms of production. In dealing with population 
dispersal from urban areas, local government in the cities faced demands for 
policy to address reduced economic activity and to promote it anew; all in the 
context of declining local tax revenues (Ibid., p. 28).  
 
Population decentralisation pressured the rural growth areas into the 
provision of services which matched the expectations of the new influx. This 
took place alongside local demands pertaining to the control of the 
commensurate level of growth and development. In response to these new 
demands the question of adaptation was viewed as an issue of policy and 
resource as opposed to structure (Ibid., p. 28-29). Gyford states an 
alternative view: „it may also be argued that the transformations under way in 
society over the past two decades do ultimately require not only new policies 
but also new forms of organisation through which to deliver those policies‟ 
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(Ibid., p. 29); a statement of considerable foresight given the sweeping 
change instigated six years later by New Labour. Arguments around „post-
Fordism‟ underpin this stance in debating whether large-scale industrial era 
bureaucracy is sufficient in a post-industrial world. The decline of assembly-
line production methods pioneered by Henry Ford, has led to the post-Fordist 
argument that „new technologies are drastically altering production, stocking 
and retailing methods, leading to a new pattern of small batch production of 
customised products and employing a more versatile workforce with a 
greater degree of autonomy on the job‟ (Ibid.).  
 
The author goes on to highlight two ways in which the post-Fordist / Taylorian 
model of local government was deemed inadequate in the  move towards a 
post-Fordist world (Ibid., p. 30-31). Gyford describes the argument that 
rigidities inherent in Fordist local government rendered it unsuitable for 
changes associated with broader post-Fordist trends. Service users and their 
increasing vocalism and activism challenged further the Fordist local 
government paradigm:  
 
... attachment to uniform, standardised forms of local service provision 
no doubt owed some of its origins to bureaucratic convenience and to 
beliefs in economy of scale and “rational” use of resources … 
Increasingly however the recipients of local services have come to 
expect them to reflect user rather than provider requirements (Ibid., p. 
31). 
 
This factor is of extra significance when placed in the context of another 
social transformation described by Gyford. Of equal importance was „the 
emergence of an increasingly diverse society and of a less deferential , more 
assertive political culture‟ (Ibid., p. 23). Taken in sum, the social changes 
described in this chapter provided a significant catalyst for the reform of local 
government political management. 
 
2.4 Conflicting images of the state 
Differing images of the state can also provide frameworks to characterise the 
changed role of local government, three of which are forwarded by Chris 
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Skelcher (2000). The first concerns the „overloaded state‟ of the 1960s and 
1970s in which welfare bureaucracies reliant on representative democracy 
delivered services to a largely passive community.  
 
The „hollowed-out‟ state (cited in Skelcher, 2000, p. 5) of the 1980s and early 
1990s occurred within the context of a political desire to reduce the role of 
the state. Governmental bodies were fragmented and increased use was 
made of arm‟s-length organisations accountable through patronage and 
market-based systems. This could involve two changes in public service 
delivery mechanisms. The first would involve the reallocation of activities to 
bodies outside the state, i.e. privatisation or contractual relationships with the 
private and/or voluntary sectors. The second transferred responsibility from 
primary, multi-purpose governmental bodies to secondary, single-purpose 
agencies (Ibid., p. 7). The final image, the „congested state‟, arose with the 
desire to tackle cross-cutting „wicked issues‟ through plural governance in the 
form of partnerships. This occurred „in response to the problems inherent in 
the fragmentation arising from hollowing-out‟ (Ibid., p. 3).  
 
The pluralistic approach has meant that „[a]uthority has flowed from elected 
bodies to quangos but then on to the new partnership structures‟ (Ibid., p. 
16), leading the author to state that „[p]artnerships are the new quangos, in 
the sense that their board appointments, decision-making processes and 
transparency to public inquiry and scrutiny are as opaque now as quangos 
were in the early 1990s‟ (Ibid., p. 17). This analysis adds further to the 
imperative for a stronger form of local authority external scrutiny.  
 
2.5 New localism 
Gerry Stoker has called for a „new localism‟ which combined with a „practice 
of public engagement and participation lays the foundations for a new form of 
networked community governance‟ (Stoker, Unknown, p. 1). This 
governmental form surpasses old-fashioned public administration and New 
Public Management approaches „to provide a focus for both integrated 
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service and programme delivery and the capacity to engage and involve a 
large number of stakeholders in influencing policy‟ (Ibid.).  
 
Stoker bases the case for a new localism on the grounds that it is a sure 
response to the complex issues of modern governance; it allows for a more 
engaging democratic style fit for the needs of today, and it encourages civil 
renewal in fostering trust, empathy and social capital (Ibid., p. 2). Civil 
renewal „is about giving people a stronger sense of involvement in their 
communities and a greater say over their lives‟ (Ibid., p. 7) and combines 
equal measures of rights and responsibilities, both social and political. The 
current era of networked community governance that is upon local 
government emerged in the mid 1990s and „demands a complex set of 
relationships with „higher‟ tier government, local organisations and 
stakeholders. The relationships are intertwined and the systems of 
accountability are multiple‟ (Ibid., p. 21). Elected members today are just one 
„system of accountability‟, although they remain one of the most effective 
given their democratic legitimacy, knowledge and links to the people in their 
locality.  A more deliberative and inclusive OS function better fits the reality of 
Stoker‟s networked community governance. 
 
Table 1: Eras of local governing 
 
  
Elected local 
government  
in the post-war 
setting 
 
Local government 
under New Public 
Management 
 
Networked 
Community 
Governance 
 
Key objectives 
of the 
governance 
system 
Managing inputs. 
Delivering services in 
the context of a 
national welfare 
state 
 
Managing inputs and 
outputs in a way that 
ensures economy 
and 
responsiveness to 
consumers 
 
The overarching goal 
is greater 
effectiveness in 
tackling the 
problems that the 
public care most 
about 
 
Dominant 
ideologies 
Professionalism and 
party partisanship 
 
Managerialism and 
consumerism 
 
Managerialism and 
localism 
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Definition of 
public 
interest 
By politicians / 
experts. Little in the 
way of public input  
 
Aggregation of 
individual 
preferences, 
demonstrated by 
customer choice 
 
Individual and public  
preferences 
produced through 
a complex process of 
interaction 
 
Dominant 
model of 
accountability 
 
Overhead 
democracy: voting 
in elections, 
mandated party  
politicians, tasks 
achieved through 
control over the 
bureaucracy 
 
Separation of politics 
and management,  
politics to give 
direction but not 
hands on control, 
managers to 
manage, additional  
loop of consumer 
assessment built into 
the system 
 
Elected leaders, 
managers and key 
stakeholders 
involved in search for 
solutions to 
community problems 
and effective delivery 
mechanisms. 
System in turn 
subject to challenge 
through elections, 
referendums, 
deliberative forums, 
scrutiny 
functions and shifts 
in public opinion 
 
 
Preferred 
system for 
service 
delivery 
 
Hierarchical  
department or self-
regulating 
profession 
 
Private sector or 
tightly defined arms 
length public agency  
 
Menu of alternatives 
selected 
pragmatically  
 
Approach to 
public service 
ethos 
 
Public sector has  
monopoly on 
service ethos, and all 
public bodies have it  
 
Sceptical of public  
sector ethos (leads 
to inefficiency and 
empire building) – 
favours customer 
service 
 
No one sector has a 
monopoly on public 
service ethos. 
Maintaining 
relationships  
through shared 
values is seen as 
essential  
 
 
Relationship 
with ‘higher’ 
tiers of 
government 
 
Partner relationship 
with central 
government over 
delivery  
Upwards through 
performance 
contracts and key  
performance 
indicators  
Complex and 
multiple: regional, 
national, European.  
Negotiated and 
flexible 
 
(From: Stoker, Unknown, p. 19) 
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2.6 Partnership  
A greater emphasis on partnership working across sectors underpinned New 
Labour strategy. Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) bring together the main 
service providers in an area to coordinate effort in tackling the problems best 
dealt with using a multi-agency approach. Currently,1 a Sustainable 
Community Strategy (SCS) stating the long term vision for an area is 
developed by the LSP. A Local Area Agreement (LAA) is then negotiated 
with the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) via the 
Government Office for the region.  
 
In two-tier areas LSPs currently exist at both tiers, with the upper tier LSP 
responsible, in consultation with the lower tier (each district area has an 
LSP), for the LAA. The LAA is to be the practical expression of the SCS, 
containing local priorities and appropriate targets to achieve the vision 
developed in the SCS. Monies are currently made available to the LSP from 
central government in the form of a non ring-fenced payment known as the 
Area Based Grant (ABG). The pooling of local budgets is also encouraged. 
The broader partnership framework in an area feeds into the LAA priorities, 
as do (to varying extents) the activities of the individual organisations 
comprising the LSP. In the case of some councils cabinet portfolios are now 
aligned to the LAA priorities. In all cases council plans will describe the way 
in which local authority outputs are furthering the LAA priorities. OSCs are 
also increasingly aligned to the LAA objectives, reflecting both the 
importance of holding partnerships to account and the recent legislative 
imperative contained in the Local Government and Public Involvement in 
Health Act 2007.2  
 
In two-tier areas in particular, partnership frameworks have become very 
complicated. The arrangements at county level tend to be, essentially, 
mirrored at each district‟s level, meaning that the potential for duplication and 
excessive bureaucracy is considerable. The burden that these arrangements 
                                                 
1
 Coalition government policy on this requirement is currently unknown.  
2
 The Act includes the power for OS to hold LAA partners to account in relation to their 
performance against „Local Improvement Targets‟ (LAA targets).  
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can place on agencies that are not coterminous with a single district area is 
also a major issue. Lightly resourced police and NHS partnership teams often 
find themselves struggling to attend regularly an array o f partnership 
meetings in various different localities. 
 
In terms of priorities, many LAAs are relatively uncontroversial and seemingly 
apolitical. This is a reflection of the fact that many partnerships are 
dominated by officers with no apparent party political agenda. In addition to 
this, LAAs are negotiated with central government and many others, meaning 
that the resultant priorities within them reflect a mixture of concerns, driven 
by the requirements of various agencies‟ performance management 
arrangements. This would include, amongst others, the civil service‟s Public 
Service Agreements (PSAs), local government‟s local and National 
Indicators, and police force Analysis of Policing and Community Safety 
(APACS) indicators. LAAs are therefore a big compromise, involving in some 
instances trade-offs between partners‟ priorities and measures. Except where 
certain priorities are highly uncontroversial, this can lead to friction over 
which prevails.  
 
Certain findings of this doctoral research illustrate some of the issues facing 
effective partnership working which any OSC would have to be aware of. For 
example, findings confirmed that entrenched ways of working can pose a 
threat to effective partnership working, especially where people within 
organisations delineate both inter- and intra- agency responsibilities very 
uniformly. An example of this encountered during the doctoral research was 
a council middle manager who stated that community safety „was the 
responsibility of the police‟, when referring to his non-attendance at meetings 
of the local Community Safety Partnership (CSP). This is short-sighted when 
it is considered that community development, CCTV, street lighting, anti -
social behaviour teams, housing services, etc. are provided by councils or 
their agents; all of which play a large role in securing community safety. Non-
attendance, or delegated attendance, at partnership meetings is just one 
symptom of organisational „silo‟ mentality. At a higher level this might include 
passive attendance or complete withdrawal. It could also include 
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intransigence over the pursuit of particular shared goals, unwillingness to 
pool budgets or share resources, or an intolerance of the needs of other 
organisations when altering service provision. Such partnership working  
issues are important considerations for OSCs wishing to enact partnership 
scrutiny powers. They must have effective strategies in place in order to see 
the full picture, including the many barriers to effective partnership working 
described. 
 
At operational level the doctoral research noted examples of both good and 
bad practice in the CSP concerned. Several of the partnership actions that 
had been agreed at the strategic level were not being passed down to 
subordinate officers by the (frequently non-attending) involved council middle 
managers. This meant that, essentially, the overarching strategic level 
partnership was wasting time in attempting to involve the council in 
deliberations. To complicate matters further, the strategic level partnership 
set the direction of an operational partnership, meaning that the potential for 
break downs in communication was even greater. However, despite this, 
what was observed generally in the operational level partnership (the Tasking 
and Coordinating Group) appeared to be effective partnership working of the 
variety that delivers actual change on the ground, with partners at the correct 
level in their respective organisations to be able to deploy and directly 
influence frontline staff. The importance of this was that they could ensure 
that the principles of partnership working were translated into actions in the 
teams they controlled. An example was the partnership working around a 
„bottle watch‟ scheme, which marked bottles of alcoholic drinks in off-licenses 
with tags unique to each premises. This enabled agencies to trace discarded 
bottles collected in areas where young people congregated, giving an idea of 
which off-licensed premises were supplying them.  
 
The operational level Tasking and Coordinating Group was able, via its 
membership, to ensure that counci l street wardens were recording the 
tagging details on each bottle they found. This information was then shared 
with the group and passed on to the local neighbourhood policing team.  The 
group also had access to useful, restricted access, police intelligence which 
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was used to inform Tactical Assessment documentation. This gave partners 
access to the latest data, including the names of individuals. This in turn 
allowed interventions to be made by the appropriate partner body, whether it 
was an early intervention, enforcement action or ongoing support.   
 
2.7 Councillors  
The shift towards the „enabling‟ authority had a large impact on the elected 
member role. Pratchett and Wilson summarise the essentials of this: „the role 
of councillors has been affected by the increased use of single purpose non-
elected bodies operating locally. The dominant role of local authorities in 
direct service provision has been challenged and elected government is now 
only part of a complex mosaic of local governance‟ (1996, p. 14; Bound et al., 
2005).  
 
The previous section covered briefly the role and development of 
partnerships, which have recently been the cornerstone of local governance 
arrangements. The impact of „local governance‟ and partnerships on the role 
of elected members has yet to be fully established, as each local authority 
area is different. Where one local authority area has allowed the 
development of it to impinge on the role of elected members, others have 
placed members in a steering position. The reality is that a number of 
agencies are exhorted to an ever-increasing extent to work more closely 
together; the recession and developments such as Total Place are added 
imperatives (DCLG & Treasury, 2010). This drive does not emanate only 
from central government, as increasing numbers of local public sector bodies 
are aiming to realise the savings to be had by sharing services and working 
jointly. Therefore partnership working will, undoubtedly, characterise the 
future of local service provision, with alterations to the elected member role 
increasingly likely as a corollary. 
 
A main concern for the elected member role is that potentially only one (in 
unitary areas) of the major strategic partners is directly accountable to them. 
Most agencies are accountable to separate boards, and/or directly to central 
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government. Indeed, some agencies will be actively inimical to elements of 
local political involvement, especially where it is likely to lead to operational 
interference. The most recent and high profile example of this involves the 
police service, where a perceived politicisation of the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, ultimately leading to his resignation, provoked a robust 
response from senior police figures (Dodd, 2009). Despite this, there is an 
expectation that in the context of Total Place, local authorities will lead „with 
their unique local democratic mandate‟ (DCLG & Treasury, 2010, p. 5). In 
theory this is relatively uncontroversial, but complicating matters are the 
aforementioned convoluted lines of accountability and generally low turnouts 
in local elections, which in turn lead to issues with the democratic mandate 
proclaimed by councillors. Later in the thesis an idea of „competing 
legitimacies‟ is explored (see p. 216), which may prove an even greater 
challenge to the abilities of councillors to effect change.  
 
The changing elected member role: the historical context 
The move towards the enabling local authority and the emphasis on 
partnership is only the latest step in a gradual reframing of the elected 
member role which has taken place over thirty years. This began with the 
privatisation of many state functions, the setting up of single purpose service 
delivery agencies and the competitive tendering of the remnants of much 
remaining state provision. This was underpinned by a Thatcherite ideology 
only slightly amended by John Major, whereby „state employees are poorly 
motivated, unless they are on performance-related pay ... their activities need 
to be measured and controlled ... managers should be given the right to 
manage ... only if the function could not be privatized ... the private sector [is] 
inherently better than the public‟ (Flynn, 2007, p. 28).  
 
When put into practice, this set of principles shrank the overall power of 
elected members alongside overall levels of direct state provision. In 
government, the Labour Party erred away from the view that privatised 
services are necessarily superior. In practical terms this meant a move away 
from compulsory competitive tendering, but the stringent performance 
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management regime implemented by the party (only lightened late in the final 
Labour governmental term) suggests that views of public managers and their 
abilities have not altered much since the previous Conservative 
administrations. There has, therefore, been no subsequent resurgence of any 
significance in the competencies of councillors, in relation to direct service 
provision since 1997. However, the then central government tended towards 
a positive view, suggesting new and potentially wide ranging roles such as 
„community leadership‟ (DETR, 1998b; LGIU, 1999). Others, in turn, took a  
more negative view, stating that broader global developments such as 
managerialism sidelined politicians in general, whilst privileging experts 
(Hughes, 2003). It can be said that other pressures on the role of elected 
politicians are not restricted to the local level, but represent a broader 
challenge for democratic government at all levels, including globally (Strange, 
1996) and continentally (Dinan, 1999). This could ultimately have broader 
implications for electoral legitimacy and understandings of democracy itself.  
 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has set the context for the study by summarising the main 
trends in local governance, with particular focus on the role of the local 
authority. The role of the council in modern governance has been 
established, although it is an ever-changing picture, heavily subjected to 
central government direction. Given the increasing emphasis on partnership 
working, which has accelerated due to recessionary pressures and other 
agendas, the important role for external OS is clear to see. Members, 
through OS, can provide important „bottom up‟ accountability to partnerships 
which were often notable for their democratic deficits. The success or 
otherwise of this is in large part dependent upon a range of factors, not least 
OS itself being able to demonstrate the value it can bring. This is a significant 
challenge, as organisations other than local government are unused to 
elected member challenge. Members themselves must be willing and able to 
extend their focus beyond the local authority, and adequate support must be 
in place to allow them to do so.  
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3. Overview and scrutiny  
 
This chapter builds overview and scrutiny (OS) into the picture of local 
government developed in the previous chapter. Using the literature on the 
subject as a guide, it highlights the main issues and trends in OS to-date. 
This in turn allows the research project to be grounded in the body of 
knowledge on the topic currently in existence; it allows the research already 
undertaken to inform the project so that the work is not done in isolation; 
finally, it demonstrates that the project is making an original contribution to 
knowledge on the subject.  
 
3.1 Overview and scrutiny: the background 
Fundamental change has occurred in local government political management 
since the Local Government Act 2000. The change involves the move from 
the committee system to an executive and OS arrangement, which has split 
councillors into respective executive and non-executive roles. However, to 
limit change in such a way to structural and functional arrangements is facile; 
the change qualifies as „near revolutionary‟ (Wilson & Game, 2006, p. 111). 
What had been brought about was a near-complete revision of the role of the 
councillor.  
 
The councillor of old, immersed in a system in which „[t]he dominance of 
party politics and group discipline meant that in many authorities decisions 
were taken in private group meetings and enforced by the whips at 
committees‟ (Stewart, 2003, p. 58) was replaced. In its place was the 
scrutineer, a new breed incorporating new roles, described by Snape and 
Dobbs (2003) as the lobbyist, the policy analyst and the challenger.  
 
The rationale for the change was provided by a broader democratic renewal 
agenda, which viewed local government as essentially opaque and staid in 
its political management (DETR, 1998a). A changing society was seen to 
have a greater desire for oversight of its elected representatives, alongside a 
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more demanding attitude which required choice and personalisation of 
services (DETR, 1999). Low turnouts in local elections were attributed, in 
part, to this lack of transparency. New arrangements were intended to 
address this by creating a clear point of contact for local concerns in the form 
of an easily definable executive.  
 
However, the new arrangements were  not always welcomed, as the work of 
Michael Cole (2002) at Devon county council has shown. Research by Cole 
revealed that councillors were „at least sceptical‟ (2002, p. 44) about them. 
This was related to party poli tical matters and feelings of frustration at the 
removal of the decision making role. One key complaint related to the 
composition of the authority in question; the dominance of the Liberal 
Democrat ruling group limited the capacity of OS to constrain the executive. 
Many councillors argued that the removal from decision-making had reduced 
their capacity to represent their electoral divisions; with this they felt 
resentment at their loss of competency given the interest of many in policy 
matters (Cole, 2002, p. 44). With broader implications for the envisaged 
community leadership role (DETR, 1998b) was the finding that counci llors felt 
no greater levels of community involvement under the new structures, as 
most members already spent significant time in this capacity.  
 
Such complaints would not have been unusual as the new arrangements 
were being introduced. In some authorities cultures would have gradually 
began to change, especially as „wins‟ for OS accrued. Other authorities‟ OS 
functions would have languished, many due to lack of resourcing and an 
unwillingness to scrutinise for party political reasons. Smaller authorities with 
fewer than 85,000 residents were able to adopt the fourth option of a 
„streamlined committee system‟; nevertheless, these authorities were still 
obliged to constitute at least one OSC. This alternative arrangement led to an 
interesting case study of how a long standing system of decision making was 
made to co-exist with a new and externally enforced form of internal 
accountability. This is the subject of the following sub-chapter.  
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3.2 Overview and scrutiny in alternative arrangements 
Overview and scrutiny was the way in which the new executives were to be 
balanced. Whereas before executive power had resided in full council and in 
delegated form in the policy committees, it was now concentrated in the 
hands of an individual or in the hands of portfolio holders and cabinets. An 
exception to this arose from a last minute concession won from the 
government in the Lords during the passage of the LGA (2000). For 
authorities with fewer than 85,000 residents a fourth option, dubbed the 
„streamlined committee system‟, was made available. This allowed the 
continuation of the committee system with the addition of OS arrangements.  
 
The researcher managed the overview and scrutiny function in a fourth 
option authority and has therefore been fortunate to be able to observe at 
first hand the nuances of the system. Differences are not as great as some 
may believe. The most fundamental difference is in the way in which 
executive power is dispersed throughout the policy committees of the fourth 
option authority. This is in contrast to the concentration of executive power 
found in the other new political management arrangements. Ultimately 
executive power is vested in full council which then delegates power down to 
the policy committees. Because there is no executive per se, the role of 
scrutiny was often placed by members alongside the party-based scrutiny of 
policy which takes place during policy committee deliberations . Distinction 
often had to be made between scrutiny of this variety and the qualitatively 
different, non-party political overview and scrutiny. Often OS activity was 
viewed as a supplement to the scrutiny which took place in the policy 
committees. This is not to say that overview and scrutiny was not highly 
valued. It was, however, seen as an extra layer of scrutiny which could pick 
up on issues and examine them in depth in a non-partisan environment.  
 
A principal difference that was observed was the fact that very little 
„monitoring‟ activity took place, of the variety that fills agendas in larger 
authorities. This type of activity would include receiving officer reports on 
particularly important topics such as the progress of large infrastructure 
 45 
 
projects or actions taken to tackle a specific „wicked issue‟. This could easily 
be attributed to the fact that such work is undertaken in the party political 
environment of policy committees, with cross-party member oversight of each 
and every officer report. In this regard, the monitoring and executive 
functions are not separated out as they are in OS systems (although 
obviously there is still a monitoring role retained by the executive). In 
practical terms, this meant that members of the two OSCs felt able to fo rego 
monitoring activity (except for certain high level items) in favour of scrutiny 
reviews, which filled the OSCs‟ work programme. The doctoral research has 
shown that many stakeholders are of the view that scrutiny reviews are the 
most valuable OS output. The coalition government has since indicated a 
desire to allow councils to choose their own political management 
arrangements, which may result in many returning to the committee system 
of decision making. Therefore, a discussion as to how a council with a newly 
established committee system could retain this, the best of OS, is included in 
the conclusion chapter. 
 
3.3 The day to day operation of overview and scrutiny 
It can be hard for the individual not involved in OS to envisage the internal 
workings of an OS function, especially in terms of the day-to-day activities 
and resourcing of OS support. The following sub-chapter explains the 
operational fundamentals of OS. This is done in the knowledge that while 
varied OS arrangements exist in local government, the basic principles of OS 
support are, essentially, universal.  
 
The OS review / service improvement process 
It is useful to split the OS review process into three segments, consisting of 
generally three different stages. These stages can be roughly characterised 
as a beginning, middle and an end. Or, in less abstract terms, the scoping 
stage, the evidence gathering and recommendation stage, and the tracking 
of recommendations. Before the scoping stage of a review comes the 
selection of an appropriate topic which will usually be included in the OSC 
work programme, mainly formulated at the start of the municipal year. The 
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work programme is an iterative document, and sufficient flexibility must be 
built in to allow for emergent issues as the year progresses. It is especially 
important with the advent of the Councillor Call for Action (CCfA) that this 
flexibility is present, given that a CCfA can arise at any time and the OSC 
concerned will be obliged to consider it in formal session.  
 
Work programmes are usually developed initially through identification of 
cabinet member and senior officer priorities and issues with specific services. 
Central government policy can influence whole OSC work programmes, an 
excellent example being the Every Child Matters agenda which has 
influenced both district and county council OSC work programmes 
encountered by the researcher.  The requirements of the external OS role 
also mean that where the resources are available to do so, external 
stakeholder opinions are sought on the content of the work programme. 
 
There are issues in consulting external stakeholders, not least the vitally 
important need to manage expectations. This would mainly involve outlining 
the fact that OSCs do not exercise executive power, but instead shape policy 
and procedures through evidence-based deliberation and the exercise of 
publically mandated influence. Usually predetermined topics on the work 
programme will comprise the scrutiny reviews, although on occasion a topic 
will arise which will warrant urgent review. In the case of any topic, before 
work commences it is thoroughly scoped. 
 
The scoping stage of a scrutiny review will usually consist of decisions 
regarding some or all of the following: 
 
 Rationale 
 Witnesses 
 External involvement 
 Methodology 
 Site visits 
 Officer support 
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 Indicators of success 
 Outcomes 
 
The scoping stage delineates the topic and should prevent „drift‟ during the 
course of the review. At this stage potential witnesses are identified who may 
be able to provide useful evidence to inform the process of building 
recommendations. The importance of identifying the correct witnesses for a 
review is obvious when one considers the key factor underpinning scrutiny‟s 
effectiveness: a strong evidence base. An often heard criticism of OS 
(usually from members) is that it is „toothless‟, but the best response to this is 
to highlight that scrutiny is what one makes of it, and good scrutiny is tied 
inherently to a strong evidence base. A broad and comprehensive evidence 
base mitigates a lack of executive control by allowing non-executive 
members to effectively compel action from the executive, purely on the basis 
of solidly evidenced recommendations. If a strong enough case can be built 
by taking evidence from a variety of stakeholders, the effective ness of 
scrutiny in policy development becomes clear. The primary argument of this 
thesis is that OS can be a site of external stakeholder participation and 
democratic renewal, leading on a practical level to stronger evidence bases 
upon which recommendations for service improvement can be built.  
 
Following the scoping stage, meetings will take place, facilitated by officers, 
where evidence and information will be presented. Meetings can be held 
anywhere appropriate and it is recognised as good practice that OSCs get 
out and about, into the community they represent. The role of the officer in 
the meeting varies and generally hinges on the competency of the members 
involved. Given that scrutiny should be member led, and assuming that the 
meeting is effectively chaired, officers generally avoid intervening unless 
invited to do so. Generally, the scrutiny officer is seen as the facilitator of the 
meeting, providing a steer if necessary and providing the background 
research and knowledge to allow members to conduct their deliberations on 
the topic at hand. Members and officers bring two sets of distinct but 
symbiotic qualities to the scrutiny process. Some members that this 
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researcher has encountered suffered frequently from crises of confidence, 
and, when faced with technical data retreated into a „what do I know?‟ 
mentality. It had to be pointed out to such members that here lay the strength 
of the elected member, a strength which qualified them uniquely for the 
scrutiny role on behalf of the general public: the lay perspective. Technical 
information presented to an OSC will usually be simplified to allow an 
informed amateur to comment and query the data. A typical example of this 
is the use of traffic lights or smiley faces to denote the direction of travel of 
performance indicators presented to the OSC. It is also a primary example of 
the value of having public representatives scrutinise the information; if an 
untrained member can assimilate the information, then so too can a member 
of the public.  
 
Knowledge of an area, comprising detail such as geography, demographics, 
diversity and local concerns place members at an advantage over career 
officers, who may live outside of the area and never truly grasp the nature of  
the aforementioned specialist knowledge. Only by continuous exposure to 
the day-to-day case work and complaints that members face, could an officer 
hope to claim a level of local knowledge to match that of the elected member. 
In an era of customer facing, bespoke services, this specialist local 
knowledge is more important than ever, a fact that is often forgotten by both 
members and officers.  
 
Formal meetings of an OSC, or a working group of an OSC, will often be 
complemented by site visits, interviews, focus groups and desk-based 
research. Ideas around the efficacy of the research undertaken are similar to 
those found in academic research; there is a strong emphasis on 
triangulation and the need to balance conflicting views and avoid bias. The 
added dimension of party politics appears, in most cases, to not be present in 
the OS functions observed by the researcher. This is in contrast to the 
findings of earlier research conducted shortly after the establishment of OS in 
a particular authority, which found that party political considerations were 
hampering the effective operation of the function (Cole, 2001a). Some of the 
OS functions observed by the researcher have, on various occasions, sent 
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chairs and other interested members on some of the many training courses 
specifically on questioning ski lls. In some cases there was reluctance on 
behalf of certain members to avail themselves of such training, and reports 
from those who had participated were often negative in terms of the extent to 
which the training was applicable in their authority, or was practical as 
opposed to merely theoretical. Questioning in OS review mee tings observed 
was in some instances unfocussed and often parochial. Members have, 
however, been observed injecting reality into the technical world of officers. 
The main example in this case was an officer who was reporting on the 
authority‟s progress in implementing child safeguarding measures and 
referred to the need to meet Ofsted targets. A member of the OSC was very 
quick to point out that the focus should instead be on the needs of the child, 
rather than the requirements of Ofsted.   
 
After a period of evidence gathering which will have employed various 
research methods depending upon the size, scope and duration of the 
project, a report will be produced and submitted to the council‟s executive. 
The report will contain recommendations for service improvement. Where 
recommendations impact on the work of partner agencies, a response will be 
sent to the governing body in question, which will hopefully issue a timely 
response stating whether or not the recommendations have been accepted. 
In the case of the council‟s executive, a report will be issued detailing which 
(if any) of the recommendations have been accepted for implementation. The 
report will usually contain timescales for implementation, and the OSC in 
question will then take an ongoing interest i n how the recommendations are 
progressed. An important point is that once the recommendations have been 
accepted by the executive, they are then owned by it. Despite this fact, in 
general, OSCs will take an active interest in the implementation of 
recommendations arising from their work. OSCs are also ideally placed to 
hold the officer and, often less frequently, cabinet member charged with their 
implementation to account for any progress or otherwise made.   
 
As mentioned, members and internal stakeholders spoken to typically feel 
that OS reviews are the biggest contribution that OS makes in terms of 
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adding value. It is much easier in an agency such as a council to view 
victories in terms of measurable outcomes. Unfortunately, many good 
outcomes cannot be directly linked to OS recommendations. Their specific 
impact is all too easily lost amongst the efforts of others, who may be only 
too willing to accept the credit. Executive members and relevant officers can 
easily claim that „it was going to happen anyway‟, which consequently 
removes a lot of the credit for service improvement from OS. This can often 
mean that making the case for OS can be hard, and any discussion of 
outcomes arising from OS intervention is contentious. The other aspect of 
OS work is the monitoring role, which is, occasionally, even harder to justify 
in terms of value added, simply because the role is concerned with 
accountability, an abstract concept which is impossible to quantify for the 
purposes of business cases or performance indicators. It remains of high 
importance, but in discussions with senior internal stakeholders, it was often 
this aspect of OS work which was hardest to sell.   
 
The monitoring role 
The principal concerns expressed by the aforementioned senior internal 
stakeholders centred on the need for continual reports to OS on seemingly 
perennial issues. It was often the case that such requests from OSCs were 
perceived as reflecting particular member „hobby horse‟ issues which were 
not when taken in isolation of any value. This wasted officer time when often 
reports took several weeks to prepare.   
 
Despite these concerns, the reality is that the monitoring role is of vital 
importance, especially in terms of holding key figures to account for their 
actions. It assists in making local decision-making more transparent and 
allows members to unlock information which would otherwise be 
unforthcoming. In the vast majority of cases there is nobody else questioning 
the decision-maker or their data, so if OSCs were not acting in that capacity 
then in all likelihood nobody else would. The monitoring work of an OSC is in 
that regard a vital democratic function but, as mentioned, it is one that is hard 
to defend in terms of easily identifiable outcomes. Positive outcomes exist, 
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but they are abstract and in many ways offer a kind of assurance rather than 
effect change (e.g. has due process been followed? Has value for money 
been achieved? Is service performance high enough?). Such monitoring 
activity may prompt a more in-depth review, which is when the „value work‟ 
(as it is perceived) takes place.  
 
In the larger authorities OSCs are swamped with potential items of business 
and the scrutiny officer has a key role in conjunction with the OSC chair in 
topic selection. Typically the OSC will decide in open session that it requires 
a report on a particular issue and a request will be made by the scrutiny 
officer to the appropriate report author, which will invariably be a relatively 
senior officer. The report is received, hopefully, in time for analysis before the 
OSC formally meets to discuss it, but often the report is delivered „just in 
time‟ with little available opportunity for preview.  
 
The OSC meets and the report author and / or appropriate other will present 
to the OSC on the subject. Following the report the OSC will question the 
author and may decide that a follow-up report is appropriate. It has been 
observed that some senior officers can obfuscate in reports both discreetly 
and adeptly, meaning that it is often very difficult to reproach or question their 
performance. In one authority observed, where cabinet members attend on 
issues relating to their portfolio they will form a double act with „their‟ officer, 
usually with the officer providing the technical knowledge of primary interest 
to the OSC. The cabinet member in the case of this authority is, however, the 
primary focus of the OSC, as the OS function of the authority has particularly 
emphasised their role of holding the executive to account. The OSC 
concerned therefore directs questions to the portfolio holder, who can provide 
a description of his or her group‟s policy on the issue, but will invariably defer 
to the officer on operational, financial or statutory matters. Much of the OSC 
questioning and business across the councils researched is officer focussed, 
which is not necessarily a problem, but prompts the question of what the 
cabinet member role is in relation to his or her portfolio, especially when 
technical questions are usually fielded by senior officers within the relevant 
portfolio of services. An interesting and positive effect of insisting that cabinet 
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members themselves give account is that it strongly compels them to 
increase their own knowledge and aptitude or else face potential humiliation 
in the public setting of the OSC meeting. This can only be beneficial to local 
democracy.   
 
To illustrate the varied ways in which OS is practised, two examples from the 
case studies have been included focussing specifically on the operational 
aspects of OS. 
 
Example 1: County council 
 
The council operates four scrutiny committees, three of which are aligned to 
internal departmental structures; the fourth is the statutory health scrutiny 
committee. A fifth joint scrutiny committee exists to hold the LAA partnership 
to account, and consists of both district and county council members. 
chairmanship of the four internal committees is shared between the ruling 
group and the main opposition group, with two chairs allocated to each group 
and rotated at the midpoint and end of each council session (4 years).  
 
Scrutiny officers are the key figures supporting the work of the OSCs, with a 
scrutiny officer assigned to each committee to facilitate its activities and to 
provide advice. The scrutiny officer works with a dedicated democratic 
services officer that provides administrative support (the production of 
minutes and agendas, the latter in conjunction with the scrutiny officers) and 
constitutional / procedural advice.  An extremely valuable extra resource is a 
dedicated scrutiny liaison officer, a fairly senior manager (approximately 
fourth-tier) within the directorate under scrutiny, charged with being the key 
point of contact and advice on the services concerned. This individual is the 
„sounding board‟ in many respects for the scrutiny officer, and can point the 
committee in the right direction within the large county council directorates.  
 
The relationship between the scrutiny officers and the chairs of the OSCs is 
close and synergistic. There is great emphasis placed on the member-lead, 
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which characterises effective scrutiny, and scrutiny officers are keen to play a 
facilitative rather than lead role. Despite this, the expertise and knowledge of 
the scrutiny officer often means that they enjoy a powerful role in relation to 
the committee; this is always in conjunction with the chair, who ultimately 
arbitrates committee business.  
 
The size and complexity of the county council departments means that the 
scrutiny officer develops an expertise that he or she would not normally 
develop in the smaller district councils. District council scrutiny officers tend 
to develop broad ranging knowledge on a more diverse range of topics, 
especially where OSCs remits are thematic and crosscutting. In the case of 
the county council, scrutiny officers become experts on the particular 
services they are scrutinising, especially where, as in the case of this county 
council, OSCs are aligned to the large departments of the authority (e.g. 
Children and Young People‟s Services). The same is true for committees of 
members, which over the life span of a council will accrue considerable 
knowledge and expertise on the services and issues in question.  
 
Particular emphasis is placed on the attendance of cabinet portfolio holders 
at OSC meetings. OS members themselves have been especially vocal in 
this, seeing it as the duty of the cabinet members to be well informed enough 
to discuss the services they preside over and to be held to account by no n-
executive members through the OS process. Cabinet member attendance is 
normally requested for specific items, although there is a debate amongst 
those involved in scrutiny at the authority as to whether executive members 
should attend every meeting by default. In many cases cabinet members 
attend scrutiny meetings voluntarily, regardless of whether any formal invite 
is issued.  
 
There is separation between the development of policy from the outset (pre-
implementation policy development) and the development of policy through 
scrutiny recommendations. In the case of the former, specific groups 
(separate from scrutiny) operate in a policy development capacity under the 
chairmanship of the relevant cabinet portfolio holder. Senior officers take 
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reports and nascent policy along to the groups and present alongside the 
relevant portfolio holder on the policy. This kind of policy development often 
takes place within OSCs, although many authorities‟ OS functions do not 
develop policy in this manner at all, instead engaging in policy development 
„after the event‟ through the recommendations produced by scrutiny reviews. 
It could be argued that the best OS functions engage in both pre- and post- 
implementation policy development, assuming that policies presented to the 
OSCs are strategic, appropriate and worthy of committee time and 
resources. Moves towards this system are, at the time of writing, under 
discussion at the authority.  
 
A corollary of departmentally aligned OSCs is an inward focus. At the 
authority this is reflected in the relatively low levels of general public 
involvement in the scrutiny process (the exception being the work of the 
Health and Adult Social Care committee), other than the involvement of 
statutory co-optees on the Children and Young People‟s Services Scrutiny 
committee.  Interestingly, a scrutiny officer speculated that the county council 
is more distant from the public than the district councils, leading to 
commensurately lower levels of public engagement.  It should be noted that 
often, broader external stakeholder involvement takes place in the context of 
scrutiny reviews; this is true at the council, where review groups 
commissioned by the respective OSCs speak to external stakeholders in the 
development of evidence bases.  
 
A contrast here can be drawn between the way in which district and county 
council OS functions operate. In district councils observed by the researcher, 
the bulk of OS activity involves reviewing specific topics. The OS work 
programme tends to consist of scrutiny review topics and there is little 
monitoring activity takes place aside from occasional forays into performance 
management or budget scrutiny of some form. County and unitary council OS 
functions include a far greater array of activities and many err towards a 
commissioning model of OS, whereby the „parent‟ OSC constitutes 
subgroups comprising OSC members, co-optees, external stakeholders, etc. 
In the case of this council, the scrutiny team occasionally enlist other officers 
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of the authority (usually graduate trainees) to support the review groups. This 
is seen by the scrutiny team as a means to commandeer extra resources, but 
also it is seen as an opportunity for the recruits to work with elected 
members; an opportunity which rarely arises for junior officers under the new 
political management arrangements.  
 
As well as constituting subgroups to examine discrete topics, the OSCs also 
conduct ongoing scrutiny of issues via reports from appropriate senior 
officers / executive members. This involves much larger and iterative work 
programmes, comprising far wider topics and items for committee 
consideration. This difference is most likely due to the size of the 
organisations concerned and the relative complexity of the topics. To 
illustrate this point, the examples given above consist of a district council 
(employing 500 staff in total) „generalist‟ OS function and a county council 
„specialist‟ OS function (aligned to the Children and Young People‟s Services 
Department, itself employing 4000 of a total of 17,000 county council staff).  
 
The council operates a prize-winning budget scrutiny process; when the 
cabinet is developing its budget proposals, individual scrutiny members from 
the respective committees pair with the appropriate directors to discuss the 
issues arising from executive proposals. The use of the same pairings over 
many budget cycles has meant that the members involved have developed 
significant expertise in the services concerned. This allows the paired 
member to act as a well informed champion and resident expert for the 
parent committee on the issues discussed. Later in the budget process, the 
OSCs question „their‟ cabinet portfolio holder/s on the content of the majority 
group budget. To balance what is a party-politically contentious process, the 
opposition group „shadow‟ budget is then scrutinised in a separate session. 
The findings from both proceedings are then reported to council in time to 
inform the budget setting process. As in other leader/cabinet authorities, full 
council agrees the budget and policy framework within which the cabinet 
operates.  
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The non-partisan way in which the process has been conducted has been 
recognised by both OS and cabinet members, and is testimony to the way in 
which members can set aside party political differences in the scrutiny forum. 
It is interesting to note that despite this, scrutiny officers have highlighted 
occurrences of overt party political confrontations in the budget scrutiny 
process. The researcher observed too, that in one meeting examining the 
opposition budget proposals, a leading shadow cabinet member questioned 
whether the same line of enquiry (regarding whether or not the budget 
proposals had been risk assessed) had, or would, have been put to her 
cabinet portfolio holder counterpart. 
 
 
Example 2: District council 
 
When in existence,1 the council operated two OSCs with respective „internal‟ 
and „external‟ remits.  The model of political management employed by the 
council was the „streamlined committee system‟, or „fourth option‟; an 
arrangement with potential implications for OS. Members of the authority 
were defensive of the streamlined committee system, maintaining that it 
offered greater scrutiny than any of the executive political management 
arrangements utilised elsewhere. The policy committees, which were aligned 
to the council directorates, offered party political scrutiny which 
complemented the non-party political OS.  
 
The two OSCs were supported by a single scrutiny manager operating in 
isolation. The support provided by the scrutiny manager included 
administrative duties such as minute-taking, with minimal support from 
democratic services. Only around the time of the authority‟s final Corporate 
Assessment was scrutiny support increased following the submission of a 
successful revenue growth bid by the scrutiny manager, which secured a 
scrutiny officer. Given the resource constraints described, the work 
undertaken was limited and primarily comprised scrutiny reviews involving 
                                                 
1
 The authority was abolished in the 2008/9 round of Local Government Reorganisation 
(LGR).  
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the entire committee (rather than commission smaller review groups). The 
relatively small committees (seven and eight members, respectively) allowed 
the entire membership to be involved when topics were reviewed. The main 
method employed for the gathering of evidence for reviews was the semi-
structured interview, using a parliamentary select committee-style approach. 
This involved pre-ordained questions to the witness/s attending the 
committee; the chairs consistently stated before each interview that 
questions gave rise to questions, which was intended to prime the witness for 
the broader-based questioning which occasionally arose from the pre-
ordained questions. Scrutiny support was heavily involved in producing 
questions for the committees, which were then invariably ratified without 
question in pre-meetings. Members then proceeded to recite the questions 
verbatim, with occasional deviations where the need arose. This approach 
meant, inevitably, that OS in the council was heavily officer-led, with a great, 
bordering on excessive amount of power exercised over and on behalf of the 
committee by the scrutiny manager.  
 
Other activity undertaken by the OSCs included „Performance Clinics‟, which 
allowed members to dissect the performance of each directorate using 
performance indicators, budget exception reports and excerpts from service 
plans and departmental risk registers. The process engaged certain 
members who were either ambivalent or cynical about the OS process, as 
they felt better able to hold the key decision makers (in this case the senior 
officers) to account. Comments from senior managers suggested that they 
too found the process beneficial.  
 
The small size of the OS function meant that there was certain flexibility in 
the way in which work could be undertaken; there was less formality, 
decisions were consensual and everyone got the chance to speak. These 
benefits were mainly as a result of the smaller and, therefore, less formal 
committees. Larger authorities can replicate this (as many do) by 
commissioning smaller working groups when reviewing topics in-depth.  
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Key themes in overview and scrutiny research 
Numerous works have emerged on the prospects and barriers facing OS 
since its foundation. Ashworth and Snape highlighted the „quite staggering‟ 
(2004, p. 539) efforts expended by bodies such as the Improvement and 
Development Agency (IDeA) and the then newly created Centre for Public 
Scrutiny (CfPS) in attempts to develop OS. They went on to highlight the four 
key roles of scrutiny: holding cabinet to account, best value reviews and 
general performance management, policy development and review, and 
external scrutiny. Importantly, Ashworth and Snape found that scrutiny was 
struggling to fulfil its role in several key areas, such as operating as an 
effective check on local decision-making. Whilst the public had not been 
engaged to any great extent evidence was emerging that in cross-cutting 
issues some engagement had occurred. More positively however, scrutiny 
was making a difference through in-depth policy review. 
 
Michael Cole‟s (2001a) study of Devon county council focused on members 
and their response to modernisation. Devon county council was chosen for 
its innovative and embracing attitude to modernisation; it‟s open, „scrutiny 
friendly‟ culture; its leader and cabinet model and finally because of the sheer 
size of the area covered and the amount of services offered by the authority. 
After semi-structured open-ended questioning on five main areas: the 
implementation of the reforms; the decision-making process; the availability 
of information about the council; the impact and operation of the scrutiny 
committees; and the proposition that the changes gave members more time 
to represent their electoral division, Cole reported the following. Party 
discipline still hampered scrutiny; access to information had been 
problematic; most non-executive councillors felt excluded by and critical of 
the reforms; there was concern over the combination of policy 
recommendation and executive review, and finally the implication was that 
members felt less able to represent their wards.  
 
Subsequent work by Cole (2001b) found that members missed the flow of 
information which was a regular part of the old committee system. Under the 
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new system, the „need to know‟ criterion which had usually applied to internal 
documents and information no longer applied to them, as they ceased to 
enjoy privileged access as decision-makers. Furthermore, Cole expressed 
concern over a potential conflict in loyalty between party group and scrutiny, 
and how no differentiation has been made in the roles of councillors 
operating at various different tiers in an area. He also stated that executive 
control of the budget makes securing extra provision for OS a chore, 
especially when competing against front-line services for funding.  
 
On that basis Cole made the following points. Central government should aim 
to strengthen the scrutiny role, possibly by ring-fencing funds and separating 
the review and policy development roles. Party discipline needs to be 
weakened and access to information strengthened. Cole states that in the 
White Paper Modern local government: in touch with the people (DETR, 
1998a) the government erroneously assumed that councillors were unhappy 
with the frequency of meetings and the lack of contact with their constituents, 
an assumption contradicted by academic research (Cole, 2001b). 
Additionally, the White Paper offered no justification for the belief that the 
new structures would enhance community interest in the work of the council. 
Finally, Cole identified councillor conservatism as possibly the most 
significant barrier to the effective operation of the new arrangements. 
councillors wanted a decision-making role and did not think that greater time 
spent with the people of their ward was necessary; meanwhile executive 
councillors were unlikely to relax party discipline and may utilise the new 
arrangements to strengthen their control over policy making.  
 
Difficulties encountered in the delicate balance between party discipline and 
the needs of scrutiny are investigated by Steve Leach and Colin Copus 
(2004). Four models of party group behaviour are identified: partner, 
arbitrator, filter and leviathan. Leach and Copus go on to describe what 
constitutes effective scrutiny, namely „added value‟, arrived at either in a 
substantive sense (e.g. better decisions) and in a democratic process sense 
(e.g. better informed debates).  They describe the party group system as „the 
antithesis of the overview and scrutiny process, predicated as it is on 
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openness, transparency, inclusivity and cross-party deliberation‟ (Ibid., p. 
338).  
 
The following table summarises the basic features of Leach and Copus‟ 
model of party group behaviour (Ibid., p. 340-342): 
 
Table 2: Models of party group behaviour 
 
 
Model 
 
Characteristics 
Partner 
Almost complete relaxation of group 
discipline. Deliberative, not a 
decision-making body. Councillors 
speak and vote without deference to 
the party group. 
Arbitrator 
Group tries to make scrutiny work. 
Applies whip sparingly and not at all 
to the results of scrutiny reviews. 
Scrutiny seen as means of holding 
executive to account. 
Filter 
Applies whip to most business. Filters 
information as it places itself between 
executive, OS and full council. Does 
not whip in scrutiny but self-imposed 
whip may be prevalent. 
Leviathan 
Real scrutiny takes place in group 
meeting as scrutiny function is 
whipped. Party group as deliberative 
and decision-making body 
demanding absolutely loyalty and 
obedience in public. 
 
Leach and Copus found that the party groups researched were gathered 
around the filter and Leviathan models, which „sit closest to current practices 
and represent minimal, or no change, in the conduct of council politics ‟. 
However, they went on to argue that to ensure executive accountability and 
the effectiveness of the OS role, party groups should be emulating the 
partner and arbitrator models (Ibid., p. 352). 
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter has explored the day-to-day workings of the typical OS function, 
with a particular focus on practicalities. The following chapter will explore the 
concept of representation, the political system built upon it and some of the 
problems facing the two, specifically to illustrate the democratic context in 
which OS is operating.  
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4. Theories of representation and 
participation 
 
 
4.1  Representation 
 
There is a unique legitimacy conferred by democratic election, but it has 
to be realised by the way that leadership is shared and provided 
(ODPM, 2005, p. 19). 
 
This chapter aims to elaborate some of the theore tical perspectives on the 
current state of liberal, representative, democracy. On that basis both the 
challenges facing and the prospects for democratic renewal and external 
stakeholder engagement through OS can be appraised. Certain perspectives 
would see the government‟s goal of democratic renewal and enhanced 
participation as compromised by aspects of liberal democracy, including the 
emphasis on the individual and the market, and the fundamental nature of 
the current representative system.  
 
The vision of local democracy described by the government builds on the 
representative model by advancing citizen empowerment: „Effective 
representation involves acting both as advocates and as leaders for wards 
and neighbourhoods‟ (Ibid., p. 18). The community leadership role implies 
politically active localities, in which people recognise their „leader‟, even if this 
is undeveloped. It can be argued that this is entirely in keeping with the ethos 
developed in the shift toward the „enabling‟ authority. Empowered 
communities fit the picture of less paternalistic public services in their 
willingness to probe and question. This image is far from the traditional 
conception of British-type democracy which is, to borrow the terminology of 
Robert Dahl, a polyarchy. This system incorporates public contestation and 
limited participation but is removed from an „ideal-type‟ democracy, „one of 
the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost 
completely responsive to all its citizens‟ (1971, p. 2).  
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Democratic malaise 
Local government has been criticised for the woefully low turnouts at many 
council elections, which have in part prompted central government calls for 
democratic renewal (Meadowcroft, 2001, p. 38). Democratic malaise has 
been seen as endemic throughout the formal political system, from local to 
supranational levels, with many joining in the critique of liberal democracy 
within the context of lowering electoral turnout, elite dominance, globalisation, 
and seemingly increased public apathy towards formal politics.  
 
Apathy is a particular issue for all institutions that rely upon electorally 
mandated legitimacy, such as council political management arrangements. 
The effect that this has on OS is quite significant, as the doctoral research 
has shown that a compromised electoral legitimacy places members at a 
disadvantage when making policy recommendations that challenge 
professional or expert orthodoxy on a given matter (see p. 216).  
 
Commentators on the state of representative democracy and its institutions 
have offered critiques (Crouch, 2004) and alternatives to the system (Barber, 
2003; Held, 2006). Bellamy and Raab have specified „[s]everal well-
established, mutually reinforcing phenomena‟ (1999, p. 524) with which the 
perceived democratic malaise of today is commonly associated. These 
include: 
 
 „... the growth of the mass political party as a response [to] the 
creation of the mass electorate, leading to the development of 
oligarchic party machines; 
 the accompanying development of party discipline both in Parliament 
and outside, leading to the control of the elected house by the political 
executive; 
 the development and commercialisation of the media of mass 
communications, leading to the erosion of the public sphere by highly 
managed forms of sound-bite politics; 
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 the increasing complexity of social and economic problems, and the 
growing interdependence between the institutions of civi l society and 
government organisations in developing and implementing policy, 
leading to the transfer of policy-making outwards to the twilight world 
of policy networks; 
 the shift of power and authority upwards to the European Union and 
downward to regions and nations, exacerbating the “hollowing -out” of 
the British state‟ (Ibid., p. 524). 
 
Others have highlighted more specific issues which contribute to democratic 
malaise. Hardin (2003) has claimed that those who bother to cast votes do so 
in the mistaken belief that they will count in terms of outcomes; a belief which 
has resulted from proselytising to that effect. More enlightened people may 
simply abstain from voting and engagement, leading to wider-spread 
disengagement. At a local level it may be even harder to identify outcomes 
arising from an individual vote, due to the less than comprehensive UK local 
government remit (Batley & Stoker, 1991). 
 
Post democracy 
The emergence of a „post democratic‟ system has fostered a negative model 
of citizenship concerned with the „activism of blame and complaint‟ (Crouch, 
2004, p. 13). This is receiving greater emphasis as opposed to a positive 
model of citizenship, grounded in positive conceptions of a citizen‟s rights, 
which would „stress citizens‟ abilities to participate in their polity: the right to 
vote, to form and join organizations, to receive accurate information‟ (Ibid.).  
Negative rights to Crouch „are those which protect the individual against 
others, especially against the state: rights to sue, rights to property‟ (Ibid.).  
 
When the system itself is loaded against „positive‟ participation by citizens, it 
does not actively enable participation through OS processes, which would go 
some way in explaining one of the key findings of the thesis: OS functions 
have failed to involve lay people sustainably and to any great extent (see p. 
208).  Significantly for OS, Crouch does state that single issue groups are 
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growing in importance (Ibid., p. 15). They have mobilised successfully in 
response to provocative issues such as nuclear power at both local (Baggott, 
1998) and international levels (Byrne, 1998).  
 
Whilst this type of group actively engages with formal political institutions to 
further a cause or agenda, another type which has grown considerably over 
the years actively avoids such political engagement (Crouch, 2004, p. 15). 
These groups have developed „to fill the gaps in care left by a retreating 
welfare state‟ (Ibid., p. 16). Where this is the case it adds to the argument for 
a refocusing of OS away from statutory service providers, where others are 
„filling the gaps‟ left by reducing state provision. This is especially relevant in 
the context of recent moves towards a commissioning model of service 
provision and joint commissioning by partnerships.  
 
Liberal individualism: a barrier to participation? 
Barber (2003) has forwarded a vision of participatory politics which he terms 
„strong democracy‟. His work forwards a powerful critique of liberal 
democracy using two perspectives, both of which have negative implications 
for public engagement and participation. The first refers to the „Newtonian 
politics‟ (Ibid., p. 26-45) of liberal democracy which grounds political theory in 
mechanics and material considerations. This disposition can be traced back 
to the „pre-conceptual frame‟ of liberal democracy, its  
 
... most striking feature [being] the physicality of its language and 
imagery. There was a “thingness” about Hobbesian and post-
Hobbesian liberal thought that seems to have been both new and 
extraordinary in the history of political discourse. Mimicking the newly 
revealed physical cosmos of the scientists, political theorists suddenly 
began to depict the human world as inhabited by units, particles, and 
atoms, things with a solidity and externality quite at odds with the 
traditional teleological, psychic, and spiritual understandings of the 
human essence (Ibid., p. 34).  
 
Goodwin has described similarly the favoured theoretical methodology of the  
era: „Liberal thought evolved at a time when the favoured scientific method 
was to decompose objects and substances into their smallest parts and to 
 66 
 
examine how these combined to form the whole, a method which Hobbes 
claimed to adopt in Leviathan‟ (1997, p. 36). This led in part to subsequent 
liberal emphasis on the individual, as „[Hobbes] and other more liberal 
theorists take the individual as the basic unit of society and view the latter as 
no more than an aggregate of individuals‟ (Ibid.). The liberal emphasis on the 
individual described by these analyses can be viewed as problematic for 
enhanced political participation.  
 
Obviously, participation has and does occur frequently throughout modern 
liberal democracy, although the analysis of Barber would place such 
participation in the realm of self-interest and consumerism, a view which 
corresponds with MacPherson‟s (1962) concept of „possessive individualism‟ 
(see Balibar, 2002, especially p. 300). The supplementary benefits of 
participation, one example being the educative effect (Pateman, 1970), are 
not typically considered. Participation within the conventional liberal 
democratic framework, to Barber, can and will only ever be viewed as self-
interested individuals collaborating for personal gain: a means to a purely 
selfish end. This poses a challenge for the OS function attempting to involve 
the public. As OS is focussed on strategic policy review and development, it 
may be hard for members of the general public to discern how involvement in 
OS will result in a direct personal benefit.   
 
Barber‟s attack on liberal democracy is based on the theory‟s assumptions 
about human nature and its supposed antipathy to substantive collaborative 
action. The author argues that the „pre-conceptual frame‟ of liberal 
democracy and it‟s, „genetic reasoning‟ has „endowed it with its stubborn 
intolerance of complexity, ambiguity, experience, and process; and they have 
burdened it with pretensions to objectivity and phi losophical certainty that 
have often proved inimical to practical reason and to participatory political 
activity‟ (2003, p. 29).  
 
The main contribution Barber‟s critique of liberal democracy can make is in 
pointing out that the suppositions of liberalism, especially those which 
would see mankind as essentially uncooperative and apolitical, are bui lt on 
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less than solid foundations. Clearly then there is potential within the 
framework of the representative system  for more citizen participation. 
Barber deconstructs the liberal argument that human nature is inimical to 
deeper participation and shows it to be theoretically questionable, a fact of 
key significance to the democratic renewal agenda. Nevertheless, any 
potential there may be in this regard is limited by confusion and apathy 
amongst the public over what constitutes the political; a fact clearly and 
empirically verified by the annual Audit of Political Engagement conducted 
by the Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society (2007). The audits 
look at sixteen engagement indicators.1 In the 2007 audit 1,490 UK adults 
(18+) were interviewed face-to-face at home. The indicators are grouped 
as follows: 
 
 Knowledge and interest 
o Know own MP's name 
o Passed political knowledge quiz 
o Feel knowledgeable about politics 
o Feel knowledgeable about role of MPs 
o Interested in politics 
 
 Action and participation  
o Have discussed politics 
o Propensity to vote (general election)  
o Presented views to MP/councillor 
o Electoral activist 
o Political activist 
o Political membership/giving 
 
 Efficacy and satisfaction 
o Getting involved works 
o Trust politicians generally 
o Satisfied with Parliament 
o Satisfied with their own MP 
o Think present system of governing works well 
 
The chart below summarises the findings of the four audits to 2007: 
 
 
                                                 
1 
All sixteen indicators were examined in audit 2004 and 2007. The intermediate years only 
looked at the marked () indicators. 
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Chart 1: Public attitudes to engagement over four years  
 
 
 
The findings of the most recent audit show a relative stability in levels of 
engagement which has persisted since the first was conducted. Whilst this is 
still cause for concern, given generally low levels of engagement, it 
nevertheless detracts from the argument of those that speak of wholesale 
democratic decline.  
 
An increase in those with knowledge of politics has occurred and levels of 
perceived personal knowledge have also risen. Whilst many people reported 
discussion of political issues with family and friends, few connected the 
discussions with the political process. They failed to recognise issues such 
as the war in Iraq and asylum as political. Of greater significance is the report 
that at least a quarter of people who have discussed an overtly political issue 
such as the House of Lords fail to equate the discussion with politics, and it is 
speculated that politics as a brand is off-putting to people (The Electoral 
Commission & The Hansard Society, 2007, p. 49). This is viewed with 
concern, the audit arriving at the conclusion that „[t]he most widespread 
obstacle to greater activism, then, is apparently neither hostility to politics or 
a complete dismissal of its value, but a low assessment of its importance by 
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people who perhaps might be more active were it a higher priority for them‟  
(Ibid., p. 51).  
 
Building on similar large scale studies of engagement (Almond & Verba, 
1963; Parry et al., 1992), Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley develop the picture of 
engagement in the UK today by highlighting a trend they refer to as the 
„atomised citizen‟, characterised by „[t]he rise of individualistic forms of 
participation at the expense of collectivist forms‟ (2004, p. 275; also Stoker, 
2006a, p. 185-186). Individualistic forms of participation include voting and 
donating money, whilst other forms include contact participation, such as 
speaking to a representative or writing to the media, and collec tive 
participation at events such as public meetings and demonstrations (Pattie et 
al., 2004, p. 265).  
 
Using the broad definition of participation adopted by the authors, it appears 
in good health. Indeed, over a twelve month period more than 80 percent of 
people participated in some form. The explanation for this broad definition of 
participation is that „a narrow focus, say on electoral participation, will miss 
much of the participation which is actually going on‟ (Ibid.). In this approach 
the authors have adopted the wider conception of politics which sees it, 
rightly, as involved in all aspects of human interaction. They have not limited 
participation to the realm of the formal, representative political framework.  
 
The Engagement Audit (see p. 68) is focussed on a less broad-based 
conception of participation, primarily involving formal political institutions and 
their agents (MPs and political parties), and is consequently less optimistic.  
The findings of the engagement audit may well indicate that the public now 
conflate politics with party politics, the mechanisms and agents of which are 
now widely distrusted (Pattie et al., 2004; Coleman, 2005). This can be 
assumed due to the frequent discussion of current issues, despite the failure 
of many to comprehend the inherently political nature of the topics 
concerned. That such deliberation on political matters takes place is an 
indication that political discourse is not the issue; rather, it may be that the 
public has a commonly held view which limits the idea of politics specifically 
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to party politics. Topics of interest are not seen as political, whist distrusted 
politicians and bureaucrats are. This may contribute to the lack of willingness 
to participate more formally, despite the view of many who state that they 
would like a say in how the country is governed (The Electoral Commission & 
The Hansard Society, 2007). Forms of participation may have to steer away 
from party politics and embrace non-partisan deliberation, at least until trust 
in politicians and the formal political process can be restored.  
 
Non-party political OS could potentially act as a vehicle for broader 
democratic engagement in these circumstances, although the involvement of 
politicians may pose problems. However, in reputational terms, councillors 
have fared better than national politicians in light of the recent expenses 
scandal (LGC, 2009). This could mean that those tempted to get involved in 
local democratic processes may not be as disinclined to do so by recent 
events in Parliament.  
 
This sub-chapter has examined the concept of representation by drawing 
on a combination of theoretical literature and practical research findings. It 
has examined the state of political engagement within the liberal 
democratic system, thus illustrating the challenges facing overview and 
scrutiny in engaging certain external stakeholders.   
 
4.2  Participation  
This chapter focuses primari ly on the literature on public and other external 
stakeholder involvement in political processes and, by linking this to OS, 
draws it into the broader scope of the thesis. It describes the theoretical 
underpinnings of New Labour policy, which saw representative democracy 
augmented by elements of participatory democracy, and develops on the 
content of the previous chapter.  One of the principal contributions to 
knowledge that the research makes is in filling a gap in the literature: 
research findings and theorising on broader, cross-sector, external 
stakeholder involvement in OS processes, none of which are covered in the 
review of the literature that follows given the paucity of relevant material.  
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Democratic participation varies in its extent, means and in its motivation. The 
classic example of the varying extent of participation is Sherry Arnstein‟s 
(1971) typology which places participatory initiatives on an ascending ladder 
of participant competency, ranging from manipulation to citizen control. 
Dibben and Bartlett  split participation broadly into a minimal, „consumerist‟ 
role, focusing on the participant as a consumer of services, and a stronger 
„collectivist‟ strand emphasising a greater role in decision-making (Dibben & 
Bartlett, 2001, p. 45).   
 
In common with Arnstein‟s (1971) work, the Involve report, People and 
Participation describes an increasing degree of public competency in 
participation. These range from inform, where the public is provided with 
objective information on a problem or initiative; consult, in order to gain 
feedback; involve, to allow public aspirations to be duly aired and considered; 
collaborate, partnership working with the public in decision-making and 
ultimately, empower, which places final decision-making competency in the 
hands of the public.  
 
Many have theorised participation in other different terms. Vivien Lowndes 
and colleagues (2001a; also Cole, 2004 for analysis of Devon County 
Council) discussed the means of participation, describing consumerist 
methods, traditional methods, forums, and consultative and deliberative 
innovations. In terms of motivation, Susan A. Banducci et al (2004) have 
examined the effects of minority representation on empowerment and 
participation.  Fisher and Webb (2003) also described participant motivations 
and found that views on libertarian/authoritarian issues, post-materialism and 
Europe, amongst various others, are common catalysts to get involved. 
Leadbeater (2004) has also described as a motivating factor the 
personalisation of politics which can be achieved through participation.   
 
How authorities constitute the „public‟ that they wish to consult is the main 
concern of Barnes et al (2003; see also Gyford, 1991, p. 1-22). Barnes et al 
view „the public‟, „the community‟ and „citizens‟ as social constructs. For 
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example, „citizenship‟ must be viewed as consisting of differences that „inform 
both access to the dialogic process and the legitimacy of different voices 
heard within it‟ (Barnes et al., 2003, p. 380).  
 
The ways of conceptualising participation described above pose questions 
for OS in terms of its capacity to involve external stakeholders; the thesis 
makes an original contribution to knowledge by analysing this issue in much 
greater depth (see p. 169). However, current thinking on OS would suggest 
the following. Firstly, the competency bestowed on participants by OS is, 
ostensibly, limited by its lack of executive power, although, as described later 
in the thesis, this may be largely irrelevant in an era of partnership 
governance characterised by influence rather than executive power. 
Secondly, the means of participation provided by OS are wide-ranging. They 
depend primarily on the culture of the OS function concerned, the 
imagination of those involved and the level of OS support available. Typically 
the means deployed in OS engagement activities are consultative and, 
frequently, deliberative. This is discussed further in the findings section of the 
thesis. Finally, in terms of motivation, OS functions may find that external 
stakeholder opinion varies. What constitutes a motivation to participate to OS 
members and local authority internal stakeholders may not represent a 
similar motivation to external stakeholders.  
 
Co-option 
In the broader local government context participation has taken many forms; 
varying levels of competency have also been bestowed in the process. One 
of the oldest and most commonly used forms of participation is co-option. It is 
widely used in the OS context today, providing a valuable means of involving 
experts and other interested parties. Co-option pre-dated the Municipal 
Corporations Act 1835. When the Act was being developed, co-option came 
under scrutiny in parliamentary debates which addressed the relationship 
between appointment and election (Gyford, 1991, p. 55). The Lords took the 
view that unelected appointments were a vital check on democracy and with 
the passage of the 1835 Act they exacted a price in the form of  the 
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aldermanic system, „whereby the elected councillors added to their number 
by choosing non-elected aldermen to form one quarter of the total 
membership of the council‟. Gyford refers to this arrangement, which 
continued until the abolition of the aldermen in the 1970s, as a „reformulation 
of the co-optive principle, designed to temper electoral pressure through the 
presence of the local equivalents of elder statesmen‟ (Ibid.).   
 
The Local Government Act 1894 introduced the power for councils to co-opt 
non-elected voting members onto committees. Ultimately, the benefits of co-
option have been seen in terms of the „acquisition of expertise, the promotion 
of good inter-organisational relations and the representation of specific 
affected interests‟ (Ibid., p. 56). Opponents have voiced their arguments in 
terms of both practice and principle. Specific concern lay in potential party-
political abuses of the system and in questions of public accountability.  
 
Lobbies, pressure groups and social movements 
OS is operating in a policy environment filled with groups attempting to 
exercise influence over decision makers. For example, the business lobby 
has been identified as one of the most powerful forces in politics today, at all 
levels of governance (Klein, 2001). The motivations of the business lobby are 
mainly financial; participation is often perceived to be not borne of a sense of 
altruism or public good. In contrast to this, many organised pressure groups 
and social movements become involved in politics to effect positive change 
(Brown, 1998; Carter et al., 1998; Harvie et al., 2005; Leite, 2005), often 
around single issues of concern (Griggs et al., 1998; Read, 1998; Thomson 
et al., 1998). Other campaigns can be founded, simply, on NIMBY-ism (not in 
my back yard) (Ridley, 1998, p. 310), a powerful force in the UK (Pattie et al., 
2004, p. 39).  
 
Campaigns focused specifically on a local issue have often developed to 
incorporate a much broader, more strategic, outlook, in some cases out of 
necessity „to avoid being played off against each other‟ (Doherty, 1998, p. 
371), in other cases as consciousness of an issue grows (McLeod, 1998). 
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Social movements are distinguishable from pressure groups in that they 
organise at first temporarily in response to an issue. The Stop the War 
Coalition is an example of a social movement which developed out of its 
initial remit. The activities of the group in opposition to the war in Iraq led in 
part to the development of Respect, a political party with a broad manifesto. 
As Wilson and Game point out, there are also numerous groups which exist 
in the community who „burst into political life‟ (2006, p. 337) only when an 
issue affects them directly.  
 
The political composition of a local authority can have a big effect on the 
influence that such groupings can exercise (Gyford, 1991, p. 45). The more 
left wing authorities may embrace community, cause and voluntary sector 
groups which challenge the status quo. The more centrist councils may be 
keen to engage the widest range of groupings and for Conservative councils 
groups may be seen as an obvious alternative to the council‟s monopolistic 
hold on service provision (Wilson & Game, 2006, p. 340). These party-
political considerations would, theoretically, be put aside in the OS context. 
This would, perhaps, provide greater potential for the involvement of such 
groups in the OS process; although their involvement would have to be 
counter-balanced by opposing viewpoints. If this were not to happen, then 
the objectivity of OS could be called into question. 
 
Democratic forms, proportional representation and 
participation 
 
Representative democratic systems vary in their openness to citizen 
participation. Patterns of Democracy (Lijphart, 1999) analyses the forms and 
performance of governments across 36 democracies. Tellingly, Lijphart finds 
that across a range of social indicators, consensus democracies; those with 
far greater levels of citizen participation, fare better than their majoritarian1 
counterparts (Ibid., p. 258-274). The following is derived from pages 9-47 of 
Patterns and summarises the key differences of the two models: 
 
                                                 
1
 Lijphart refers to the „majoritarian model‟ interchangeably as the „Westminster model‟.  
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Table 3: Characterising majoritarian and consensus democracy 
 
 
Majoritarian democracy  
 
 
Consensus democracy 
 
 
Concentration of executive power in 
one-party and bare-majority cabinets 
 
Executive power-sharing in broad 
coalition cabinets 
Cabinet dominance 
 
Executive-legislative balance of 
power 
 
 
Two-party system  
 
Multiparty system 
 
Majoritarian and disproportional 
system of elections 
 
Proportional representation 
 
Interest group pluralism  
 
Interest group corporatism 
Unitary and centralised government 
 
Federal and decentralised 
government 
 
 
Concentration of legislative power in 
a unicameral legislature 
 
Strong bicameralism 
 
Constitutional flexibility 
 
Constitutional rigidity 
 
Absence of judicial review 
 
Judicial review 
 
A central bank controlled by the 
executive 
 
Central bank independence 
 
Whilst there is no greater voter and representative congruence 1 under PR 
(Blais & Bodet, 2006), numerous factors can make consensus democracy 
more conducive to participation.  
                                                 
1
 Level of correspondence between views of citizens and policy positions of the government. 
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Firstly, the multiparty system can reflect a broader cross-section of opinion. 
Secondly, proportional representation grants a far greater chance of gaining 
a voice to smaller party groups - Lijphart has shown that consensus 
democracy and voter turnout are positively correlated (1999, p. 285) –  and 
interest group corporatism provides a channel for strong participation. 
However, interestingly, Blondel et al speculate that in the case of European 
Parliamentary elections the opposite effect is true. PR depressed electoral 
turnout by distancing candidates from voters and by leading to confusion and 
dissatisfaction (1997, p. 265).  
 
As the UK is a majoritarian democracy it would appear that, based on 
Lijphart‟s analysis, it is disadvantaged at a systemic level in relation to 
consensus democracies in terms of its ability to engage with its citizens. This, 
in combination with Barber‟s (2003) verdict on the inherent participatory 
shortcomings of liberal democracy and Crouch‟s (2004) post-democratic view 
(see Chapter 4.1, p. 62), would appear to pose a particular challenge for OS 
functions wishing to engage with local residents.  
 
ICT, E-democracy and direct representation 
Stephen Coleman (1999; Coleman et al., 1999) and many others (Acland, 
2003; Carter, 1999; Löfgren et al., 1999; Lyons, 2007) have investigated the 
central role that ICT can play in modern democratic governance, 
campaigning (Ferguson et al., 2006) and in connecting citizen to 
representative (Coleman, 1999). It has also been shown that the internet has 
broadened the numbers of those politically active (Gibson et al., 2005), 
although in general the internet is more useful in opinion-formation than 
decision-making (Buchstein, 1997, p. 260).  
 
To underpin and develop his arguments in relation to the uti lity of IT in 
modern governance, Coleman (2005) has related in detail to the apathy 
facing representative democracy. Research he draws upon illustrates the 
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lack of public trust in political institutions and in politicians generally. The 
following chart illustrates findings concerned with the latter: 
 
Chart 2: Perceived honesty of people commonly encountered1 
 
 
 
Coleman argues „for the need to promote a closer, more conversational 
relationship between citizens and their representatives‟ (2005, p. 12) and 
believes that the future of democracy lies in „direct representation‟ which can 
be realised through the medium of IT.  
 
Campbell et al concur in stating that „[t]he rapid growth of the Internet over 
the last five years has created a medium for debate, which is unparalleled in 
history‟ (1999, p. 400). They cite the Minnesota Electronic Democracy 
Project, founded in 1994, as one of the earliest examples of this in a formal 
political context.  
There is a growing literature dealing with the processes, operation and 
prospects of „wired‟ consultation (Dialogue by Design, 2005). There have 
also been considerable developments in the use of ICT in electioneering and 
campaigning (Docter et al., 1999; Ferguson et al., 2006). However, others 
                                                 
1
 Based on data from Coleman, 2005, Figure 2, p. 2. 
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have been less positive about the potential of the internet as a „public sphere‟ 
(Dean, 2003). Bellamy and Raab (1999) have also very cautiously appraised 
the usefulness of ICT in governance. Whilst acknowledging the possibilities 
the author‟s also highlight conservatism in that „members will not give way to 
megabytes‟ (Ibid., p. 525).  
 
Another main concern forwarded is the extent to which competency is 
devolved via ICT. In doing so an interesting parallel is drawn with Sherry 
Arnstein‟s (1971) Ladder of Citizen Participation, which classifies participant 
competency within a linearly structured typology. The resultant „ ladder of 
informatisation‟ (Bellamy & Raab, 1999, p. 520-521) is an attempt to place 
ICT application within similar terms from the standpoint of parliamentary 
democracy. The authors are at pains to state that „it would not destabilise 
representative democracy‟ (Ibid., p. 527), and instead claim that it could 
augment existing arrangements. 
 
In retaining a more measured approach to the potential of ICT in democratic 
renewal, the authors are commendably aware of both its importance and its 
limitations: „informatisation is almost certainly important and may even be 
necessary for reinvigorating parliamentary democracy, but it is hardly 
sufficient to deal with either the scale or nature of its problems‟ (Ibid., p. 533, 
authors' emphasis). David Held has stated: „Typically, experiments to 
enhance voter feedback and citizen communication provide avenues for 
deepening political participation within existing patterns of liberal 
representative politics‟ (2006, p. 250, author's emphasis). This would 
seemingly add to the suggestion that such initiatives are constrained by the 
limitations imposed by the representative system, as discussed in previous 
chapters (see p. 62). 
 
It therefore follows that the use of ICT in OS processes could potentially fall 
prey to the limitations imposed by the broader representative democratic, 
majoritarian system as operated in the United Kingdom. As an inseparable 
part of that system, OS is hampered by the confines within which it operates. 
However, as OS can adopt more flexible ways of working, there is limited 
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Participants 
scope for the use of ICT as an administrative tool and as a means to garner 
wider opinion. Council ICT policies may prove an additiona l, institutional, 
barrier to this being utilised to its full potential.  
 
Making participation a reality 
Fung (2006) develops a holistic view of participation in building his 
„Democracy Cube‟. The cube places participation on a three-dimensional 
model gauging participant selection, communication and decision, and finally 
authority and power, and is illustrated in the following table (from Ibid., p. 71): 
Fung states that modes of participation in modern society are, and indeed 
should be, multifaceted. Public participation advances various purposes and 
values. At the more abstract level, these include an equal say in collective 
Figure 2: Fung's democracy cube 
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decisions and respect for individual autonomy. Fung aims to provide 
guidance on the aims and character of citizen participation and therefore 
examines „the range of proximate values that mechanisms of participation 
might advance and the problems that they seek to address‟ (Ibid., p. 66). 
  
Fung emphasises that participation complements political representation or 
expertise, it does not provide an alternative: „public participation at its best 
operates in synergy with representation and administration to yield more 
desirable practices and outcomes of collective decision-making and action‟ 
(Ibid.). The relationship between public bodies and members of the public 
depends on the context of the situation and the issue at hand; variables 
which determine whether the public are treated as consumers, clients or 
citizens.  
 
Fung also identifies the three questions of institutional design which 
formulate his Democracy Cube. Who participates determines what issues of 
governance can be addressed, and various selection methods can be 
employed (for a full description see Ibid., p. 67-69). How participants interact 
is dealt with in the second dimension of institutional design. These 
interactions take place very passively in the case of those who wish merely to 
listen and to be educated; whilst at the opposite extreme officials employ 
their technical expertise to solve problems. The final dimension quantifies the 
impact of public participation, or how what the participants say is linked to 
what is done. In this case Fung identifies New England town meetings as one 
extreme in which decisions made become policy. It is at the opposite extreme 
where participatory initiatives most commonly lie, where participants „have no 
real expectation of influencing policy action at all‟ (Ibid., p. 69). Fung‟s 
framework is drawn upon later in the thesis to evaluate aspects of external 
stakeholder participation in OS processes across the four case study local 
authorities (see p. 208).  
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Participation: attitudes and practice in local government  
Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker (2001a) reported on research conducted in 
1998 for the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(DETR) (Lowndes et al., 1998). The research analysed contemporary 
attitudes and practice towards participation within local government with two 
key objectives: To provide an up-to-date picture of the nature and scope of 
public participation via a survey of local authorities; and to investigate the 
views of local authorities and citizens on participation initiatives in practice via 
selected case studies (Lowndes et al., 2001a, p. 206). The survey was sent 
to the chief executives of all principal English local authorities in January 
1998, and an 85 per cent response rate was achieved.  
 
The case studies were conducted in 11 local authorities and involved in-
depth interviews with individuals who had developed or organised 
participation initiatives. The research showed the dominance of consumerist 
methods (such as complaint/suggestion schemes), those forms of 
participation concerned mainly with the customer and aspects of service 
delivery (Ibid., p. 207). Also prevalent were traditional methods (such as 
public meetings), described as having a long history of use in local 
government. 
 
Lowndes et al found very little difference in numbers of participation initiatives 
in authorities with different party-group control; Liberal Democrat controlled 
authorities held a slight edge. Those with no overall control offered fewer 
initiatives, whilst independent controlled authorities had the fewest (Ibid., p. 
209). Enhanced opportunities to participate, which started to accelerate in the 
mid-1990s, developed due to two reasons given by the authorities. 
Participation was seen by many authorities to offer better informed decisions, 
and the importance of gaining people‟s views to this was emphasised. Also, a 
large proportion of respondents linked participation to service improvements, 
however, „the goals of empowering citizens or increasing their awareness 
were largely secondary to the more tangible benefits of improving decision-
making‟ (Ibid., p. 211). 
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Clearly, in the view of those authorities, the stress of service provision 
necessitated a less idealistic, more pragmatic approach to participation.  
Lack of resources and time were highlighted by the majority of respondents 
as the main barriers to the further development of public participation.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, district councils were those with the fewest 
participatory initiatives. Lowndes et al speculate that the generally smaller 
budget and limited resources of districts reduce the potential for 
experimentation (Ibid., p. 209).  
 
In terms of the negative effects of public participation, almost a third (32 per 
cent) of those local authorities with issues were concerned about raising 
unrealistic expectations among the public. This was of particular importance 
when the authority‟s ability to respond was limited by legal or financial 
implications. Others also identified possible conflicts with broader council 
policy. Of those identifying negative effects, a quarter was concerned with 
public participation slowing down decision-making, especially where 
partnership working with other agencies demanded a faster response (Ibid., 
p. 212).  
 
It is in the realm of resource allocation that Lowndes et al identify a key and 
seemingly intractable issue: „The problem of when and how to commit 
resources to democratic enhancement, rather than to service delivery, is an 
unresolved dilemma which lies at the heart of the current process of 
democratic renewal‟ (Ibid.). Paradoxically, in this instance, a strong customer 
service ethos concerned with value for money conflicts with the requirements 
of the democratic renewal agenda to facilitate greater citizen participation. 
The equally paradoxical combination of a centrally imposed performance 
management regime (Martin & Davis, 2001, p. 474) and a commitment to 
devolved local governance may also be a considerable barrier to the 
realisation of enhanced public participation (Foley & Martin, 2000; Peckham 
et al., 2005; Wilson, 1999). In these circumstances there is little wonder that 
confusion over what the government requires has emerged (Martin & Boaz, 
2000, p. 51). 
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Lowndes et al also reported in a similar vein on public perspectives on 
participation, highlighting „some latent interest among citizens in opportunities 
for participation‟ (2001b, p. 450). The research consisted of 30 focus group 
discussions with citizens from 11 contrasting local authority areas, with 
particular attention paid to the recruitment of citizens from traditionally 
excluded groups. The focus groups consisted of ten participants and there 
were four different types of group. The „participators‟ had participated in a 
local authority initiative. The „activists‟ were people involved with local 
community and voluntary organisations. Young people were recruited from 
local colleges and youth groups. Finally, „ordinary citizens‟ were randomly 
selected by a market research agency.  
 
It was found that people claimed that they would participate in initiatives 
based on the issues that „mattered‟, although very few people had actually 
done so. The authors speculate that when people refer to such „big issues‟ 
they are identifying matters in which they feel they ought to participate rather 
than reflecting on their actual practice: „People‟s real experiences of 
participation were more likely to relate to the protection of their own or their 
community‟s immediate interests, rather than to the wider “issues” that they 
referred to in the abstract‟ (Ibid., p. 447 authors‟ emphasis).  
 
People were also unaware of, and uninterested in, the limitations of local 
authority responsibility, stating to the researchers that local authorities should 
consult on areas outside of their remit. There was a tendency to rely on a few 
committed individuals to have their say on behalf of others. Lowndes and 
colleagues also identified why people did not participate and highlighted four 
main reasons (Ibid., p. 450-454): A negative view of the local authority, a lack 
of awareness of opportunities to participate, a lack of council response, and 
issues of social exclusion. Focus group findings underline the important fact 
that more participation does not equate to more democracy, as „participation 
initiatives may reinforce existing patterns of social exclusion and 
disadvantage … Direct invitations to participate, and appropriate incentives, 
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may be particularly important in engaging those who would not ordinarily take 
part‟ (Ibid., p. 453).  
 
Arguments for and against greater participation  
Bingham et al detail relatively succinctly the views of those in favour of 
greater participation, partnership and networking; advocates of which 
 
... argue that new governance processes promote increased 
collaboration among government, business, civil society, and citizens; 
enhance democratic decision-making; and foster decisional legitimacy, 
consensus, citizen engagement, public dialogue, reasoned debate, 
higher decision quality, and fairness among an active and informed 
citizenry. They contend that these processes promote individual liberty 
while maintaining accountability for collective decisions; advance 
political equality while educating citizens; foster a better understanding 
of competing interests while contributing to citizens‟ moral development 
and orient an atomized citizenry toward the collective good (2005, p. 
554). 
 
Phillips has articulated the rationale behind moves toward greater 
participation in the following terms: 
 
Raising overall levels of political participation is then seen as part of a 
strategy for greater political equality. Almost more important, however, 
is that higher levels of participation have been said to enhance the 
capacity for political judgement and the quality of the decisions that are 
made (1996, p. 22). 
 
Political equality in the UK is guaranteed legally by universal suffrage, 
frequent, free and fair elections and the rule of law, etc. Although, as Barnes 
and colleagues have pointed out: „the notion of representative democracy is 
based on an idea of formal equality that masks the conditional and 
problematic access to citizenship for certain groups‟ (Barnes et al., 2003, p. 
380). Pre-eminent scholars such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John 
Stuart Mill have been classical advocates of strong participation. In the case 
of the former, Pateman states: 
 
Rousseau‟s entire political theory hinges on the individual participation 
of each citizen in political decision-making and in his theory participation 
is very much more than a protective adjunct to a set of institutional 
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arrangements; it also has a psychological effect on the participants, 
ensuring that there is a continuing interrelationship between the working 
of institutions and the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals 
interacting within them (1970, p. 22). 
 
To Rousseau, the human benefits that accrue through participation provide 
important justification for a participatory system. It is equally important as a 
thing in itself as it is a means to an end. G. D. H. Cole, in the development of 
guild socialism, tried to adapt the thought of Rousseau to a modern setting: 
„He thought that there existed large untapped reserves of energy and 
initiative in the ordinary man that a participatory system would call forth‟ 
(Ibid., p. 40). Also with Mill, Cole shared both the belief that the educative 
function of participation is crucial and the idea that individuals „learnt 
democracy‟ only by participation at the local level (Ibid., p. 38). Pateman 
states that „for Mill, it is at local level where the real educative effect of 
participation occurs, where not only do the issues dealt with directly affect the 
individual and his everyday life but where he also stands a good chance of, 
himself, being elected to serve on a local body‟ (Ibid., p. 31; see also Copus, 
2006, p. 5; also Gyford, 1991, p. 20; also highly congruent with the views of 
New Labour, see for example DETR, 1998a; DETR, 1998b).  
 
Aside from the educative function, in which „Mill sees government and 
political institutions first and foremost as educative in the broadest sense of 
that word‟ (Pateman, 1970, p. 29), Mill saw the benefit to governance to be 
gained from airing as broad a selection of views as possible in decision-
making, based on the following assumption:  
 
Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring 
out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human 
judgement, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when 
it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting 
it right are kept constantly at hand. In the case of any person whose 
judgement is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? 
Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and 
conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be 
said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to 
himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. 
Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can 
make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing 
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what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and 
studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of 
mind (Mill, 1998, p. 25). 
 
Political participation has, therefore, been seen to provide benefits in several 
areas. Participation, it has been argued, raises political equality, giving 
ordinary people a greater voice in what has been perceived as an elite 
dominated society (Crouch, 2004; Klein, 2001), and provides a strong 
educative function which „develops and fosters the very qualities necessary 
for it; the more individuals participate the better able they become to do so‟ 
(Pateman, 1970, p. 42-43). It also contributes to better quality decision-
making, arrived at by greater participation. This latter benefit has also, in part, 
justified moves towards partnership working and greater collaboration across 
the public sector (Bound et al., 2005). 
 
Despite its many advocates, broad participation in governance has not been 
universally accepted as desirable. Works from antiquity onwards have 
questioned the desirability of popular participation beyond the „protective‟ act 
of voting in the election of certain officials. For example, prominent 
commentators such as Joseph Schumpeter, advocate of competitive elitism 
(Held, 2006, ch. 5), would claim that citizen  „participation has no special or 
central role‟ (Pateman, 1970, p. 5). Indeed, in discussing the „classical 
doctrine‟, Schumpeter‟s main criticism „was that the central participatory and 
decision-making role of the people rested on empirically unrealistic 
foundations ... it is the competition by potential decision makers for the 
people‟s vote that is the vital feature‟ (Ibid., p. 4). Others have even 
questioned whether individual preferences can be aggregated upwards to a 
collective level (Arrow, 1963 cited in; Hardin, 2003, p. 163).  
 
Arguments against deeper participation also, for a long period, justified the 
dominance of aristocracy in the echelons of power, such as in the British 
Upper House. This was summarised well by Walter Bagehot, who claimed 
that the aristocracy were „above corruption because they are the corruptors. 
They have no constituency to fear or wheedle; they have the best means of 
forming a disinterested and cool judgement of any class in the country. They 
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have, too, leisure to form it‟ (Bagehot, 1963, p. 137). This class-based 
assessment excluded, by necessity, the vast majority of the population from 
the UK legislature for the 19th and much of the 20th Centuries. 
 
Today, the predominant liberal view sees citizens‟ rights as primarily negative 
in relation to the state and other citizens: „They give citizens the opportunity 
to assert their private interests in such a way that by means of elections, the 
composition of parliamentary bodies, and the formation of a government, 
these interests are finally aggregated into a political will that makes an impact 
on the administration‟ (Habermas, 1994, p. 2). The emphasis placed by New 
Labour on participation stemmed mainly from the well documented culture of 
apathy and disengagement afflicting the democratic process (Chandler, 
2000, p. 4; Ashworth et al., 2004; Foley & Martin, 2000, p. 485; Wilson, 1999, 
p. 247). Wilson states that: „While enhancing representative democracy 
through increased voting turnout is seen as important, the Blair government 
was particularly keen to emphasise innovation in participatory democracy‟ 
(Wilson, 1999, p. 248).  This was within a context of a broader democratic 
renewal policy agenda that included major constitutional changes such as 
devolution and reform of the House of Lords alongside changes in local 
authority political management arrangements and a greater emphasis on 
partnership and participation (Morrison, 2001).  
 
4.3 Summary 
The chapter has placed OS within the broader democratic framework as 
operated in the UK. Theorising the UK democratic system necessarily 
involves an examination of representative democracy, its characteristics and 
issues currently facing it. This is especially important given the fact that OS is 
a function of the representative political system.  
 
Participatory democracy is an ever-increasing area of interest, and it is very 
much a part of an effectively functioning representative democratic system. 
Few would suggest that representative democracy is not complemented by 
greater participation, although the extent to which it is complementary, and in 
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what circumstances, remain contentious. Participation as a concept is 
particularly important to a study of OS processes, given that OS has been 
seen as a vehicle for greater external stakeholder engagement (Centre for 
Public Scrutiny, 2007). 
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5. Democratic renewal  
 
Although scholars have studied the transformation of governance 
through globalization, devolution, and networks, and they have argued 
for a greater role in governance for the public, practitioners have 
developed a rich diversity of processes that use negotiation, mediation, 
facilitation, citizen and stakeholder engagement, deliberation, 
collaboration, and consensus building … This is the other face of the 
new governance. These processes are in widespread use at the 
international, national, state, and local levels of governance and in 
intersectoral networks crossing jurisdictions (Bingham et al., 2005, p. 
552). 
 
This chapter discusses some of the main theoretical ideas underpinning 
much New Labour policy, social capital, communitarianism and deliberative 
democracy. The development of OS should be viewed in the context of these 
ideas. The description that follows provides a more focussed analysis with 
which to frame the research.    
 
The democratic renewal policy agenda 
New Labour sought to revitalise democracy in many ways, such as the 
devolution of power to Scotland and Wales, the promotion of freedom of 
information, in encouraging cabinet systems and locally elected mayors and 
in investigating new voting arrangements and electronic government  
(Skelcher, 2000, p. 17-18).  
 
At the core of these approaches has been the issue of greater public and 
other stakeholder engagement in decision-making; a topic of fundamental 
significance to the operation and quality of democracy and a principle „widely 
accepted in much national and local policy‟ (Warburton, 2001, p. 3). Indeed, 
in numerous policy documents Labour articulated a vision of public 
participation that bui lt on the consumerist vision of the Conservatives 
(Cabinet Office, 1998).  
 
Barnett (2002) has shown how there has been a strengthening commitment 
to the consultation and engagement of stakeholders and service users from 
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central government. This has been enacted partly through initiatives such as 
a re-launching of the Major Government‟s Citizens‟ Charter in altered form, 
as Service First (Cabinet Office, 1998), which marked a change in the narrow 
approach of its predecessor. The Health Service White Paper A First Class 
Service (Department of Health, 1998) and The NHS Plan (Department of 
Health, 2000) aimed to centre aspects of services on the consumer. The 
White Paper aimed to take into account patient and care experience in the 
assessment of performance; the latter sought to establish various 
patient/user led initiatives. „Zones‟ and „pathfinder‟ areas „have stressed the 
central place of partnership and active engagement with stakeholders‟ 
(Barnett, 2002, p. 311) and are furthering the participation agenda, in which 
Labour‟s interest stems from areas which Barnett highlights: concern with a 
democratic deficit, interest in the democratic capabilities of civil society and a 
concern with the fostering of social capital; the blanket term being 
„democratic renewal‟. „The agenda, therefore, has drawn upon attempts to 
institute a „thicker‟ form of democratic engagement as concern has 
increasingly been expressed with the capacity of representative democracy 
to engage and involve the citizenry‟  (Ibid.).  
 
Underlying this was an ideology which has been the cause of consternation. 
Freeden, writing on the ideology of New Labour in an aptly named article, 
raised amongst other issues the Blairite minimalist view of the state as one 
actor amongst many. Ironically, the Labour government displayed 
„centralising tendencies‟ (1999, p. 43) whilst simultaneously extending the 
range of stakeholders consulted. Ultimately, „the role of government now is to 
direct [a] reallocation of power and functions, while reserving the last word for 
itself‟ (Ibid.). This was in the context of Labour‟s idea of participatory 
citizenship and partnership, dressed in the language of rights and obligations.  
 
5.1 Partnerships and ‘double devolution’  
 
There have been moves to address the apathy observed in relation to the 
traditional processes and institutions of representative democracy. At a local 
level, these moves have not always involved the local authority. Increasing 
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emphasis on partnership and „double devolution‟ has meant, in certain 
instances, the bypassing of the council in favour of neighbourhood 
arrangements and collaborative forums. The Local Strategic Partnerships 
(LSPs), fairly recent innovations bringing together cross-sector organisations 
and other stakeholders, have attracted considerable funding. In those local 
authority areas with pockets of high deprivation, LSPs were allocated large 
sums of Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) (replaced by Area Based 
Grant - ABG). Allotted funds must be spent in accordance with the Local 
Area Agreement (LAA), a short term strategy document produced in 
collaboration with local statutory and non-statutory stakeholders.  
 
Strategic partnerships are intended to be an open, transparent means of 
coordinating service delivery in a locality. Given the influence of them, 
accountability is an issue. Informal „horizontal accountability‟ networks may 
exist within the partnership, with participating bodies providing mutual checks 
and balances. Upward accountability to Parliament and the relevant 
Government Office is also a supposed safeguard. In reality, „horizontal‟ and 
„top down‟ accountability mechanisms can be severely lacking. In the case of 
the former, opacity and only nominal levels of communication may act as a 
barrier to any genuine accountability. Distance and conflicting priorities 
effectively block the „top down‟ accountability process. If LSPs and other 
partnerships are to enjoy true democratic legitimacy, an effective „bottom up‟ 
accountability mechanism should be in place. In response to these issues, 
the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 created 
new powers for OS in relation to the scrutiny of LAA partners, indicating the 
important role envisaged for OS in holding a wider range of external 
stakeholders to account.  
 
Currently, elected members in some areas hold seats on the boards of 
partnerships, although numbers vary. Elected members are in these 
circumstances acting very much as democratic champions to a locality (de 
Groot, 2006). In this respect they partially fulfil the envisaged community 
leadership role described by the government (LGIU, 1999; Stewart, 1999).  
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The OS powers in relation to LAA partners were first discussed in the White 
Paper Strong and Prosperous Communities, which detailed several public 
bodies with a duty to respond to scrutiny. Coupled with the Community (now 
„councillor‟) Call for Action (CCfA), these powers should, assuming they are 
used correctly facilitate external OS to a fairly significant extent. The key 
issue of crime and disorder is given special significance and is assigned its 
own CCfA, introduced in the Police and Justice Act 2006 alongside the 
requirement for a designated „crime and disorder committee‟ to scrutinise the 
Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP – in some areas known as 
Community Safety Partnership) on at least one occasion per year. This 
ensures the attendance and cooperation of the CDRP with OS, although OS 
cannot specify who attends. All that is required is that a CDRP representative 
attends and that recommendations be responded to.  
 
This is a weakness in the mechanism, as in the event of a specific CDRP 
partner being accountable, an alternative and unconnected (notwithstanding 
the relationship through the partnership) representative may attend. The 
suitability of this person/s may be questionable and may, regardless of 
intentions, protract the CCfA process. In this instance the most likely 
explanation would be a breakdown of communication between OS and the 
partnership, outlining the necessity of involving relevant partners from the 
earliest stages of a CCfA. In rare circumstances such a move on behalf of 
the partnership may be an attempt to dodge the OS process.  
 
Performance management 
The shift from Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) to 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) – now defunct following the change 
of government - signified another shift in perspective. Under CAA, 
performance assessment was to be focussed chiefly on outcomes across 
areas, regardless of who was responsible for delivery. A gradual phasing in 
of the CAA took place, with the final arrangements in place by 2009. The 
general consensus was that CAA provided added impetus for the 
development of a „scrutiny of place‟. 
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The democratic renewal agenda: underlying concepts 
The stance of New Labour towards citizenship, governance and participation 
developed in varying degrees from communitarian thought (Bound et al., 
2005, p. 11; Furbey et al., 2006, p. 6; Jochum et al., 2005, p. 9; Leadbeater, 
1997, p. 2; Maile & Hoggett, 2001, p. 511; Marinetto, 2003, p. 114) and social 
capital theory (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001, p. 629; Muers, 2004, p. 46; 
Skidmore et al., 2006, p. vii). These in turn have led to developments in 
deliberative democracy (Coaffee, 2005, p. 30; Lowndes & Wilson, 2001, p. 
636-637). The following is a detailed exploration of the concepts. Deliberative 
democracy is later accorded particular attention, given the fact that OS can 
be a very effective deliberative process. 
 
5.2 Social capital 
Social capital as a concept has emerged primarily from the work of Robert 
Putnam (1993; and most notably Putnam, 2000) and has been highly 
influential to policy-makers, with organisations from the World Bank to One 
North East debating its merits and potential. It is often perceived as a benefit 
of participation (DCLG, 2006; also, for example Koontz, 2005, p. 476) and is 
defined as: „resources for collective action, such as contacts, friendships or 
the ability to ask favours of people, which citizens access through 
membership in particular types of social networks‟ (Skidmore et al., 2006, p. 
vii).  
 
Marilyn Taylor describes the term „social capital‟ as aspects of the social 
sphere which collectively empower and enable (2003, p. 41-43). A more 
normative view of social capital, such as that espoused by Robert Putnam 
(1993) and critiqued by Wollebaek and Selle  (2003), links historically 
developed social capital with „the formation of the capacity for civic 
engagement which he sees as essential for modern democracy‟ (Taylor, 
2003, p. 41). The findings of Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley (2004, p. 178-179), in 
different ways, both support and refute Putnam‟s thesis. They do find that 
group membership, both formal and informal, „promotes obligations to 
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volunteer as well as all types of participation‟ (Ibid., p. 178), a finding mirrored 
in India where „high social capital vi llages ... tend to have significantly higher 
levels of political participation‟ (Krishna, 2002, p. 457). In rural England 
however, Williams reports „that participation in community-based groups is 
primarily by higher income households who use them as vehicles for 
bolstering their social support networks‟ (2003, p. 87). Also, in discussing 
gendered differences in social capital, Vivien Lowndes finds that „there is no 
straightforward causal relationship between social capital and political 
involvement‟ (2004, p. 61), and concludes: „A better understanding is 
required of the circumstances under which social capital becomes an actual, 
rather than a potential, resource for democracy‟ (Ibid., p. 62). Pattie et al go 
further, and describe 
 
... the danger of circularity when it [social capital] is applied to the task 
of explaining wide forms of political participation; it comes close to 
saying that participation in voluntary activity creates further participation 
and so on. This is not such a problem when one is trying to explain 
specialist types of participation such as voting, but it is a potential 
problem when broad measures of participation in effect become both 
independent and dependent variables in explanatory models (2004, p. 
150).  
 
Unfulfilling political engagement could even damage social capital insofar as 
it encourages further engagement. The work of Shlomi Segall (2005) backs 
this view. Segall states that „when forms of participation do not have a “point” 
to them, they may actually do more harm than good, as they end up causing 
frustration and a sense of futility when it is realised that participation was 
“about nothing”‟ (Ibid., p. 370). However, Segall does mention that small 
deliberative bodies (a role which OS committees could fulfil) such as citizens ‟ 
juries do have the, albeit limited, potential to cultivate social solidarity.  
 
Citizens‟ juries usually consist of between 12 and 16 randomly chosen 
members who are tasked with deliberating over a specific policy issue to 
reach a decision (although the decision need not be unanimous). Numerous 
benefits are attributed by Segall to citizens‟ juries: deliberation of the type 
found in citizens‟ juries enhances the „political sophistication‟ of those 
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involved and leaves them considerably better informed; deliberation over a 
certain area of policy leads to a sense of attachment and ownership of the 
policy or institution involved; and, when deliberation involves vulnerable 
groups in society, it leads to greater empathy towards the group in question. 
Overall: „this greater empathy and sense of responsibility tends to spill 
beyond the space and time of the discussion‟ (Ibid., p. 369). Segall‟s 
measured view of participation as a driving force of community solidarity is 
summarised as follows:  
 
Participation in politics, when it is carefully construed, may cultivate 
responsible citizenry and commitment to the common good. But not 
only are those occasions where participation is both conducive to 
solidarity and meaningful (for the participants) rare, political participation 
is also only a peripheral aspect of our lives, so its effect on our 
dispositions can only be limited (Ibid., p. 373, author's emphasis). 
 
In this interpretation participation may develop a more collective outlook only 
in the correct circumstances. To realise any possible benefit participation 
must be frequent, empowering and conducive to collectivism. 
 
Taylor describes those arguments which state the exclusionary potential of 
social capital, founded on the idea of „closure‟: „Closure increases the 
potential for the effective sanctions, norms and expectations which generate 
trustworthy relations between participants‟ (2003, p. 56). „Closure‟ can be 
seen as negative in its conception, concerned more with what unites 
communities as they stand, rather than develop a more inclusive, 
encompassing conception of community. The danger of this lies in the idea 
that networks of the type on which social capital is developed „can create 
their own norms, at odds with the outside world‟ (Ibid.), with commensurate 
dangers to the heterogeneous society of the UK today. This conception 
echoes what Putnam has referred to as „bonding‟ social capital, „a willingness 
to trust only members of one‟s immediate group‟. In contrast to this, Putnam 
spoke of a desirable „bridging‟ social capital, „the willingness to trust 
strangers‟ (Pattie et al., 2004, p. 150) which he believed was the key to 
democratic renewal.  
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Social capital in the UK 
It would appear that social capital in Britain is in relatively good health, even 
in its potential „bridging‟ variant, given that „[f]or most writers trust is the key 
indicator of social capital‟ (Ibid., p. 149), and the report that people in the UK 
tend to trust others with whom they have contact (Ibid., p. 36). Interestingly, 
and in accordance with the report of Coleman (2005, p. 2),  the same study 
reveals that people „are more likely to trust the institutions which are not 
directly associated with elected politicians‟ (Pattie et al., 2004, p. 37); 
according to the authors, a finding replicated in other advanced industrial 
democracies.  
 
Clearly this has implications for OS functions wishing to engage the public. 
Distrust has led to greater participation outside of traditional and institutional 
political structures, has driven people with strong views away from traditional 
forms of participation and has created protest against the status quo. For 
example, before certain key events from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s, 
including economic change which led to more highly mobile capital and 
labour (Gorz, 1997), anti-capitalist voices could be heard strongly within „old‟ 
Labour. Increasingly, in the modern world, left wing voices are now heard in a 
variety of settings that reject vertical hierarchies and closed epistemologies 
whilst embracing pluralism and creativity (for example the World Social 
Forum, see Leite, 2005). As one „new‟ leftist put it, „with British socialism and 
trade unionism in serious decline, combined with the haemorrhaging of the 
Marxist-Leninist left, the traditional labour movement is becoming rapidly 
extinct‟ (Hewson, 2005, p. 137). People with an opinion are going outside of 
traditional political channels to voice it, which is a severe loss to formal and 
potentially more constructive forms of participation.  
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5.3 Communitarianism 
The “restoring community” theme has been given a new lease of life in 
recent years by a communitarian movement which draws support from 
across the political spectrum. For communitarians, the solution to urban 
decline is to reinstil a sense of responsibility as well as rights, and to 
make communities rather than the state the primary institutions of 
decision-making and service provision. The revival of this theme also 
owes a great deal to the popularisation of the concept of social capital 
as the basis for making democracy work (Putnam, 1993), redressing 
political apathy and creating cohesion (Taylor, 2003, p. 21). 
 
The communitarian conception of responsibility and communal values as well 
as rights, „struck a deep chord with [Tony] Blair‟ (Seldon, 2004, p. 126). 
Parallels can be drawn with deliberative conceptions of democracy in the 
mutual emphasis placed on reciprocity (Taylor, 2003, p. 39) and in that 
deliberative democracy believes „people to be to some degree communally 
oriented in their outlook‟ (Miller, 2003, p. 184). In this parallel, a strong 
communitarian-like ethos and its accompanying levels of social capital could 
be highly conducive to the correct forms of deliberative democracy. 
Communitarianism arose from  
 
... the fragmentation of other collective, associational links between the 
state and society, from the falling membership and influence of trade 
unions and working men‟s associations to the decline of the established 
church and the Women‟s Institute. The political repercussions of the 
collapse of these collective institutions were raised in the 1980s by 
communitarian theorists who warned that markets and contracts ... do 
not create any social cohesion in and of themselves … The policy 
advocates of the Third Way share the communitarians‟ focus on 
rebuilding social cohesion, advocating a proactive and interventionist 
set of policies on behalf of both the central and local state  (Chandler, 
2000, p. 4-5).  
 
The local government modernisation agenda, specifically the LGA (2000) 
provides an example of „proactive and interventionist‟ policy of this kind. New 
political management arrangements were intended, in part, to provide easily 
identifiable leadership to the community and a focal point for their concerns 
(DETR, 1998a; b).  
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The envisaged community leadership role for members built further on this 
approach, as did the importance attached to sustainable communities 
(ODPM, 2005) - a further example of the community-oriented approach of 
New Labour - as were programmes such as local management for schools 
and area-based initiatives such as the health and education action zones 
(Walker, 2000, p. 11). That New Labour saw community as inextricably linked 
to the governance of locality is apparent in the Communities and Local 
Government portfolio, the department of which issued documents such as 
the White Paper Strong and Prosperous Communities (DCLG, 2006) 
detailing the role of local government in this regard. It was also apparent from 
the White Paper that the then government viewed the delivery of more 
tailored services, informed by the community and individual service users, as 
a key challenge to be met.  
 
A desire to be engaged in their governance is frequently ascribed to the 
public, as is the desire for personalised services.  Moves to empower 
communities via OS arose from both the White Paper and the Police and 
Justice Act 2006. The Community (now „councillor‟) Call for Action (CCfA) 
mechanisms roughly outlined in these documents provided a means by 
which members of the community could potentially have concerns relayed 
directly to an OSC. Should a councillor deem a CCfA appropriate, i.e. not 
vexatious or otherwise unsuitable, he or she would at first attempt to address 
the concern independently. Should the issue persist following this initial 
intervention the councillor can pass the concern onto OS, which, obliged to 
respond, will have the power to demand the presence of certain external 
bodies relevant to the particular issue raised. In this instance these bodies 
are accountable to OS and must provide a representative at any 
proceedings. CCfAs are invalid in the case of concerns where there exists a 
statutory appeals process, for example planning.  Procedurally and in terms 
of competency, both CCfAs were the same; where they differed was in the 
context in which they were to be raised. The Police and Justice Act 2006 
CCfA related specifically to crime and disorder matters, with the 
corresponding Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) as the 
object of scrutiny. The White Paper CCfA covered a host of issues and the 
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list of bodies with a duty to respond was equally broad. The two separate 
CCfAs are now merged under the new title Councillor Call for Action. 
Separate provisions continue to apply to crime and disorder issues only 
insofar as there must now be a designated „crime and disorder‟ committee 
that hears crime and disorder CCfAs and undertakes scrutiny of the local 
CDRP on at least one occasion annually. At many professional events such 
as the North East Regional Employers Organisation scrutiny officer and 
members‟ network meetings, issues around the CCfA were raised. Many 
simply stated that this already occurs and it would appear that central 
government was formalising unnecessari ly an already functional relationship.  
 
Driver and Martell (1997) identify six dimensions on which variants of 
communitarianism can differ (cited in Taylor, 2003, p. 40): 
 
 „Conformist (building an overarching morality) versus pluralist 
(recognising difference) 
 More versus less conditional (responsibility arises from duties; 
responsibility arises from fellowship and solidarity) 
 Conservative versus progressive 
 Prescriptive versus voluntary  
 Moral versus socio-economic (social cohesion due to shared morals; 
social cohesion due to socio-economic equality and shared rights) 
 Individual versus corporate (that is, the responsibilities of business 
and institutions)‟  
 
Driver and Martell argue that New Labour tended towards the former 
approach given at each of the above points. Their argument is that the then 
government sought to devolve power downwards through institutional 
pluralism, but also sought ethical conformity to ensure adherence to a 
centrally-imposed all-encompassing moral framework.  
 
Pattie et al (2004) describe the communitarian approach to citizenship: „For 
communitarians citizenship arises from culturally defined communities which 
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exist prior to the formation of the state. The latter is thought to derive its 
authority from these communities. Relationships in such communities 
transcend the uti litarian calculations of individuals which are the basis of 
liberal conceptions of citizenship‟ (Ibid., p. 11). In this, the communitarian 
approach can be questioned using a similar argument to that deployed by 
Barber (2003, p. 3-114 see above) against liberal democracy. Simply, it 
presupposes an immutable pre-conceptual frame, upon which the theory is 
built. This consists of an assumption opposite to tha t of liberalism, that 
humanity in the state of nature is inherently communal, as opposed to the 
liberal „atomisation‟ thesis which emphasises individualism. The issue is not 
which view is correct; rather it is about basing policy on supposition.  
 
5.4  Deliberative democracy 
Some democrats are of a similar opinion to Adams, who claims that citizen 
deliberation and rational persuasion are „[a]t the core of democracy‟ (2004, p. 
51). Others would argue otherwise, privileging instead the unique role of the 
elected representative in conducting deliberations with his or her peers. What 
can be stated definitively is that the role of deliberation in modern democracy 
is subject to some debate. This is centred primarily on, amongst other 
considerations, where and when it should be utilised, and what form it sho uld 
take (Fishkin & Laslett, 2003, p. 1-5). 
 
It is important to clarify that deliberative democracy is not a variation of a 
direct participatory type democracy (Held, 2006, p. 237) and as such it need 
not be inimical to the representative system. Jan Teorell (2006) develops this 
point in distinguishing „responsive‟, „participatory‟ and „deliberative‟ models of 
democracy. The first conception is protective and entails the expression 
through participation of individual needs and preferences into collectively 
binding decisions. The participatory model involves direct influence in final 
decision-making whereas the deliberative model is concerned with 
„subjective legitimacy‟ (Ibid., p. 803). It seeks an informed and reciprocal 
period of deliberation prior to certain decisions and is underpinned by many 
views of how it should be:  
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Where deliberation should be sited, and the extent of popular 
participation, are not questions about which there is a consensus 
among deliberative thinkers. To the extent that deliberation is seen as a 
supplement to liberal institutions, theorists tend to recommend it as a 
way of improving the quality of existing political institutions. To the 
extent that deliberation is regarded as a transformative mode of 
reasoning which can be drawn upon in diverse settings, from micro-fora 
and neighbourhood associations to national parliaments and 
transnational settings, it tends to be interpreted as a new radical model 
of democracy (Held, 2006, p. 252).  
 
Deliberative democracy „affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens 
and their representatives‟ (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 3). Its 
epistemology claims that „no set of values or particular perspectives can lay 
claim to being correct and valid by themselves, but they are valid only in so 
far as they are justified‟ (Held, 2006, p. 233). It therefore has a reason-giving 
requirement grounded in an idea of mutual respect (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004, p. 4). Citizens should be empowered beyond voting in elections and 
interest group bargaining to a level where they become „autonomous agents 
who take part in the governance of their own society, directly or through their 
representatives‟ (Ibid.).  
 
For this to take place reasoning must be accessible, in the sense that 
deliberation must take place in public and must be delivered in a manner 
which can be understood by all. Deliberation must produce a decision binding 
over a certain period of time, distinguishing the deliberative process from a 
debate. Despite this the deliberative process should be dynamic, in that few 
decisions are justifiable indefinitely. Therefore the chance to re-assemble 
must be assured so that a challenge to the decision can take place at some 
point in the future. To the deliberative democrat „[h]ow citizens deal with the 
disagreement that is endemic in political life should … be a central question 
in any democracy‟ (Ibid., p. 7). The emphasis should be on finding 
justifications that minimise differences between conflicting parties. In doing 
so mutual respect is promoted; a value at the heart of deliberative democracy 
(Ibid.).  
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The roots of deliberative democracy go back as far as ancient Athens, 
although the conception then differs from that of today. Pericles and Aristotle 
both articulated the value of deliberation. Pericles, however, spoke in the 
context of the elitist „citizen-dominated‟ democracy of Athens, and Aristotle, 
whilst seeing the virtues of deliberation by the many, preferred aristocracy. 
Even John Stuart Mill preferred deliberation to be led by the better educated  
(Ibid., p. 8-9). However, Mill‟s influence on modern deliberative democracy 
can be observed, as the authors state: „Through the give-and-take of 
argument, participants can learn from each other, come to recognize their 
individual and collective misapprehensions, and develop new views and 
policies that can more successfully withstand critical scrutiny‟ (Ibid., p. 12).  
 
The lasting appeal of deliberative democratic ideas is evident in their 
adoption and continuation by modern political parties. The Community 
Politics of the 1970s Liberal Party is still to this day advocated by the Liberal 
Democrats and represents a relatively unsuccessful attempt to forge a more 
deliberative style of local politics (Meadowcroft, 2001). Electoral gain was not 
to be the main outcome of the Community Politics strategy, rather, it sought 
„a reformation of representational relationships to create a participatory 
democracy‟ (Ibid., p. 26). Vestiges of this style may still be advocated actively 
by some Liberal Democrat groups, meaning that it is a mainstream part of 
local politics in many areas.  
 
Deliberative legitimacy 
Legitimacy and the value of „talk‟ in the OS context are key themes that 
emerge in the findings of the thesis. To its advocates, deliberative democracy 
can enhance legitimacy; one of Benhabib‟s three „public goods‟ (1994, p. 26) 
of complex modern democracies. Barber also credits the legitimising function 
of democratic talk. The conception of talk employed by Barber is expansive 
and includes „every human interaction that involves language or linguistic 
symbols‟ (2003, p. 173), it is highly reciprocal, receptive and empathetic 
(Ibid., p. 174). The purpose of talk in this context is not to arrive at the „truth‟ 
of a situation: „Conversation does not reify metaphysical certainty as political 
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unanimity; all it can hope to attain is a dynamic of interaction that permits 
transient convergences as well as ongoing differences and that makes 
moments of shared vision desirable oases in a never-ending conversational 
journey‟ (Ibid., p. 185).  
 
The legitimacy granted by deliberation is grounded in the discourse model of 
ethics and politics, which assumes that arrangements and rules of action can 
be valid only when agreed upon by those affected consequentially. This is 
contingent upon a deliberative process consisting of equality and symmetry 
in initiating speech, debate, questioning and interrogation; the right to 
question the assigned topics of conversation; the right to initiate argument 
about the rules of the discourse procedure, with no rules limiting the agenda 
or the participants involved, assuming they are relevantly affected by the 
proposed outcome. This model „formulates the most general principals and 
moral intuitions behind the validity claims of a deliberative model of 
democracy‟ (Benhabib, 1994, p. 31, author's emphasis). However, Benhabib 
argues that this may neglect practicality, as „the procedural specifics of those 
special argumentation situations called “practical discourses” are not 
automatically transferable to a macro-institutional level nor is it necessary 
that they should be so transferable‟ (Ibid.). Despite this view, deliberation 
should generate a degree of practicality as well as legitimacy. Practicality can 
lie in the ability of deliberation to impart information and assist in the 
formulation and ordering of coherent preferences within a public policy 
context. An example of this in the current financial climate is the new 
chancellor‟s attempt to involve the public in decisions around spending cuts.  
 
In its practical application there should, nevertheless, be an awareness of the 
possible misinterpretations, misapplications and abuse of the procedure that 
can occur. However, Benhabib refers to an inherent provision against such 
abuse in „the reflexivity condition built into the model [that] allows abuses and 
misapplications at the first level to be challenged at a second, meta-level of 
discourse‟ (Ibid., p. 33). Additionally, the ability of all involved to initiative 
deliberative discourse means that no outcome is beyond revision and 
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ongoing scrutiny. Barber‟s „strong democracy‟ is an extension of this kind of 
democratic deliberation. Barber defines it as „politics in the participatory 
mode where conflict is resolved in the absence of an independent ground 
through a participatory process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation and the 
creation of a political community capable of transforming dependent, private 
individuals into free citizens and partial and private interests into public 
goods‟ (2003, p. 132). The process of deliberation over political problems is 
conducted by the citizenry through media such as multiple choice referenda,1 
neighbourhood assemblies and technological innovations. The emphasis 
placed on citizenship arises from the creation of a public capable of 
reasonable public deliberation, including the ability to provide challenge. The 
public become citizens when this ability to self-legislate is granted and acted 
upon: „Anyone can be an actor. Only a citizen can be a political actor … To 
speak of those who choose with deliberation and act with responsibility is in 
the political realm to speak of citizens‟ (Ibid., p. 126, author's emphasis). It is 
assumed that in such a situation community would be strengthened by the 
deliberative process (Ibid., p. 152). 
 
Implications for the individual 
Enhanced public deliberation does not place an abstract community prior to 
the individual in terms of significance or purpose; in that respect, the „strong‟ 
democratic mode does not privilege democracy at the expense of traditionally 
conceived individual liberty (Ibid., p. 133). It is not, therefore, inimical to the 
UK system of liberal democracy. Community is seen as something arising 
from, rather than being prior to „strong‟ democratic practice. Indeed, Barber 
writes of „the creation of community as one of the chief tasks of political 
activity in the participatory mode‟ (Ibid., p. 133, emphasis added). Unlike 
forms of consensual democracy which may seek to sideline conflict, Barber‟s 
strong democracy acknowledges the importance of conflict to the political 
process. In this acknowledgement, the liberal idea of intractable conflict is 
                                                 
1 
This is to contribute to the deliberative process, rather than reduce political debate to „yes / 
no‟ simplicity (see Barber, 2003, pp. 286-288). Brooks concurs and elaborates the point in 
stating that „referendums may reduce complicated policy debates to simplistic opposites and 
risk hardening attitudes‟ (1999, p. 52).  
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modified in favour of „a politics that can transform conflict into cooperation 
through citizen participation, public deliberation, and civic education‟ (Ibid., p. 
135).  
 
Criticism of deliberative democracy 
Several critics have adopted a stance similar to that of Josie Brooks, who has 
qualified her praise by referring to the dangers of replicating exclusion within 
the deliberative forum: 
 
Deliberative democracy is very appealing. It has the potential to 
enhance democracy and to provide a practical display of civic behaviour 
that may effectively by-pass political cleavages. Yet, there remain some 
questions about the ability of deliberative forums to overcome the 
difficulties of exclusion that are apparent elsewhere in society. Factors 
such as gender, education and ethnicity are factors which contribute to 
political exclusion. Whilst deliberative forums may use strategies which 
aim to ensure those citizens that participate reflect the social and 
demographic composition of the community, there remains the question 
of whose voice predominates (1999, p. 53).  
 
The findings of this doctoral research suggest that OS functions are very 
aware of the need to address this risk of exclusion in their processes. For 
example, many OS functions, when scoping topics for scrutiny, will 
specifically address this in their terms of reference and associated 
documentation. However, institutionalised exclusion cannot be overcome by 
this alone, which poses a challenge to OS processes. 
 
Margaret Kohn builds on Brooks‟ critique in stating that „reasonable ness‟, a 
key facet of deliberative democracy, is a social construct „which usually 
benefits those already in power‟ (2000, p. 409). Power relations are also 
reflected in language, therefore „the normative validity of the resulting 
intersubjective consensus would always be provisional and open to further 
contestation‟ (Ibid., p. 410). On this basis she takes issue with Jürgen 
Habermas‟ idea that an „ideal speech‟ situation can provide a platform for 
„rational, intersubjective consensus about norms‟ (Ibid., p. 411). Existing 
power relations may be replicated in deliberation and meanings can be 
convoluted. Similarly, Meadowcroft voices concern over the prevalence of 
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traditionally dominant socio-economic groups in deliberative processes, 
concluding: „The promise of Community Politics and other models of 
deliberative democracy for meaningful popular participation in political 
decision-making may ultimately prove incompatible with the liberal 
democratic requirements of democratic accountability and equity‟ (2001, p. 
39). 
 
Cass R. Sunstein shows how „enclave deliberation‟, a process involving 
deliberation amongst the like-minded, who happen to talk or live for much of 
the time in isolated enclaves, is „simultaneously, a potential danger to social 
stability, a source of social fragmentation or even violence, and a safeguard 
against social injustice and unreasonableness‟ (2003, p. 82). Sunstein‟s 
primary concern is „group polarization‟, a phenomenon common in bodies 
deliberating myriad subjects all over the world which drives homogeneous 
groups to a more extreme stance „in the direction indicated by the members‟ 
predeliberation tendencies‟ (Ibid., p. 81). The primary mechanisms underlying 
„group polarization‟ are people‟s desire to maintain their reputation and their 
particular self-conception, and the limited number of „argument pools‟ to be 
found in any group which lead group members in certain directions (Ibid.). 
OS can challenge „group polarization‟ occurring amongst public service 
professionals but, ironically, it as a process can also fall victim to the 
phenomenon, if its processes are not widely inclusive and deliberative.  
 
An advocate of deliberative democracy, Archon Fung (2004, p. 100) identifies 
a further five „critical takes‟ on deliberative democracy, based on the following 
perspectives explored below: 
 Strong rationality  
 Strong egalitarian  
 Social capital  
 Cultural difference  
 Expertise  
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Strong rationality 
The strong rationality (rational choice) perspective simply states that human 
motivations and behaviour are fundamentally self-interested and therefore 
inimical to deliberation. Involvement in deliberative processes would be only 
to further one‟s own interests and these interests would be relatively 
unwaveringly pursued, despite any countering opinion or prevailing generally 
accepted notion of communal good arising from deliberation. Political 
situations in which people meet involve the quest for a single „social choice‟ 
as a result of the meeting. The rational choice perspective would see the 
social choice as resulting from „the aggregation of conflicting individual 
interests via negotiation and bargaining, voting, domination, or some other 
such mechanism‟ (Ibid., p. 106). This is as opposed to a social choice 
resulting from balanced and rational deliberation involving the key facets of 
justification, legitimation and „reasonableness‟ (Kohn, 2000, p. 409) 
discussed earlier. 
 
Strong egalitarian 
Strong egalitarian critique of deliberative democratic processes is grounded 
on the entrenched socio-economic inequalities facing participants. This can 
be seen as both a procedural barrier, whereby the actual process of 
deliberation is exclusive and participants‟ ability to input is therefore unequal, 
and as a producer of unequal policy outputs. So in the case of the former the 
tendency for more highly educated people, for example, to be involved in 
political actions (Pattie et al., 2004, p. 85) may mean that in many 
deliberative forums they predominate. This in turn could make it more difficult 
and less attractive for less well-educated people to participate. As a 
consequence, policy outputs from deliberations may be unfairly skewed in 
favour of a particular (in this case the more highly educated) segment of 
society.  
 
Social capital 
‘Generalized reciprocity‟ is the idea that an individual will act in the interests 
of another now, in the knowledge that at some point he or she will, in turn, 
benefit from the actions of another (Fung, 2004, p. 120); it is a cornerstone of 
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social capital theory and in certain communities it is in short supply. Those 
adopting a social capital-based critique of deliberation would argue that this 
militates against either participation itself, or good quality participation in the 
political process.1 The underlying judgement is that „participatory schemes ... 
require rich civic resources, dense networks of associations and norms‟ 
(Ibid., p. 100).  
 
Cultural difference  
The cultural difference critique is predicated on the idea that success in 
democratic institutions and deliberative schemes rests upon homogeneity. 
Where there is no homogeneity, „culturally advantaged parties‟ (Ibid.) will 
dominate to the detriment of balanced deliberation. This will lead to 
exclusivity in terms of those involved in deliberation, as the dominated will 
withdraw or refrain from participating in the first instance. The outcome, then, 
would be policy based upon the needs and interests of the dominant group.  
 
Expertise 
Quite simply, this critique states that the complex policy problems of today 
are unsuitable for non-expert involvement (Ibid., p. 128). The particularly 
centralised system of government employed in England could make this 
argument even more applicable as full time experts are required to keep 
abreast of central government guidance and regulations, as well as the 
frequently updated requirements of their own professional bodies. Against 
this backdrop, even if the lay person could make a useful contribution to 
expert deliberation, it would be highly unlikely that they would be up-to-date 
with the ever-changing legislative, regulatory and good practice requirements 
that govern public service delivery.   
 
There are clearly arguments both for and against deliberative democratic 
processes. New Labour‟s positive attitude to democratic deliberation led to 
moves towards greater participation in decision-making and some 
deliberative innovations (Coaffee, 2005, p. 30). Initiatives such as Best Value 
                                                 
1
 See chapter 5.2 on social capital for comprehensive discussion of the concept.  
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and the „Big Conversation‟ all entailed a two-way discussion with the 
electorate, with e-democracy, postal voting and innovations such as elected 
mayors1 supposedly facilitating wider public deliberation.2 However, what has 
emerged has fallen drastically short of the deliberative ideal (Lowndes & 
Wilson, 2001). Nevertheless, the coalition government‟s ideas around „Big 
Society‟ clearly have deliberative democratic undertones that indicate the 
idea has resilience across the party political divide.  
 
Observing deliberative democracy during the research 
Local authorities develop policy i n conjunction with a variety of external 
stakeholders, a concept used throughout the thesis to refer to all those not 
mainstreamed within the membership or employ of the council, but with an 
interest in its work. As previously described, it is an intentionally broad 
ranging term, including children and young people up to top ranking local 
professionals. This is a reflection of the complexity of the cross-cutting 
challenges facing the public sector and the need to work collaboratively to 
address these; in such circumstances all could be said to hold a stake in the 
work of the council and its partners. A good example of such a challenge is 
climate change, which requires the full engagement of every external 
stakeholder to assist the local authority in the fulfilment of its duty to reduce 
the quantity of waste going to landfi ll, levels of harmful emissions, and so on.  
 
To illustrate, the general public divides household waste into recyclables and 
non-recyclables, local businesses work to reduce their carbon footprint, and 
public agencies enforce environmental regulations, mitigate the impact of 
climate change through flood defences, etc., and undertake a range of other 
activities to address the climate change imperative. Much of what drives this 
work could be described as coercive, for example, the use of legislation to 
compel councils and others to act. In turn, councils may impose policies such 
                                                 
1
 „The mayor would be a strong political and community leader with whom the electorate 
could identify‟ (DETR, 1998a, para. 5.14, p. 31).  
2 
Although Chris Game (2003) judges the government‟s policy of encouraging the adoption of 
directly elected mayors a failure, and Colin Copus states that „[e]nhanced involvement  and 
public deliberation are … not automatic results from mayoral politics‟ (2004, p. 587).  
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as alternate weekly household waste collections and „twin bins‟ to reduce 
levels of non-recyclable waste going to landfi ll. Where a less coercive 
approach is desirable, councils use a wide range of initiatives to engage with 
the general public and other external stakeholders in order to gather opinion 
about current practices or discuss the future design and delivery of services 
in question.1 Only some of this engagement could be described as 
deliberative if the concepts of subjective legitimacy, justification and 
reasonableness - described earlier in this chapter - are qualifying criteria. 
Chart 3 (p. 112) gives an indication of the prevalence of deliberative 
initiatives in relation to non-deliberative initiatives used by councils in 2001-
2002 with reference to the following list of engagement methods from Wilson 
and Game (2006, p. 46): 
 
 Traditional methods 
o Public meetings / consultation documents 
o Co-option to council committees 
o Public question and answer sessions at council or committee 
meetings  
 
 Consumerist methods – concerned mainly with aspects of service 
delivery 
o Complaints / suggestion schemes 
o Service satisfaction surveys, service-specific or authority-wide 
 
 Consultative methods 
o Interactive websites 
o Citizens‟ panels – statistically representative panels of 1000+ 
residents 
o Local referendums 
 
 Forums – gatherings of residents with a shared background or 
experience 
                                                 
1
 Participation and the ways of eliciting it are discussed in chapter 4.2 (p. 70) 
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o Service user forums 
o Area or neighbourhood forums 
o Issue forums 
o Shared interest forums 
 
 Deliberative methods – to encourage the in-depth consideration of 
issues 
o Focus groups – small discussion groups of 10–12  selected 
residents 
o Community plans / needs analysis – setting priorities for local 
service provision 
o Visioning exercises – getting participants to „vision‟ some aspect of 
the future  
o Citizens‟ juries – extended and evidence-based consideration of a 
policy area  
 
 User management – direct citizen control over local services 
o For example, tenant management co-operatives, community-
run nurseries and youth clubs  
 
The following chart details the approximate percentage of counci ls stating 
that they had used each of the above methods during 2001-2002 (derived 
from Wilson & Game, 2006, p. 46): 
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Chart 3: Participation methods and their usage by councils in 2001-02 
 
 
What then separates the „deliberative‟ methods from the „non-deliberative‟ 
methods? Drawing upon earlier review of the literature, it can be seen that at 
fundamental level the difference arises from the competency bestowed by 
the process, the level of autonomy conferred and the assumed nature of the 
interrelationship between citizen and council. To illustrate, Wilson and 
Game‟s „traditional‟ methods bestow some competency in that they actively 
seek the opinion of the governed, although – as with the majority of 
participation initiatives - the governor is not bound by those opinions; little 
autonomy is granted due to the governor‟s ownership / framing of the 
question to be addressed – typified in consultation documents - the issue to 
be addressed is therefore based strictly on his or her terms; and the 
governor‟s interrelationship with the citizenry is paternalistic. For example, 
council question and answer sessions are by definition predicated on the 
governor holding a meaningful „answer‟. „Consumerist‟ methods, the most 
popular of those employed by councils in 2001-2002 (see chart 3, p. 112), 
include complaint / suggestion schemes and service satisfaction surveys. 
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Both of these techniques were employed by 90% of those councils polled, yet 
they have been criticised for eliciting „at best snap responses rather than 
considered judgements on a given issue‟ (Beetham, 1996, p. 44).  
 
Where deliberative forms of democratic engagement depart from this is at the 
point at which the process is conceived: from the outset the design of the 
process must be correct both procedurally and in principle (see Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2003, p. 31-33). In the case of the former, this involves ensuring 
that deliberative procedure facilitates reciprocity and engagement by all on 
an equal footing. In terms of principal, it involves a reframing of the role of 
citizen vis-à-vis public service provider, and a willingness on behalf of the 
latter to be genuinely responsive to the findings of a properly invested 
deliberative democratic process. Such a process would involve an array of 
stakeholders representing the wider population as far as possible. This would 
include service providers and democratic representatives and would involve 
measures to ensure the inclusion of those either explicitly or implicitly 
disenfranchised from the process; one such measure could be the use of 
facilitators (see for example Barber, 2003, p. 271-272) committed to the 
integrity of the process. Open questions on a given subject would be placed 
before the deliberative group with an expectation that a clearly definable next 
step arise from the process of deliberation (even if this is simply to reconvene 
to consider the issue at a second session). Reciprocity would be the guiding 
principle, stating „that citizens owe one another justifications for the mutually 
binding laws and public policies they collectively enact‟ (Ibid., p. 33), although 
these justifications must go beyond basic reasoning.   
 
To illustrate further, Figure 2 (p. 114) shows roughly the distinctions that can 
be drawn between the various participation methods described above.  
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Figure 3: Comparing participation methods 
 
Measure 
Method 
Competency bestowed Autonomy conferred Citizen / service provider interrelationship 
Traditional Gives the public a voice within a 
relatively tightly prescribed 
framework of discussion: e.g. 
specific questions are posed in 
formal consultation documents 
Limited: participation on the council‟s terms, be it 
through co-option or  public Q&A in council 
meetings, etc.  
User / provider:  
 
Individual service recipients giving their views 
Consumerist Very specific: an opportunity to 
rate or submit comments on a 
service or aspect of life in the 
local authority area  
Very limited: an opportunity to provide feedback on, 
often, immediate first impressions of a service. 
Little opportunity for considered reflection and 
typically simplistic feedback mechanisms (star 
ratings, etc.) 
Customer / provider:  
 
Individual service users providing assessments of 
council services as they would as product 
customers in a commercial environment  
Consultative Varying levels of competency 
bestowed, often dependent 
upon the topic in question  
Limited: autonomy is constrained by the posing of 
the questions in hand by the service provider 
User / provider: groups of service recipients giving 
their considered collective view (in the case of 
citizens‟ panels); or, the views of many individual 
users analysed in aggregate (e.g. referendum 
responses) 
Forums Varying levels of competency 
bestowed: often greater due to 
the knowledge and specific 
interest of those typically 
involved 
Moderate: within the broader scope of the group, 
there is often little prescription as to the topics 
under consideration; e.g. Neighbourhood Policing  
Panels allow the communication of general 
community safety matters by residents directly to 
the authorities in attendance 
Partnership: within the scope of the particular issue 
/ service under consideration, the relationship can 
be described as a partnership; e.g. in the case of 
the Neighbourhood Policing Panels, residents, in 
forum, set the priorities for the local neighbourhood 
policing team  
Deliberative Relatively greater competency 
bestowed than with other 
methods: influence a given, 
often involving an opportunity to 
redesign policy 
Moderate: more likely to proceed with very open 
questions / topics for discussion with subject matter 
demarcated to a lesser extent  
Partnership: especially where policy / service 
delivery can be effected as a result of deliberative 
processes  
User 
management  
Significant / complete 
competency granted over the 
service in question 
Significant / complete within statutory / locally 
agreed limitations  
Partnership 
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A major objective of the research is to investigate the extent to which OS is 
engaging a wide variety of external stakeholders in a richer, stronger form of 
democracy – more inclusive and deliberative than seen previously - at the 
local level. Throughout the research, processes defined as deliberative will 
be those matching broadly the description provided throughout chapter 5.4, 
which is summarised in Figure 3, above. 
 
5.5 Overview and scrutiny: facilitating participation? 
Many commentators have expressed high hopes for OS in its capacity to 
engage the public and other external stakeholders. For example, the CfPS 
has stated that: „The overview and scrutiny function of the local authority is 
increasingly becoming recognised as having the potential to reconnect local 
government to the public‟ (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2005, p. 4 author's 
emphasis). Academics too, such as Howard Davis and Mike Geddes have 
mentioned that „[m]any believe that scrutiny committees will, in time, prove to 
be a valuable method of informing and opening up local political debate‟ 
(2000, p. 16). Why is OS better placed than other local authority structures to 
facilitate participation in local governance? 
 
Freedom from the party whip 
Under old arrangements, councillors, especially of the Labour Party (Brooks, 
1999, p. 55; Leach, 2004), had been under strict discipline. Under the new 
arrangements this has ceased to be the case. For example, Rao cites 
research which states that only 15 per cent of councillors report whipping in 
scrutiny operations (2006, p. 22). By removing from them the decision-
making function elected members have been freed in some contexts from 
party discipline. Although questions have been raised on member autonomy 
when deliberating areas in which there is a clear party policy (Stewart, 2003, 
p. 81), the new arrangements potentially enable a far greater concern with 
public rather than party grievances. The implications of this are clear: 
potentially, external stakeholders can be involved at every stage in the OS 
function, working closely with elected representatives towards a common 
goal. As Stewart has stated „[p]articipatory democracy does not replace 
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representative democracy but informs it‟ (Ibid., p. 46), therefore the 
relationship between the public and their representatives regarding 
participation is one of great importance (Copus, 2003), and can be mutually 
reinforcing. The councillor provides the time and knowledge, and the public 
provides the impetus for change and adds legitimacy to the 
recommendations of OS.   
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Overview and scrutiny is a non party-political forum 
It would be naïve to assume that this is true in all authorities as the work of 
Leach and Copus (2004) has shown. Whilst in accordance with its original 
The overview and scrutiny function is ideally placed to facilitate 
external stakeholder participation for a variety of reasons: 
 
 It is, officially, a non party-political forum, meaning debate is not 
encumbered with ideology  
 Member and external stakeholder co-working provides a 
complimentary balance between representative and participatory 
forms of democracy  
 Health scrutiny, the scrutiny of Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships and Local Area Agreement partners provide added 
competency in the ability to formulate recommendations in these 
vitally important areas 
 Flexibility of working arrangements 
 A specific OS review topic means that the terms of reference are clear 
 Knowledgeable members are available to inform and steer the 
process 
 Dedicated officer support is often available to facilitate the process  
 The competencies of OS can be explained from the outset meaning 
no confusion over what can be achieved 
 In sum, the OS process is composed of numerous elements, each of 
which can be used to elicit participation 
 Access to complaints and petitions can provide an instant topic for 
scrutiny and potential participants in the complainants or the 
petitioners 
 The relationship engendered between member and constituent / 
partner organisation can be informative and ongoing following a 
scrutiny review 
 Minuted proceedings enable focus, accountability and consistency of 
approach 
 Proximity to service heads and other senior management coupled 
with the ability to require their attendance before the OS committee 
enhances participatory competency 
 The ability to „call-in‟ decisions can enhance the competency of the 
participatory initiative 
 Easy access to relevant information can enhance participatory 
working through OS  
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conception (Leach, 2004, p. 84) OS is procedurally non-partisan, it is unclear 
whether this is always so on a substantive basis.  
 
The non-party political framework of OS is crucial in its potential to facilitate 
participation. Importantly, however, Leach and Copus have described the 
local councillor‟s „Burkean‟ (2004, p. 339; also Copus, 1999, p. 97) approach 
to representation and state: „councillors from the three main parties travel 
different intellectual journeys to come to the same conclusion: acting in 
identifiable, coherent party groupings is the most appropriate and effective 
way of conducting council politics‟ (Ibid.). With reference to this, Copus has 
described a situation which can potentially create disharmony between 
participant and representative: „When a collision of views occurs between 
citizen and the councillor supporting his or her party group on a particular 
local issue, a crisis develops in the processes of local representation, and the 
participatory tensions are thrown into sharp relief‟ (1999, p. 89; see also 
Stoker, 1996, p. 17). On occasion members will need to avoid and overcome 
these crises if the participatory potential of OS is to be released. 
 
The extent to which any insidious politicking may affect citizen participation is 
uncertain and would likely depend on factors such as the topic and content of 
the review in hand, the political composition of the authority and the status 
afforded OS by council. It is possible to contend that the clear scope of a 
scrutiny review would leave little room for political machinations and 
manipulation of any external participants to any significant party end.  If a 
positive view of OS is taken, in which party politics are sidelined for the 
purposes of cross-party deliberation and executive accountability, OS can 
provide an ideal forum for representative-constituent co-working on an issue 
of concern. In this context, it is certainly better than a more open forum which 
may not defend the external participants from politicking with the admittedly 
limited conceptual and procedural safeguards provided by OS. 
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Elected member and external stakeholder co-working 
provides a complimentary balance between representative 
and participatory forms of democracy 
 
Numerous participatory and deliberative democrats already referred to have 
outlined the importance of the complimentary role they envisage for 
participatory mechanisms. Deliberative forums, e-democracy, etc. are not on 
the whole intended to supplant representative democracy (Teorell, 2006, p. 
790). Even Barber (2003), who has specified an entire reform programme 
built on participatory and deliberative foundations stipulated the importance 
of co-operation.  
 
Likewise, a one-off deliberative initiative such as Ackerman and Fishkin‟s 
(2003) „Deliberation Day‟ is conceived of within representative democratic 
confines, as are Study Circles, deliberative forums of increasing popularity in 
the USA (Leighninger & McCoy, 1998). It is also the case that any ideas of 
enhanced participation in local government coming from central government 
are firmly within the confines of representative democracy (Copus, 1999, p. 
88). If participation is assumed to be within the confines of representative 
democracy and the aim is to enhance the latter, OS can build and facilitate a 
relationship to that effect by simply allowing representatives and external 
stakeholders to work together mutually, reciprocally and democratically.  
 
External scrutiny expands the competency of OS   
That OS can check the actions of highly important external bodies makes it 
an ideal conduit for public concern in those areas. For example, health 
service bodies such as local NHS Trusts must „have regard‟ to the 
recommendations of OS. However, there are issues surrounding aspects of 
health OS, centred on the division of competency, which affect two-tier 
authorities:  
 
In two-tier authorities, district councils are likely to have a particularly 
close involvement with the concerns of local communities and are also 
responsible for a number of services that have a crucial impact on local 
well-being. However, statutory responsibility for health scrutiny lies with 
the county authorities. It was clear from our survey that the need for 
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close liaison between the two-tiers had been recognized and a range of 
mechanisms, such as co-option and delegation, to facilitate 
collaboration between the two were reported (Coleman & Glendinning, 
2004, p. 37).  
 
Indeed, the success of external OS in general relies in large part on the 
extent to which it is carried out in partnership.  
 
A scrutiny review endows participation with clear terms of 
reference  
 
The OS review usually proceeds with regard to a single issue within a single 
framework. The issue is the topic concerned, which may vary in outlook from 
operational to strategic and can include a huge variety of subjects. The 
framework is the OS process, which will typically consist of cross-party non-
executive members deliberating with officer support. The end is the 
formulation of recommendations on the topic, hopefully following a period of 
evidence gathering and deliberation. This combination can provide 
assurance to external participants that their contribution is not part of an 
arbitrary „consultation‟ process with unrealistic expectations and unclear 
outcomes, but that their input adds to the creation of productive and positive 
recommendations which can provoke real change.  
 
Member knowledge and expertise can complement the 
participatory process 
 
Members are ideally placed to assist external participants throughout the OS 
process. The networks of which they are a part, the contacts that they have, 
their knowledge of democratic practice and the workings of local authorities, 
all place them in a privileged position. However, there have also been doubts 
expressed about the willingness of members to take this role within a context 
of greater participation:  
 
There is also a good deal of anxiety among back-bench councillors that 
their decision-making role is in danger of being usurped by an 
increased focus upon public participation. They saw themselves as 
“patch representatives” and public participation as undermining that. 
This was a very sensitive issue. Sometimes political leaders support 
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participation schemes informally or even on the quiet for fear of 
upsetting fellow councillors. Public participation threatens the position of 
councillors as the voice of a locality. Representative democracy is the 
vehicle for their election; participatory democracy may therefore be 
seen in negative terms (Wilson, 1999, p. 251). 
 
This belief amongst members neglects the possibility that co-working with 
their constituents could potentially be a highly effective way of securing their 
support, regardless of outcomes. The positive effect that member assistance 
can have can only be realised if the attitude among members that Wilson 
discusses above is not allowed to prevail.  
 
Dedicated officer support provides reliable and professional 
facilitation 
 
Officers supporting the OS role liaise with members, research topics, monitor 
recommendations, question senior officers (sometimes „off the record‟) and 
play a role in steering reviews; this is among many other duties relating to 
OS. Officers also clerk the meetings, arranging diaries and taking minutes. 
Outside of OS support, other officers must be prepared to assist OS in the 
course of its work. They are also statutorily required to attend OS should a 
request be made.  
 
Scrutiny officers are undoubtedly vital to the process, not least in their 
provision of the aforementioned timely, accurate information. Whilst this may 
be so, it is important to carefully demarcate the scrutiny officer‟s role as it 
could be detrimental to the function if officers intrude on member 
competencies. It can be argued that the provision of dedicated officer support 
is one of the principal benefits of OS as a participatory mechanism. The main 
benefits are, undoubtedly, the provision of information and the compulsion to 
attend, but other activities such as producing minutes can provide valuable 
consistency of approach and accountability.  
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Each stage of the scrutiny review process can elicit external 
participation  
 
The first stage involves deciding what to scrutinise in a forthcoming period, 
for example the new municipal year, although obviously topics of urgency 
may provoke ad hoc scrutiny at any point throughout the year. Stakeholder 
participation in this initial stage relates usually, although not exclusively, to 
the submission of topics for a new work programme. This can be achieved 
either directly by appealing for topics through media such as a council 
newspaper, or indirectly, through the monitoring of complaints and petitions 
for possible topics.  
 
Naturally, those with a topic for the work programme will have a vested 
interest in the progress of any review which may take place regarding that 
topic. This lends itself to the participation of that particular stakeholder or 
group of stakeholders. This is the second point at which external participation 
can be conducive, the review itself. Through stakeholder identification 
exercises and subsequent initial contacts, those with a possible interest in a 
topic can be invited to attend. As issues become more contentious more care 
will have to be taken to „balance‟ participants in a review to avoid discursive 
homogeneity and Sunstein‟s (2003) aforementioned „law of group 
polarization‟.  
 
The final stage involves monitoring the uptake of recommendations, and 
possibly following up on a review should outcomes prove insufficient or 
unworthy. Enhanced legitimacy results from the involvement of stakeholders 
of varied opinion brought together for a period of rational, balanced 
deliberation. Throughout the whole OS process external participants can lend 
this level of legitimacy.  
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5.6 Deliberative OS: on the frontline of democratic 
renewal? 
 
OS can be highly conducive to „strong democratic‟ deliberative discourse 
between citizens, public service providers and elected representatives on 
issues earmarked for scrutiny. The nature of OS outlined above, which 
makes it as conducive to stakeholder participation, is often complimented by 
support from a dedicated officer structure. The officers involved can provide 
the enhanced role which Barber envisaged necessary for the operation of 
neighbourhood assemblies, that of „facilitator‟:  
 
[t]o protect the rights of the quiet as well as of the aggressive, and to 
make the assembly an effective forum for building agendas and 
debating issues … Facilitators, who would have no voting power, would 
be committed to the rules of fair discussion, open debate, and judicious 
outcomes and would not participate in any substantive fashion in 
discussion or debates (2003, p. 271-272). 
 
The role described by Barber is in the context of his wholesale democratic 
reform programme and as such should not be judged in isolation.  What can 
be derived from Barber‟s stipulation is the suitability, within a more limited 
context, of the scrutiny officer to fulfil a similar role in arbitrating, informing 
and reporting on OS processes. With an emphasis placed upon greater 
participation OS could go some way in reengaging an apathetic citizenry, 
leading to the increases in political equality and providing the educative 
function previously described (see p. 84). Playing the primary role in 
facilitating participation and conciliating between opposing interests are the 
elected members of the OSC.  In this role members can build trust and a 
sense of reciprocity with those involved, leading to a greater knowledge of 
the role of the local counci llor and greater mutual empathy.  
 
There are numerous benefits which can accrue through external stakeholder 
participation in OS processes. From a service improvement perspective 
stakeholder involvement offers enhanced legitimacy to OS 
recommendations. Also, the representative issue of white middle-class male 
dominance in party politics (Bochel & Bochel, 2004; Brackertz et al., 2005; 
 124 
 
Broussine & Fox, 2002; Brown et al., 1999; Childs, 2004; Sapiro, 1981; 
Wheeler, 2006) can be alleviated by involving women and different socio-
economic groups and their representative organisations in the OS process, 
although research amongst the South Asian community has shown that 
formal methods of engagement can reproduce social barriers to participation 
(Blakey et al., 2006), if unchecked.  
 
In terms of decision-making, enhanced deliberation through an open OS 
process can make it better informed, especially so when two or more 
opposing groups contribute to a review. In an outcome-focussed world this 
can help to identify service improvements, as expected from OS. The strong 
educative effect of participation can also be fostered through a scrutiny 
review. By involving interested parties, the workings and policies of an 
authority regarding the topic under review are laid bare. This also lends itself 
to greater transparency and knowledge of the workings of the authority. A 
broader educative benefit can also be attained as stakeholders in the OS 
process learn the workings of liberal democracy, and hopefully leave with the 
confidence to participate further, in local and national politics, or through civil 
society.  
 
In engaging external stakeholders in a deliberative dialogue OS can 
accumulate the benefits already highlighted in terms of added legitimacy, 
broader perspectives and ultimately better quality decision-making. Outside 
of the OS review there may be added benefits which develop through the 
empowering experience of participation which accrue to the individuals 
concerned.  Whilst there is debate around the idea of a causative relationship 
between participation and social capital development (Segall, 2005), it is 
wrong to assume that even in a limited way, at least greater empathy would 
not result from participation. Ultimately, however, participation can provide 
the insights required to improve public services, meaning that it is of great 
relevance to the work of OS. 
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To summarise, for public participants, the OS process may provide: 
 
 Better services 
 Empowerment 
 Representation 
 An educative effect 
 A stronger sense of community 
 An outlet for views of the community 
 A voice for minorities and the socially excluded 
 Better links between the public and their representatives  
 Greater accountability and transparency from the local authority 
 
For OS committees and their members, greater participation may provide:  
 
 Enhanced legitimacy 
 Broader-based deliberation 
 A broader knowledge base 
 A forum for debate  
 Better links between the public and their representatives 
 A higher public profile 
 A public presence should enhance member engagement 
 
For the authority as a whole and its partners, greater participation in OS 
processes may: 
 
 Provide all of the above, and; 
 Provide better links with the public 
 Increase the likelihood of greater participation in other areas  
 Lead to better value for money services 
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5.7 Summary 
Local government in the UK has been subjected to a steady loss of its 
traditional competencies. In previous years British local government had a 
hold over certain services and possessed greater autonomy than is the case 
today. To accompany this, in the mid-nineties the findings of Pratchett and 
Wingfield illustrated a decline in the traditional public service ethos:  
 
The findings clearly identify an erosion of some of the values of the 
public service ethos: interpretations of accountability are shifting away 
from democratic accountability towards contract and market 
accountability; the acceptance of bureaucratic rules and procedures is 
diminishing, especially amongst those who have been or are about to 
be exposed to competition; the fragmentation of local government into 
discrete business units is having a profound affect upon the collegial 
sense of community that characterised the traditional environment of 
local government, encouraging individuals to place the interests of their 
own part of the organisation above those of the wider organisation or 
community; and loyalties are being moved away from the traditional 
council wide focus towards more personally located loyalties. The 
changing nature of these features demonstrates that the principal 
foundations of the public service ethos are being eroded and 
undermined by current changes in the organisation and management of 
local government (1996, p. 122). 
 
The phenomenon has also been attributed by Barberis (2001) to 
indiscriminate use by central government of a „heavy‟ regulatory regime.  
 
How these developments will impact on attempts to increase participation is 
unknown. It can be assumed that if there has been a decline of the public 
service ethos it would lead to a lack of motivation, at least among officers, to 
develop participatory opportunities. In addition to this is the fact that a web of 
local governance organisations today share in the administration of an area, 
with counci ls as a powerful joint partner in the process. Not all of these 
organisations have the vested interest in local democracy inherent in local 
government. 
 
Increased partnership working and the use of quangos to deliver services 
has necessarily involved the downgrading of some local authority functions, 
which may have an effect on traditional forms of participation. The 
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democratic credentials of some of the organisations to which power has 
shifted are questionable and whatever opportunities there are to participate 
through them are limited. Whilst, superficially, opportunities and the desire to 
participate via local government may have declined, central government 
stipulations have enforced the need to consult and engage with stakeholders, 
especially through bodies such as Local Strategic Partnerships, Local Area 
Agreements and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships.  
 
The irony is that this participatory drive is in response to and set against the 
context of „hollowed out‟ governance and a broader epoch of apathy with 
traditionally conceived democratic processes. A great move toward 
participation has occurred in an era in which its realisation is highly 
problematic. This would be attributed by some to intrinsic flaws within liberal 
democracy itself (Barber, 2003). In a similar vein, others have argued that 
liberal democracy has been „parabolic‟ in its historical development, 
displaying characteristics today that are antithetical to democracy and 
conducive to apathy (Crouch, 2004).  
 
At the national level there have been claims that in a globalised era 
supranationalism has distanced citizen from government. In the words of 
Stoker: „Globalisation has not ended the capacity for politics but it has 
pushed it into new and more remote settings‟ (2006a, p. 189). Yet, it is at this 
global level that some of the key issues facing democracy arise. Business 
and capital have gone global, yet at that level politics has not established in 
any substantive form (see Stoker, 2006a, p. 186-187), let alone in any kind of 
participative style. In such circumstances the participatory ideal of a self-
governing community is „deeply problematic‟ (Stoker, 1996, p. 4).  
 
Whilst some of the arguments presented so far have developed a bleak 
image of traditional political engagement in the UK, a more holistic view of 
engagement may present a different image. Indeed, when taking into account 
the broader-based forms of political participation considered by Pattie, Seyd 
and Whiteley the opposite would appear to be the case; they state „that 
contrary to the claims of political apathy, people frequently participate in 
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activities designed to influence political outcomes‟ (2004, p. 80). Given the 
disenchantment with politicians and political institutions that has been 
documented, it is perhaps unsurprising that more people are channelling their 
opinions and politics into activities and groups extraneous to the traditional 
framework, a phenomenon recently described by Cabinet Secretary Sir Gus 
O‟Donnell:  
 
Traditionally [participation] has been through political mechanisms: local 
and national elections, membership of political parties. Given declining 
voter turnout and decreasing party membership, it has been said that 
citizens today are not as interested in issues that affect society as 
previous generations. The truth is perhaps more complex. What is 
evident is rising interest in single issues (the mobilization of people 
around the „Make Poverty History‟ campaign is a good example), 
coupled with confidence in alternatives to conventional transmission 
mechanisms to affect change (2007, p. 90). 
 
Political apathy may not be the sign of a populace any more indifferent 
towards politics in general than previous generations. What has occurred 
perhaps is a populace that has grown out of traditional UK style 
representative democracy, and has consequentially lost interest in the 
current political process. As Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley have shown: 
„Traditional representative, collectively organised politics is being steadily 
replaced by individualistic, consumerist politics‟ (2004, p. 79). Given this, 
introducing measures such as enhanced ICT is not enough as „it cannot … 
be a satisfactory substitute for personal presence‟ (Buchstein, 1997, p. 260). 
Nor are calls for greater consultation, which is limited by definition.  A more 
complete overhaul of democracy is needed to make politics more interesting 
to the few who may wish to participate more substantively.  
 
With the introduction of OS the Local Government Act 2000 went some way 
in providing, potentially, a partial but significant tool for this overhaul in the 
form of OS. It can be argued that factors highlighted, briefly, freedom from 
the party whip, cross-party deliberation, flexibility and dedicated officer 
facilitation, endow OS with the means to provide a radical form of deliberative 
democracy at a local level.   
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6. Methodology 
 
This study applies the principles and practice of qualitative research to 
address several areas in relation to external stakeholder engagement with 
OS processes. Within the parameters of the research, it is broadly concerned 
with the following:  
 
 Typical participants: 
o Experts 
o Lay people  
o Public / private / other sector professionals 
 
 How participants are identified: 
o Self-selection 
o Targeted 
o Intermediary 
 
 At what stage they are involved: 
o Work programme formulation 
o During the course of a review 
o Tracking recommendations / identifying outcomes 
 
 Member, officer and external stakeholder views: 
o Varieties of participation encountered  
o Duration 
o Benefit derived  
 
The methodology chapter briefly describes grounded theory and the research 
methods employed by the study. It discusses the sample and how it was 
arrived at, the role of the literature and some of the main considerations 
when researching councillors, officers and external stakeholders. 
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6.1 Why qualitative research? 
OS, how it operates and how it is arranged is determined by the preferences 
of individuals (councillors) operating within a political system. A qualitative 
approach offers the best means of beginning to understand those 
preferences and how they interact with those of others across the case study 
authorities. The research questions focus broadly on the extent to which 
external stakeholders are engaged in OS processes: this is largely 
determined by the political priorities of those engaged in the process, which 
would be very difficult to quantify meaningfully without reference to their 
individual politics, personalities and prejudices. As Flick puts it, „[q]ualitative 
research is of specific relevance to the study of social relations, owing to the 
fact of the pluralization of life worlds‟ (2006, p. 11). Semi-structured 
interviewing and observation of these individuals and processes in action 
allows both meaningful analysis of political and professional life worlds and 
useful conclusions to be drawn.  
 
Adding to the case for a qualitative approach is the complexity of the 
research subject and the wide ranging variables involved. For example, the 
multi-tiered system of local government in England is the most diverse in the 
UK, in some areas consisting of parish and town councils, district councils 
and county councils. Each council is unique and possesses its own individual 
democratic structures, municipal histories and particular longstanding policy 
issues leading to a diverse array of attitudes and opinions amongst elected 
members, officers and external stakeholders. Not all of these variables could 
be observed or explained through quantitative approaches; as Huczynski and 
Buchanan explain: „Some of the interesting variables in social science, like 
motives and learning, cannot be observed‟ (1991, p. 18). Therefore, to 
capture adequately the nuance that exists within and between OS 
arrangements, in a sea of often non-observable variables, would require a 
system that brings forth the narratives of those engaged in its operation. This 
would involve verbal communication – coupled with process observation - to 
explore how multitudinous variables interacted in the development of a given 
individual‟s views and approach to that individual‟s council‟s approach to OS. 
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In summary, as politics is essentially about people and human relationships, 
and OS is a political process existing in widely varying municipal 
circumstances, an early decision was made to rely upon a qualitative 
approach as a means to access the views, experiences and knowledge of 
those involved in shaping OS arrangements in the respective authorities.  
 
It is not that such research could not be conducted using quantitative 
methods; rather, it is argued here that qualitative methods are better suited to 
analyses of the histories, preferences and personal politics of those that 
comprise and shape the OS function. These arguments militate against a 
positivist approach to the research in which „only those phenomena which 
are observable, in the sense of being amenable to the senses, can validly be 
warranted as knowledge‟ (Bryman, 1988, p. 14). To adopt such an approach 
would be to neglect crucial non-observable factors. The anti-positivist stance 
adopted subsequently by the thesis has methodological implications in favour 
of the use of qualitative research methods. Whilst it would be wrong to state 
that quantitative methods and positivism are inextricably linked, the two do 
appear to be complementary, as Bryman‟s description would appear to 
indicate: „quantitative researchers have typically sought to conform to the 
methods and procedures of the natural sciences and consequently have 
been considerably influenced by positivism‟ (1988, p. 18).  Bryman also 
states that advocates of qualitative research „argued that this [natural science 
model] was an inappropriate model for studying people‟ (Ibid. p. 3).  
 
In accordance with these views, for the purpose of this research, positivism 
and associated quantitative methods are rejected in favour of an interpretive 
and qualitative approach. This, in turn, lent itself to an inductive approach as 
it was felt that to pose a hypothesis at the outset, to then be tested by the 
research, would risk oversimplifying the complexity of the subject matter. In 
addition to this, the broader applicability of such work, beyond the case study 
authorities, would be compromised due to the diversity of local political 
management arrangements nationwide. However, adoption of a grounded 
theory approach does result in, at micro-analytical level, interplay of inductive 
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and deductive approaches (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 136-137),1 but the 
macro-level approach of the research remains inductive.  
 
6.2 Grounded theory  
Grounded theory is widely used as a method of social analysis in the fields of 
education and health studies (Thomas & James, 2006, p. 2), primarily 
because it allows the researcher to derive theoretical conclusions from 
concepts grounded in the raw data. This allows the researcher to employ 
qualitative methods to really understand the situation from a human 
perspective and develop theoretical explanations of broader applicability.  
 
The word „theory‟ has wider connotations in the context of grounded theory, it 
„has taken a wide variety of meanings, loose and tight ... It can mean 
systems of evolving explanation, personal reflection, orienting principle, 
epistemological presupposition, developed argument, craft knowledge, and 
more‟ (Ibid., p. 5). Because of the inductive nature of grounded theory 
development, in the planning stages of the thesis it was not possible to state 
with any certainty the variety of theory that would emerge from the research, 
although the anti-foundational epistemological stance adopted lent itself to 
Bevir and Rhodes‟ approach, whereby „the “best” interpretation [is selected] 
by a process of gradual comparison‟ (2002, p. 142). 
 
Also underpinning this approach is the fact that the broader applicability of 
any findings would certainly be compromised by the array of political 
management arrangements across England. Further variables such as 
stakeholder / councillor relationships, party political matters, municipal history 
and interpersonal factors all weaken the broader applicability of the findings 
and, therefore, any definitive „theory‟ that may emerge. At best the findings 
could be said to be broadly applicable to other authorities of a similar 
composition, and could instead be better viewed as an indicator of the 
prospects and issues facing future external stakeholder participation in OS 
processes. The thesis also contributes to future development of OS by 
                                                 
1
 See „What is grounded theory?‟, below, for further explanation  
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making practical suggestions in relation to external stakeholder participation, 
based on the research findings. 
 
Why grounded theory? 
Grounded theory was utilised in the study as a means to develop an overall 
picture of the research topic across the case study authorities. It allows the  
researcher to be engaged in the subject matter, as the methodology contains 
strategies for identifying and mitigating any biases that the researcher may 
bring to the subject. This was especially important in a study such as this, in 
which the researcher brings prior professional knowledge to the research. 
The decision to adopt a grounded theory approach required analysis of other 
qualitative methods to determine their suitability. This process is outlined in 
the following, which gives an overview of alternative qualitative approaches 
(see Flick, 2006, p. 22-24).  
 
 Ethnomethodology 
An ethnomethodological approach would require the collection of „natural 
data‟ (Flick, 2006, p. 23) as a means to capture mundane verbal and 
social interactions. Ethnomethodology was introduced by Harold 
Garfinkel (1967), led to ethnographic studies of great similarity to 
traditional ethnographies and eventually spawned the sub-discipline of 
„conversation analysis‟, which drew heavily upon the presentation to the 
reader of full transcriptions and a degree of researcher interpretation 
(Bryman, 1988, p. 53). Ethnomethodology would not have provided the 
ability to contextualise interviews to the extent required by the relatively 
exact research questions posed by this thesis. As it relies upon 
unstructured interviews (Ibid.), a major risk would have been quite 
substantial deviation from the subject matter. The approach also lacks a 
coherent approach to theory development, relying instead upon reader 
inference based upon reproduction of raw data in the form of transcripts 
and recordings. Flick refers to a rejection by the approach of 
„reconstructing methods like interviews‟ (2006, p. 23); whilst a positive 
arising from this is the negation of researcher bias in the presentation of 
 134 
 
findings, a negative is that generally there is no attempt at higher level 
interpretation offered by the researcher.  
 
 Narrative analysis 
Narrative analyses are applied to data arising from interviews focussed 
on biographical experiences (narrative interviews). Broader topics arising 
from the narratives, such as coping with i llness or starting a new career, 
are then assessed. The idea that the „question – answer‟ approach 
adopted by semi- or completely structured interviews is problematic in 
terms of eliciting the subjective experiences of interviewees „is the 
methodological starting point for the propagation of using narratives‟ 
(Ibid. p. 172), and they are utilised predominantly for the purposes of 
biographical research (Ibid. p. 173). As a completely person-focussed 
approach, insofar as life events as experienced and elucidated by the 
individual are the primary focus, it is unsuitable for the purposes of this 
thesis. This is due to the need to elicit a range of opinions, beliefs and 
party political views from interviewees on topics as diverse as the role of 
politician vis-à-vis bureaucracy, the broader applicability of electoral 
mandate beyond the confines of the local authority, and so on. Whilst 
views on these matters may have a biographical component in their 
formation, essentially they are the products of professional and political 
conditioning, and could be grounded in issues of pragmatism and 
expediency. In summary, narrative analysis provides too little 
methodologically to enable thorough evaluation of the subject matter 
upon which the thesis is based.  
 
 Ethnography 
Ethnography is becoming increasingly common and it emphasises the 
importance of reaching an understanding of how social processes or 
events have developed by direct participation in them. It forgoes to a 
great extent second hand reports by those involved in these processes / 
events delivered via interviews, questionnaires, etc. This is primarily 
because of the role of the person delivering the account and their 
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inevitable bias (whether implicit or explicit) which would negatively impact 
on the theory that ethnography intends to develop. Because of the length 
of time needed for ethnographic study, and the tendency to focus in-
depth on one or a very small number of cases, it was considered 
unsuitable for this research.  
 
 Cultural studies 
Flick describes cultural studies as a „new trend‟ with little commitment, as 
yet, to „elaborate methodology and methodological principles‟ (Ibid., p. 
23). As a doctoral researcher greater methodological clarity and 
guidance would have to be present to make the approach an attractive 
alternative to grounded theory.  
 
 Gender studies 
Gender studies evaluate the construction and differentiation of gender 
and the inequalities that emerge as a result (Ibid.). The research 
questions don‟t focus to any extent of the role of gender, making a 
gender study inappropriate for the purposes of the research.  
 
What is grounded theory? 
Grounded theory has been subject to significant debate with its founders, 
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, providing the most high profile 
divergence of opinion on the subject. The two co-authored the first text on 
grounded theory (1967) but subsequently disagreed on much of the 
methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Glaser, 1992). Later work by others 
has, typically, accorded with the „Glaserian‟ or „Straussian‟ model, which are 
characterised by, respectively, broad adherence to the original conception 
outlined in 1967 and, in the case of the latter reformulation of this classic 
model. The separation was such that Glaser (1992) claimed that Strauss‟ 
model no longer represented grounded theory, but „full conceptual 
description‟ (cited in Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 142); however, the divergence 
is mainly seen to be rooted in methodological, rather than ontological or  
epistemological considerations (Ibid.).  
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Heath and Cowley see methodological differences in the manner in which the 
literature and prior knowledge of the topic are used: for Strauss, „both the use 
of self and the literature are early influences and, while diffuse 
understandings provide sensitivity, both specific understandings from past 
experience and literature may be used to stimulate theoretical sensitivity and 
generate hypotheses‟ (Ibid. p. 143). This differs from the Glaserian approach, 
which emphasises the need to avoid literature focussed on the very specifics 
of the subject until the later stages of developing an emergent theory, an 
approach which has been referred to as „beginning with general wonderment‟ 
(Onions, 2006, p. 8). Instead, in the early stages of the research project, 
reading should be wide-ranging as, for Glaser, „prior understandings should 
be based on the general problem area and reading very wide to alert or 
sensitise one to a wide range of possibilities‟ (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 143). 
The professional knowledge of OS possessed by the researcher meant that 
for the thesis the Straussian model lent itself better to the research context. 
This is mainly because Strauss with Corbin went on to develop his 
methodological approach to cater for such early influence of the self and of 
the literature by creating a more systematic and clear process to the 
development of grounded theory. In doing so, he created the second major 
methodological divergence from Glaser identified by Heath and Cowley in the 
application of the constant comparative method.  
 
Glaser sees induction as the main process in the development of grounded 
theory. Theoretical sensitivity is developed from the data, the data is allowed 
to „speak‟, and all data is important: „[s]election to fit preconceived or 
prematurely developed ideas is to be avoided, however creative these may 
appear‟ (Ibid. p. 144). Ideas emerging from the data are subject to verification 
against all other data, and categories need to be re-evaluated and refitted as 
a result of this process. In contrast to this, the first edition of Strauss and 
Corbin (1990) emphasised deduction alongside the use of verification in 
advocating the use of questioning and speculation, as opposed to the 
Glaserian reliance on constant comparison alone to allow concepts to 
emerge from the data. The next edition of Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
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demonstrated an elaboration - or evolution, depending upon personal 
perspective - of the authors‟ initial stance.  The interplay of induction and 
ongoing data comparison is more apparent in this edition (Heath & Cowley, 
2004, p. 145), and it is this edition that provides the methodological approach 
utilised in the thesis as it offers a more interpretive approach with less 
„forcing‟; it therefore provides better than its predecessor a fit with the 
ontological and epistemological stance of the researcher. It also mitigates a 
weakness in the first edition (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) methodology of 
significance to this researcher. Strauss and Corbin „take an example of 
interview data … and suggest using experience and the literature to extend 
analysis and guide the examination of subsequent data. Here, the novice 
researcher would be in danger of confirming existing knowledge rather than 
discovering new‟ (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 144). This is of particular 
relevance given the professional knowledge of the researcher.  
 
A third point of methodological departure for Strauss and Glaser is in the 
procedures each advocate for coding and theory construction. Strauss and 
Corbin add a third layer of analysis in the introduction of „axial coding‟ 
although Glaser remains true to the original model of two levels (see Table 4, 
below).  
Table 4: Glaserian and Straussian approaches to data analysis  
 Strauss and Corbin Glaser 
Initial Open coding Substantive coding 
Intermediate Axial coding  As above 
Final Selective coding Theoretical  
(Derived from Heath & Cowley, 2004, Table 1, p. 146) 
 
Heath and Cowley speculate that this extra layer of coding is necessary for 
the Straussian approach due to the multitude of codes generated by its use 
of „intense questioning‟, which requires „considerable reduction and thus the 
extra level of axial coding‟ (Ibid.). Onions states that in the Straussian model, 
in contrast to the Glaserian model, essential theoretical sensitivity (openness 
to concepts, interrelationships and variables) is arrived at through the use of 
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„methods and tools‟ (2006, p. 8) rather than immersion in the data. These can 
be used by the researcher to protect against the incursion of prior knowledge 
and experience into the data analysis, and therefore appealed greatly for the 
purposes of this research.  
 
To summarise, the second incarnation of the Straussian approach (see 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998) was the methodological approach adopted for the 
purposes of this research, for the following reasons: 
 It is not predicated on a Glaserian notion of researcher as „tabula rasa, 
or blank slate‟ (Mills et al., 2006, p. 28); prior professional knowledge 
and experience is better accommodated by the methodology   
 Tools and methods are provided to help prevent bias intruding into the 
data analysis 
 The later edition of Strauss and Corbin (1998) describes an interplay 
of inductive and deductive approaches that provides a closer match to 
the interpretivist epistemological stance adopted throughout the thesis  
 
Implementing a grounded theory approach  
Each level of coding adopted by this doctoral research (undertaken using 
Straussian methodology) and the broader practicalities of undertaking a 
grounded theory project are explained in the following figure: 
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Figure 4: Major stages of the grounded theory research process 
 
 
The grounded theory methodology involves the use of various sources of 
data, including field notes, interview transcripts and official documents. Data 
are analysed in-depth using the constant comparative method (Ibid., p. 78-
85), whereby questions are asked on the nature of the phenomena in relation 
to the full range of variables.  
 
Data 
collection
•Semi-structured interviewing and meeting observation  result 
in interview transcripts, interview notes, observation notes, 
memos 
•All provide data to be analysed
Open
coding
•Microanalysis of data ('line-by-line' coding) undertaken to 
develop concepts (categories), their properties and 
interelationships - a move beyond description into a theory 
generating 'conceptual mode of analysis' (Ibid. p. 66)
•Concepts identified within the data are elaborated according 
to their properties and the dimensions of those properties 
Axial 
coding
•Microanalysis continues; the analyst continues to employ 
tools such as 'flip-flopping', 'systematic comparison' and 
'waving the red flag' (Ibid. p. 94-99) to challenge 
preconceived notions both in relation to and within the data 
•The relating of categories to sub-categories around their 
axis, creating property and dimension related linkages 
Selective 
coding
•Categories are integrated and refined into a wider theoretical 
model 
•Theoretical model is refined by looking for consistency, gaps 
in logic, the further development of poorly defined categories, 
and the removal of excess categories
•Theoretical model can be outlined in writing 
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For example, comparison of a flower would involve its full range of variables, 
including colour, height, scent, location, life cycle, etc. In each case the 
properties (characteristics) of the phenomena are placed on a continuum (for 
example in an individual‟s garden the tallest flower might be the sunflower 
and the smallest the buttercup). The concept of „flowers‟ in the data would 
therefore be explored according to its properties and their dimensions, which 
would in turn generate deeper insights into the concept. 
 
This process was applied to several concepts that emerged from the data 
sources (interview transcripts and notes, and observation notes). Some 
concepts develop more substantively as data analysis progresses, whilst 
others are discarded as they do not provide significant theoretical insight. 
Where certain theoretical insights required further elaboration or verification 
(as the concept concerned developed), this was sought through the ongoing 
research by, for example, raising conceptual questions with interviewees and 
/ or seeking answers in observations, in a process referred to as theoretical 
sampling. This is defined by Strauss and Corbin as:  
 
Data gathering driven by concepts derived from the evolving theory and 
based on the concept of “making comparisons”, whose purpose is to go 
to places, people, or events that will maximize opportunities to discover 
variations among concepts and to densify categories in terms of their 
properties and dimensions (1998, p. 201). 
 
For example, the concept of „critical friendship‟ (see p. 171) arising from the 
data involved the use of grounded theory tools described in Figure 4 (see p. 
139) and the use of theoretical sampling to refine the concept. It included, 
amongst others, the variables: 
 
Variable Dimensions 
Relationship: Friend  Enemy 
Institutional role:  Executive  Opposition 
Objective: Help  Hinder 
Ethos: Constructive  Destructive 
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Within each dimension the properties of the concept are demarcated using 
„flip flopping‟ and „constant comparison‟ whilst undergoing a process of 
constant reflection and „waving the red flag‟ to ensure biases are limited. As 
the concept develops, its sister concept „external stakeholder‟ is undergoing 
the same process until eventually the two concepts are theoretically 
saturated (see following sub-heading). The process of axial coding is 
ongoing, and aims to link concepts to each other and to overarching 
categories (in this case the category „relationships‟) along property and 
dimension related lines. Finally, the selective coding process saw the 
interlinking of the two main categories arising from the data („representation‟ 
and „relationships‟, see p. 170) and the outlining of the theoretical model in 
writing (see p. 169).  
 
Saturation 
Saturation occurs when ongoing data analysis fails to develop concepts any 
further. Signs of saturation are described by Suddaby: „The signals of 
saturation, which include repetition of information and confirmation of existing  
conceptual categories, are inherently pragmatic and depend upon both the 
empirical context and the researcher‟s experience and expertise.‟ (2006, p. 
639). When saturation occurs it can be assumed that any further conceptual 
development will be limited.  
 
Saturation was judged to have occurred in this research when no further 
insights were generated from data analysis. As a common language and 
assumptions about democracy were employed across the case study 
authorities, saturation occurred in some concepts more quickly than in 
others. The concepts emerging from the data that were utilised included: 
 
Category: ‘Representation’ 
 „Overview’ 
Required considerable work to elaborate the concept through the use 
of constant and theoretical comparison to explore properties and 
dimensions, with saturation occurring late in the analysis  
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 „Scrutiny’ 
As above: the different explanations and conceptualisations of both 
this and „overview‟ apparent across the case studies led to greater 
work to fully explore the concept, again, with saturation occurring late 
in the analysis 
 
Category: ‘Relationships’ 
 ‘Critical friend’  
The concept of critical friendship reached saturation point in the mid to 
late stages of analysis, with – as with all the concepts - theoretical 
sampling employed to ensure saturation point had been reached  
 
 ‘External stakeholder’ 
Again, saturation occurred at the mid to late point in the analysis. 
 
Reflexivity 
The researcher is a practising scrutiny officer with professional knowledge of 
the case study authorities and various other OS arrangements across an 
array of local authorities. In one of the case study authorities the researcher 
was involved simultaneously in the doctoral research and support of OS as a 
part of the jointly sponsored studentship arranged between the local authority 
and the university that resulted in this thesis.  
 
Existing professional knowledge and opinions around the research subject 
had to be recognised throughout the research process and where necessary, 
any individual biases that were noticeable were managed using grounded 
theory strategies described elsewhere in the thesis, mainly „flip flopping‟ and 
„waving the red flag‟ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 94-99). The use of these 
tools in a process of reflection revealed the fact that a broader trend within 
the sector towards more external OS and partnership working in general, 
may have played a role in helping to develop a key premise upon which the 
conclusions of the thesis are built; the premise being that a greater focus on 
external OS is desirable. As a practitioner, an internalisation of this message 
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(that a greater focus on external OS and partnership working is desirable) 
may have contributed towards the broader conclusions of the thesis. To 
elaborate, it may be that more external OS – deliberative or not - is not a 
valid or feasible way to improve OS, despite the fact that the grounded theory 
coding processes suggested the opposite from the data. This message 
happened to be in accordance with the researcher‟s own existing opinion on 
the matter, developed through exposure to fellow professionals, academic 
literature and policy guidance from the government; however, as noted, self-
awareness, the researcher‟s adoption of reflective practice and the use of the 
grounded theory strategies mentioned above, all contributed to an awareness 
of when one‟s own „biases, assumptions, or beliefs [were] intruding into the 
analysis‟ (Ibid. p. 97). With regard to this aspect of the research, this meant 
that the emergent grounded theory was, as far as is possible, of the data, 
rather than of the beliefs, prejudices or biases of the researcher.  
 
Use of the literature 
The literature review has described the main theoretical underpinnings of the 
subject matter and the research. It has also shown that the thesis makes an 
original contribution to knowledge and that there is a scarcity of literature on 
the subject of external stakeholder involvement in OS. Most importantly is the 
role that the literature review plays in the grounded theory project and 
qualitative research more generally, which Flick describes: „[Y]ou use insights 
and information coming from existing literature as context knowledge, which 
you use to see statements and observations in your research in their context‟ 
(2006, p. 58-59). Marshall and Rossman go further and state that „the 
literature review provides theoretical constructs, categories, and their 
properties that can be used to organize the data and discover new 
connections between theory and phenomenon‟ (2006, p. 46). In reviewing the 
literature within the broad headings selected the context for the research was 
set. In addition to this, a lot of pre-existing conceptualisation described in the 
literature review was used to inform, but not influence, the data analysis.   
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Reflections on the use of grounded theory 
Grounded theory has proved to be a particularly useful approach for a 
doctoral researcher undertaking his first major research project. It provides 
the methods needed to abstract from the data, allowing theoretical insights 
rather than description only. But it also allows the freedom to apply the 
methods pragmatically, allowing each researcher to discern the best 
approach for his or her project. Pure „Glaserian‟ grounded theory allows even 
more room for methodological manoeuvre, but the Straussian approach 
adopted is more structured, and for that reason appealed to a greater extent 
to this beginning researcher as it provided the guidance and methods needed 
to develop meaningful insights.  
 
As a professional scrutiny officer with much prior knowledge of the function, 
the Straussian approach allowed for this existing knowledge and supplied the 
tools to help mitigate any bias that may have intruded into the analysis. The 
Straussian approach to the existing literature is also useful to a doctoral 
candidate required to conduct a literature review early in the project (pre – 
midpoint progression), as the Glaserian approach takes a more guarded 
stance on early readings of the subject literature. It is also useful to the 
individual who is already well versed in the existing literature on the subject, 
for the simple fact that it recognises the role that the corpus plays in 
developing theory, for example, through the use of in vivo codes. Its 
approach to the literature is one that embraces the notion that nobody 
approaches the research as a blank slate, devoid of existing knowledge and 
bias. Instead it allows the literature to play its role, and in turn, it allows the 
thesis to sit comfortably within that literature.  
 
6.3 Research methods 
The following describes the reasoning behind the selection of case studies, 
observation and semi-structured interviews as the methods used to gather 
data. 
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Case studies 
Several basic designs can be employed in qualitative research projects. Of 
these, case studies were thought to be the most appropriate for reasons 
outlined in the bullet-pointed list below. The following alternatives were 
considered and rejected for the purposes of the research (see Flick, 2006, p. 
141-145): 
 
 Comparative studies 
Whole cases are not observed in this approach, rather, excerpts that 
form a comparative dimension across the objects of study (Ibid., p. 142). 
For example, for the purposes of this research, a comparative study may 
have examined as an excerpt the views of Labour Party councillors 
across several local authorities with regard to the involvement in OS of 
third sector organisations. The comparative study approach was deemed 
too narrow for this research as the nature of the questions posed are 
cross-cutting and responses to them are contingent upon a wide range of 
variables accounting for interpersonal, historical, institutional and political 
factors. In addition to this, Flick states that a problem with the approach 
is the question of „what degree of standardization or constancy you need 
in the remaining conditions that are not the subject of the comparison‟ 
(Ibid.). Any reasonable degree of standardisation and consistency across 
local authorities would be very difficult to achieve. Full case studies were 
seen to be all encompassing and better able to generate the data 
necessary for the development of a grounded theory that addresses the 
core concerns of the research questions.  
 
 Retrospective studies  
This approach involves research undertaken with a specific section of the 
study object‟s history as a focus. Data is analysed for meaning in relation 
to individual, organisational, or other collective histories. A key issue 
when undertaking such research is the influence of current views on the 
assessment of earlier experiences (Ibid., p. 143). The approach was 
considered unsuitable as an aim of the thesis is to provide applicable 
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theoretical and practical lessons to academics and practitioners of OS. 
To achieve this requires up-to-date knowledge of the current, ever-
evolving, situation. Any focus on a specific point in the historical 
development of OS would prevent a comprehensive picture emerging, as 
OS has developed incrementally over the years since 2000. As a result, 
no one discrete period of time in that development could fully describe 
OS as it operates today.  
 
 Snapshots 
Snapshots aim to give „a description of circumstances at the time of the 
research‟ (Ibid., p. 142). The end product is not a retrospective, as 
described above, but rather, an illustration of a process, organisation, 
profession, individual, etc. at the time of the research. In this research, 
which involves a number of local authorities, to be meaningful a snapshot 
approach would involve case-by-case analysis of the data, for example: 
Authority A findings, Authority B findings, and so on. This approach was 
not adopted for the research as the grounded theory methodology calls 
for a high degree of theoretical abstraction from the data, and case-by-
case analysis would at best provide practical lessons and theory 
applicable to local authorities of great similarity to each respective case 
study. Elsewhere in the thesis the argument has been made that this 
approach is problematic as each local authority is unique, and therefore 
the decision was made to aggregate data from the case studies in order 
to develop a broader, more abstract theory of wider applicability.  
 
 Longitudinal studies 
Project duration is a key factor in longitudinal studies, in which the 
research phenomenon is subject to repeated analysis and comparison at 
a later date or dates. The doctoral programme to which this research 
adheres militates against a longitudinal approach due to the time 
constraints placed upon the researcher. In addition to this, the 
longitudinal study requires ongoing access of a variety that would be 
quite difficult to secure from a local authority, and staff and councillor 
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turnover would potentially impact negatively on a longitudinal approach. 
Flick mentions that the approach is rarely used in qualitative research, 
except implicitly in ethnographic and some biographical research (Ibid., 
p. 143; Bryman, 1988, p. 49). 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
Interviewing is an important method of eliciting the knowledge and opinions 
of research participants and complements observation well. A major decision 
around the use of interviews as a research method was the extent to which 
they were to be structured. Guidance on the issue was provided by the fact 
that different research perspectives lend themselves to certain research 
methods (Flick, 2006, p. 21). For example, methodologies with roots in 
symbolic interactionism  such as grounded theory (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 
142) are dominated by the use of semi-structured interviewing (Flick, 2006, p. 
21). As the predominant method utilised in the symbolic interactionist 
tradition, it was logical to apply semi-structured interviewing to this research.  
 
As well as the aforementioned good methodological fit with grounded theory, 
personal reflection on the use of the method allowed the researcher to arrive 
at the conclusion that it would also give sufficient focus to interviews to 
effectively elicit participant knowledge and opinions, without constraining the 
discussion to too great an extent, as was the risk if a fully structured interview 
or questionnaire-based approach was adopted. Conversely, completely 
unstructured interviewing, „in which the researcher provides minimal 
guidance and allows considerable latitude for interviewees‟ (Bryman, 1988, p. 
46), would risk too great a divergence from the subject matter in the limited 
time available per interview. Although such divergence from the core 
questions could provide valuable insight, the decision in favour of semi-
structured interviewing was made in reaction to the better methodological fit 
provided by semi-structured interviewing, the limited time available per 
interview and the risk that excessive digression would prove worthless.   
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Observation 
Observation of OS meetings was selected as a method as it allowed the 
balancing of the accounts given in interview. Approaches that adopt 
observation „stress that practices are only accessible through observation; 
interviews and narratives merely make the accounts of practices accessible 
instead of the practices themselves‟ (Flick, 2006, p. 215). For this reason, the 
combination of semi-structured interviewing and observation allowed 
triangulation through the use of mixed methods.  
 
The particular variety of observation employed is participant observation 
using field notes rather than a standardised observation scheme, with 
alternatives being non-participant observation and ethnography. The 
following describes the reasoning behind the selection of participant 
observation over its two alternatives. 
 
 Non-participant observation 
In this method the researcher aims to be a complete observer with 
distance maintained from the subject of the observation in order to avoid 
having an influence on it. This can be achieved to some extent by 
supplanting the researcher with a video recorder (Ibid., p. 217).  
 
An approach is to observe covertly with only those that need to know 
being made aware. Although, not only is this ethically dubious, but it is 
also highly unlikely to be even considered in a democratic environment 
such as a local authority. It would be considered too great a risk if OS 
chairman for example, and no other councillors, were privy to the 
knowledge that a researcher was present – if discovered it could be too 
easily construed as party political or simply dishonest.  
 
 Ethnography 
Employing an ethnographic approach requires a particular emphasis on 
the exploration of social phenomenon rather than a deductive, hypothesis 
testing approach. It involves getting close to the subject matter and those 
 149 
 
involved in day-to-day activity pertaining to it. The aim is to develop 
theory and to describe social realities and how they are constructed. 
Data collection is opportunistic, with methods employed to this end 
„treated as secondary ... [an approach that] may be interpreted (in a 
positive way) as showing flexibility towards the subject under study but it 
also holds the danger of a methodological arbitrariness‟ (Ibid., p. 230).  
 
Ethnography was considered not to be as suitable as participant 
observation due to its greater applicability to studies of single cases in 
very great depth. The desire to generate theory and lessons of wider 
applicability from the thesis meant that the examination of several cases 
was a better approach. This necessarily involved sacrificing the depth 
that could be achieved using ethnography.  
 
6.4 Sampling 
Sampling consisted of striking a balance between depth and width (Flick, 
2006, p. 131-132). „Considering limited resources (people, money, time, etc.) 
you should see these aims as alternatives rather than projects to combine‟ 
(Ibid., p. 132). Sufficient case studies must be performed in order to satisfy 
the condition of „generalisability‟. That is the applicability of research findings 
to similar bodies, in this case local authorities, not involved in the initial 
research. However, consideration must also be given to the detail, or depth, 
to which the objects of research are investigated. An increasingly broad 
sample may lead to commensurate degrees of superficiality, especially given 
restrictions on time and resources.  
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An important issue in selecting a sample was the number of variables to be 
considered in the process. Variables are as follow: 
 
 Type of authority (functional variable) 
o Unitary 
o County  
o District 
 
 Political management arrangements (governance variable)  
o Mayor and cabinet 
o Mayor and council manager 
o Leader and cabinet 
o Fourth option 
 
 Political control (party political variable) 
o Labour 
o Conservative 
o Liberal Democrat 
o Other 
o No overall control (NOC)  
 
 Location (geographic variable) 
In
c
re
a
s
in
g
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e
p
th
 
Increasing width 
Figure 5: Breadth vs. superficiality in sampling 
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o Nationwide 
o Regional 
o Local 
 
Practical constraints limit the sample size and the variables represented. A 
truly representative sample would consist of representations from all of the 
above and would demand considerably more time and resources than are 
currently available.  
 
The sample was chosen to reflect functional and party political variables, with 
geographic and governance variables reflected in the sample to a lesser 
extent. The rationale for this decision was based on practical considerations. 
The vast majority of local authorities operate the leader and cabinet system; 
therefore, authorities that were willing to get involved in the research were 
highly likely to fall in this category. Geographic proximity also played a role in 
the selection of case study authorities.  
 
Additionally, the focus of the thesis is on complex local governance 
arrangements and the engagement of external stakeholders in OS processes 
in this context. Two-tier areas therefore provided interesting case studies of 
the dynamic between OS functions at the different tiers of local government, 
and between them and their external stakeholders. This necessarily involved 
the inclusion of counties and districts in the sample, lending weight to the 
decision to use the „functional‟ variable. Interesting contrasts with the simpler 
partnership landscape inhabited by unitary council OS functions could also 
be drawn to inform the data analysis.  
 
The fundamental role of local politicians in OS made the party political 
variable especially interesting. The inclusion of a council under NOC added 
an extra dimension to this, allowing the research to include a coalition-led 
district authority (the coalition collapsed and a new one formed during the 
course of the case study). That the authority was a „fourth option‟ added to 
the interest for the research.  
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Figure 7: Case study overview 
Case 
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A1 
District 
Council 
50 councillors:  
 34 Labour 
 10 Liberal 
Democrat 
 3 Conservative 
 3 Independent 
„Excellent‟ 
(2008) 
Three OSCs reporting 
to an OS 
Management Board. 
OSCs aligned 
according to policy 
themes and chaired 
by majority group 
members. 
 
A „Scrutiny and 
Performance Team‟ 
(one manager and 
three FTE officers) 
with joint 
responsibility for OS 
support and 
performance 
management 
5 2 2 
8 meetings 
between 
October 2006 
and 
September 
2007  
                                                 
1
 Abolished in April 2009 following local government reorganisation  
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B1 
Fourth 
Option 
District 
Council 
40 councillors (no 
overall control): 
 17 Labour  
 16 Liberal 
Democrat 
 7 Independent 
„Excellent‟ 
(2008) 
Two OSCs holding the 
council‟s policy 
committees to 
account. OSCs 
aligned to internal 
(council) and external 
matters, respectively. 
Chairing shared 
between political 
groups.   
One Scrutiny 
Manager and a 
Scrutiny Officer with 
OS support being the 
only duty of the two.  
4 1 2 
10 meetings 
of both OSCs 
between 
October 2007 
and January 
2009 
C 
Unitary 
Council 
66 councillors: 
 42 Labour 
 23 Liberal 
Democrat 
 1 Liberal 
„Performing 
well‟ (2006)2 
Five OSCs aligned to 
policy themes. 
No dedicated officer 
support. Various 
officers used to 
support OSCs as 
required. 4 2 2 
4 meetings of 
one of the 
council‟s 
OSCs over 
autumn / 
winter 
2008/09 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Abolished in April 2009 following local government reorganisation 
2
 2006 Audit Commission Corporate Assessment verdict 
 155 
 
Case 
study 
Political balance 
Performance 
(Audit 
Commission 
verdict) 
OSC structure / 
focus 
OS support 
Data collection 
Interviews 
Observation 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
  
O
ff
ic
e
r 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
s
ta
k
e
h
o
ld
e
r 
D 
County 
Council 
69 councillors: 
 42 Conservative 
 23 Liberal 
Democrat 
 4 Labour 
„3 out of 4‟ 
(2009) 
Four OSCs aligned to 
internal directorates 
and an overarching 
management 
committee. 
Three dedicated FTE 
scrutiny officers.  
4 4 2 
8 meetings of 
one of the 
authority‟s 
OSCs over 
spring to 
autumn 2009.  
Total: 17 9 8 30 
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Case study A: ‘District Council’: contextual information 
 Labour controlled district council  
 Leader / cabinet system 
 OS support also undertake performance management duties  
 
The council is a relatively high performing body located in a largely urban 
section of a predominantly rural north eastern English county. The 2001 
census records a population of 81,267, of which approximately 80% is 
located in a traditional market town and a relatively new town. Several 
smaller vi llages exist within the district, which is mixed in its levels of 
deprivation. It is within commutable distance of the regional capital and has 
lately acquired a reputation for its rapidly developing renewable energy 
industry. 
 
The council has been a Labour Party stronghold for many years and many 
councillors are ex-mineworkers and trade unionists with traditional Labour 
political views. Political management reform was embraced in the council 
with the introduction of OSCs with policy thematic alignment – a relatively 
forward thinking approach at the time – and the adoption of a team to support 
OS, although it also undertakes performance management duties on behalf 
of the council. As with many district councils, it lacks the capacity to engage 
external stakeholders in the work of OS to the same extent as larger, better 
supported OS functions in many county and unitary authorities. However, the 
involvement of external stakeholders is seen as a priority and engagement is 
secured wherever possible.  
 
Majority group members chair all of the OSCs and OSC reports are 
submitted via an OS Management Board comprising the OSC chairs. This is 
problematic in many ways, as it is viewed by some as a means to deny the 
opposition a voice through OS. The „filtering‟ role of the Management Board 
provides quality assurance or an extra layer of bureaucracy and control, 
depending upon the view of the councillor concerned. It is a controversial 
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body amongst some councillors, yet it remains an integral part of OS 
arrangements at the council.  
 
Joint OS with other authorities is relatively underdeveloped in relation to 
other areas. The large geographical scale of the county in which the authority 
is situated perhaps militates against joint working, as does the unique set of 
challenges the authority faces within the county. As the most urban district in 
a rural county, finding common topics of interest to scrutinise with partner 
authorities may be more difficult than elsewhere.  
 
Case study B: ‘Fourth Option District Council’: contextual 
information 
 „Fourth option‟ council under no overall control 
 Labour, later Liberal Democrat control secured by support of independent 
members 
 OS support provided by a manager and officer responsible solely for the 
role 
 
Around 62,000 people live in the district, with a large majority residing in 
three market towns to the east. The west of the district is renowned for its 
relative inaccessibility and rurality, and has traditionally returned independent 
councillors to sit on the district council. Rural deprivation is a major concern 
in the district and associated issues such as access to public transport, poor 
numeracy and literacy, unemployment and low paid employment compound 
this.  
 
The largest proportion of those in work are employed within the public sector, 
and the decline of the traditional industries that provided much of the 
employment in the area led to a gradual decline in population which has only 
recently reversed slightly. OS processes have been implemented in the 
council as part of a fourth option arrangement involving the retention of the 
committee system of decision making. This now unusual arrangement means 
that there is no one executive body within the council. In a cabinet system 
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executive power is delegated to the cabinet by the full counci l, but under the 
fourth option executive power is delegated to several policy committees. In 
practice this has meant that recommendations are addressed to policy 
committees, most frequently the overarching policy committee. In terms of 
the way that OS is supported or operates, very little difference is observable.  
 
A corollary of a „hung‟ council is the need to work harmoniously in coalition. 
Prior to a major split over the highly contentious issue of alternate weekly 
refuse collections such harmony had, to a significant extent, been 
maintained. However, the Labour group‟s support of the policy caused an 
intractable rift in the governing coalition which led to the withdrawal of 
independent member support, resulting in the ascendancy to power of the 
Liberal Democrat group following a switch of allegiance by the independents. 
This caused great turmoil between the political groups in the final months of 
the authority before its abolishment due to local government reorganisation.  
 
Before this period of political change, the relatively stable period manifested 
in very benign relationships between the political party group members sitting 
on the two OSCs. As a result OS was able to operate effectively in a 
collaborative manner, although resource issues limited the extent to which 
external stakeholders could be involved in the process. Working relationships 
with neighbouring council‟s OS functions were, however, particularly good, 
and benefitted from a strong lead from the county council in the area.  
 
Case study C: ‘Unitary Council’: contextual information 
 Labour controlled unitary council  
 Leader / cabinet system 
 No dedicated OS support – support provided on an ad hoc basis by 
various officers 
 
Approximately 193,000 people live in the local authority area, which is of 
contrasts: there is a large rural area alongside a significant urban centre and 
much post-industrial decline. Employment is predominantly in the public 
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sector, and there are issues around relatively low levels of adult literacy and 
numeracy. Political continuity is a key characteristic of the council, with 
longstanding Labour Party control. The ten-member cabinet has its portfolios 
aligned to Community Strategy themes and is accompanied by five OSCs 
and five advisory groups.  
 
OS arrangements at the council do not have dedicated scrutiny support 
officers to call upon. Rather, officers are recruited to support various OS 
projects as they arise, with an officer tasked with orchestrating this as one 
part of a different role within the council. A general feeling is that the current 
arrangements for OS support work well, with expertise and fresh ideas being 
drawn into the support of OS as and when required. However, discussions 
were taking place on how best to support OS – dedicated officer support 
featured as a desirable possibility in this debate.   
 
Case study D: ‘County Council’: contextual information 
 Conservative controlled county council 
 Leader / cabinet system 
 Dedicated OS support provided by a team of three  
 
The county council serves a relatively affluent area which is a net contributor 
to the UK economy. Pockets of relative deprivation do exist, with the issues 
facing these communities exacerbated by the fact that they are situated 
within generally affluent areas. This leads to difficulties in recognising the 
need when often data is at a neighbourhood or ward level. The county is 
largely rural, with a city and several market towns within its boundaries.  
 
The county has traditionally been a Conservative Party stronghold, with 
Labour and smaller party representation on the county council nearly non-
existent, although there is a large and vocal Liberal Democrat group. The 
exception to the party‟s hold on power in the county is in the city, where the 
Liberal Democrats control the city council.  
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There are five OSCs at the county council and several policy groups that are 
chaired by cabinet members. Chairing of the OSCs is shared between the 
two main parties. OS at the council has the support of three dedicated 
scrutiny officers who undertake all administrative (other than minute taking), 
research and relationship building activities on behalf of the OSCs. OS is 
overseen by a management committee comprising the chairs of the OSCs 
and has a strong relationship with the ten member executive.  
 
6.5 Subjects 
Alongside external stakeholder participants, the other people of direct 
concern to this study are those involved in the scrutiny process on a regular 
basis, namely, scrutiny members and officers with a responsibility for scrutiny 
(herein „scrutiny officers‟)1. Involving these figures in the research can prove 
problematic, especially given their vested interest in perceptions of the OS 
process of their authority. External stakeholders also bring their own set of 
challenges to the research. The following explores some of the 
considerations that were made prior to the involvement of individual 
members, officers and external stakeholders in the research.  
 
Scrutiny officers: methodological issues 
When establishing the framework for questioning, and the actual questions 
themselves to be addressed to scrutiny officers, there are several factors of 
importance to be considered. Principally, OS is member-led, despite the 
varying degrees of officer input exhibited in different authorities. For this 
reason, questions for scrutiny officers mainly addressed the practicalities of 
the OS process and officer observations of it. There is an irony in that officers 
are often far better informed than members on OS itself. The most obvious 
explanation for this is that dedicated scrutiny officers (not all models of OS 
support involve dedicated scrutiny officers; see p. 233) are working on OS on 
a day to day basis, whereas members may spread their time more thinly over 
various topics. Of the four case study authorities, one had no dedicated OS 
                                                 
1
 Often in local authorities no dedicated scrutiny officers exist (as in Authority C), rather, 
officers will have responsibility for scrutiny along with other tasks.   
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support; the implications of this arrangement for the efficacy of OS are 
discussed in the research findings (see p. 234).   
 
Scrutiny officers are in the parlous position of supporting a member function 
which may prove awkward to senior officers and members. The scrutiny 
officer is simultaneously situated within the officer structure, subject to the 
same performance and line management strictures as any other officer of the 
council, and inextricably linked to either OS or in some cases the particular 
OSC that he or she supports. To add to the delicacy of the role, scrutiny 
officers tend to be relatively junior figures in the council, and must field often 
irate enquiries from the most senior. A further complicating factor is the duty 
to serve the whole council incumbent upon all local authority officers. In this 
regard there is a very real risk that the scrutiny officer becomes too 
associated with a particular member (usually the relevant OSC chair), and is 
therefore seen to be compromised in his or her neutrality.  
 
The main methodological implications arising from the above considerations 
include:  
 The need to realise that the close affinity with OS that the full time 
scrutiny officer can possess may be a barrier to his or her objectivity 
when discussing the function‟s role in their authority  
 
 Because of the fact that OS support is situated within the officer 
structure, there may be a desire to „up sell‟ the function to a 
researcher.  
 
Outside of local government, the role most directly comparable to that of 
scrutiny officer is select committee clerk. The clerks are employed directly by 
the House of Commons, rather than the civil service, although they follow 
similar pay grades and career progression (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2004, 
p. 16).  This means that they forego many of the concerns that some scrutiny 
officers may feel for their own reputations and that of the authority (whether 
or not those issues are based on a fear of embarrassing their directorate or 
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line manger, etc.), which may in turn lead to the aforementioned „up selling‟ 
of their authority‟s OS function.  
 
An example of this issue arose during the course of the research, when 
scrutiny officers painted a relatively impressive picture of external 
stakeholder engagement with OS that was undermined by an unwillingness 
to allow the researcher to access the participants concerned to cross-
reference the claims. It may be that those authorities with the weakest 
member-lead are also those with the most defensive scrutiny officers, most 
likely to oversell their authority‟s OS function. This would likely be grounded 
in the personal stake that scrutiny officers had invested in making the 
function effective; conversely, scrutiny officers in the authorities with the 
strongest member-lead would most likely be forthright in revealing any 
shortcomings. This would simply be due to the predominant member, rather 
than officer, ownership and investment in the OS function. In this case, where 
they are assured of anonymity, scrutiny officers can be amongst the most 
important observers of the way in which their authority is engaging external 
stakeholders in the OS process. This is due to their:  
 Position on the frontline of the member/officer interface  
 Liaison role with external stakeholders  
 Ability to access professional networks to learn of good practice 
elsewhere. 
 
Scrutiny members: methodological issues 
OS members are frequently engaged in a host of other activities which 
require energy and commitment. On that basis they are often stretched when 
it comes to engaging with the OS process, although it could be argued that 
some variety of OS underpins the full range of non-executive member 
activities, from pursuing casework to voting in council. The challenge is 
linking the broad spectrum of member activities into their OS duties in a 
manner which is non-party political and strategic (rather than focussed on 
their particular ward / division). On this point, one of the main methodological 
implications of researching councillors is the possibility of reference to issues 
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within their „patch‟ and the occasionally excessive focus on personal causes 
and concerns. This is, perhaps, inevitable when interviewing committed 
individuals with sufficient concern and independence of opinion to stand for 
election. The challenge for the researcher lies in enabling the councillor to 
abstract and link individual activities into OS processes.  
 
Another issue is the altered role of the local authority in an era of local 
governance (see p. 29); an essentially centrally-driven change which has in 
some cases left elected members playing catch-up. This is especially 
noticeable in the way in which some councillors reject, or are at best reticent, 
on the subject of extending the scope of OS beyond the confines of directly 
provided council services. Despite parliamentary Acts facilitating external OS,  
many members reject the premise of external OS: that elected members 
have a role in holding powerful organisations to account across the public 
services. This is due, primarily, to a lack of power to enact change and a fear 
of raising expectations amongst the electorate.  
 
This means that when researching external stakeholder participation in OS 
processes, the broad spectrum of member views must be heard and factored 
into the findings, regardless of whether the premise of external OS is 
accepted or not. It is interesting to note that scrutiny officers researched have 
almost universally embraced the notion of enhanced external OS; this is in 
contrast to the more reserved reception given by members to the powers 
contained in recent Acts and the final set of Labour proposals for OS powers 
contained in the Strengthening Local Democracy (2009) consultation.  
 
External stakeholders: methodological issues 
Propriety and issues of practicality in the research process mean that the 
involvement of external stakeholders in the research would be secured 
primarily through the main contact in each of the case study authorities. In 
each case, the main contact was a scrutiny officer, and, as mentioned above, 
in certain circumstances there may be considerable incentives for scrutiny 
officers to oversell OS in their authority.  
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For this reason the ideal scenario, which occurred in all but one of the case 
study authorities, involves unfettered access to external participants in the 
OS process. This allows for the broadest spectrum of views to emerge on the 
process. Given the intentional range of persons that the phrase „external 
stakeholder‟ would encompass (members of the public, public sector officials, 
business people, politicians, etc.), it is useful to examine the concept of an 
external stakeholder in the OS context to outline the factors at play in their 
involvement in the research. Generally, external stakeholders will become 
involved in OS processes in various guises, defined by: 
 Capacity (variable according to the level of personal and 
organisational resources the participant is able to draw upon and the 
nature of their involvement in OS processes)  
 Competency (variable according to profession, personal attributes, 
prior knowledge of an issue or the OS function) 
 Commitment (variable according to time, level of compulsion, cost / 
benefit analyses).  
 
Capacity 
Capacity will vary considerably according to the resources available to the 
organisation (especially relevant to smaller voluntary and community sector 
organisations which may have few full time employees to participate in OS 
processes). Individual members of the public, especially if it is assumed that 
their involvement is based on their use of a targeted service, for example 
carers, parents, or looked after children, will have limited time available to 
attend formal OSC sessions. There is also the issue of members of the public 
who are repeat attendees concerned with a particular issue; the data relating 
to these individuals are analysed in the findings section (see p. 169).  
 
At the opposite end of the scale are the large public sector organisations with 
a now statutory duty to respond to OSCs on issues relating to Local Area 
Agreement targets. Where mainstream services delivered by partners are 
under scrutiny capacity is less of an issue. The exception is when OS 
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focuses on a particular element of an organisation‟s work, in which case 
small teams within large organisations may have trouble meeting the 
requirements of OS where their particular specialist insights are required by 
an OSC.  
 
The nature of the involvement in OS processes, and the point in these 
processes at which external stakeholder involvement is sought, can impact 
on an organisation or individual‟s capacity to participate. It has been 
mentioned that the OS process involves an iterative cycle of activity, any 
stage of which could involve external stakeholder participation. For example, 
work programming stages could involve minimal capacity issues for 
organisations. The following ranks external stakeholder participation in work 
programming processes, from least resource intensive to most:  
 Basic email or paper-based consultation on what an OSC‟s priorities 
should be, and/or an opportunity to comment on a draft or existing 
work programme 
 Invitation to attend a work programming session, possibly in 
conjunction with colleagues  
 More substantial involvement in a larger scale work programming 
seminar or conference 
 
The business process of an OSC and its sub-groups can engage external 
stakeholders in the following ways, ranked again in approximate order of 
resource intensiveness:  
 
 Remote submission of evidence to an OSC 
 Appearance in person to give evidence at an OSC 
 Join an OSC as an expert advisor on a one-off basis 
 Join an OSC as a co-opted member 
 Undertake specific research or engage a particular demographic on 
behalf of an OSC  
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The monitoring of recommendations or actions prompted by OSCs is the 
third aspect of the OS process, with perhaps fewer opportunities to involve 
external stakeholders. In some cases participants may champion the findings 
of an OSC within their particular field of interest. They may also be able to 
keep OSCs informed of outcomes arising from their interventions, feeding 
learning points back into the process, allowing improvements in the function 
of OS to be made.  
 
Competency 
Some organisations retain staff able to 
perform well in any situation, including 
those in which they are required to give 
account for their actions and/or 
performance. Examples of this include 
senior police officers, used to appearing 
before the Police Authority, and the 
obvious example of senior council officers 
used to appearing before cabinet, OSCs, 
etc.  
 
Other organisations retain similarly high 
quality staff, but involvement in formal 
democratic processes such as OS is unusual for them. Attendance before an 
OSC can be a stressful and disconcerting ordeal, although the best OSC 
chairs ensure that their committee is welcoming and open. However, 
especially perhaps for some service users, attendance at a formal OSC 
session may be a challenge. This is irrespective of the nature of the 
involvement, whether sitting on the OSC as a co-opted member or appearing 
to give evidence. In the former case, the researcher has encountered a co-
opted (lay) member of an OSC who found that her involvement with the OSC 
quite frequently placed her outside of her comfort zone, especially when the 
requirement to speak in public arose (regardless of how limited the 
requirement).  
 
Voluntary sector 
involvement in a work 
programming session 
 
Two voluntary sector 
organisations, one national 
and the other locally based, 
attended an OSC to present 
on the main issues facing 
children and young people in 
the area. The presentation 
complemented a presentation 
given on the same topic by the 
relevant cabinet member and 
senior officer. This gave the 
OSC the means to triangulate 
the issues that were being 
communicated, leading to the 
development of a better 
informed programme of work.  
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An individual‟s position within an organisation, or in the case of st rong 
advocates of a given issue, their level of informal authority amongst similarly 
minded people, can add credence to them when involved in OS processes. A 
good example of the former point is the worker on the frontline, who in 
particular circumstances can give fantastic insights that reframe completely 
the terms of debate for an OSC. The obvious requirement in this instance is 
that the view of the individual is ratified through testing and triangulation. 
Service users can be brought in at this stage to quality assure any 
conclusions of the OSC. Informal, but well placed, advocates of an issue can 
also lend their expertise to OSC deliberations, but the individuals concerned 
must have impeccable credentials and have demonstrated their wider 
concern for the cause beyond any pure self interest, if they are to appear 
„legitimate‟.  
 
Commitment 
The level of external stakeholder commitment to involvement in the OS 
process determines, inevitably, the quality of the input. Whereas a council 
officer has a professional and ultimately legal duty to provide at least a 
minimum level of engagement with OS, external stakeholders do not share 
the same compulsion. This may seem counter-intuitive when council partners 
have a statutory duty to cooperate with OSCs in particular circumstances, but 
the data have revealed the widely held view that the invocation of statutory 
powers would be a failure, and inimical to the ethos of good OS, it being 
predicated on constructive, „critical friend‟ challenge. Therefore partners 
should be accepting of the scrutiny; both in terms of the OSC‟s inherent 
legitimacy and the rationale underlying any given OS activity (i.e. is it timely 
and/or likely to effect change, etc?).  
 
OS practitioners and members are acutely aware of the long term and broad 
reaching damage that can be inflicted by ill-conceived scrutiny of 
partners/partnerships. Partner concerns about the OS process can be 
addressed through carefully scoped work undertaken from the outset in a 
collaborative and constructive manner. If, on balance, external stakeholders 
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believe that OS involvement will prompt change for the better, they are much 
more likely to engage.  
 
Exploring the capacity, competency and commitment of external 
stakeholders to OS processes allows the research to be undertaken in a 
manner which is participant focussed. The approach by the researcher can 
be tailored to meet the level of knowledge possessed by the external 
stakeholder, especially in terms of use of language and the avoidance of 
pervasive jargon and acronyms. External stakeholders can bring prior 
experiences to the fore when discussing the topic of OS; examples of this 
include the voluntary sector interviewee who had a grievance with the council 
which impacted on her view of OS. Knowledge of such issues and an 
awareness of the methodological issues surrounding the three principal sets 
of interviewees (OSC chairs, scrutiny officers and external stakeholders) 
allowed the interviews and observation to proceed on a more informed and 
open basis.    
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7. Findings 
 
The grounded theory (GT) approach results in the development of categories 
which have arisen from, and are developed by, microanalysis of the available 
data. Data have not been analysed in silos, for example, member views; 
officer views; external stakeholder views, or on an authority by authority 
basis. Rather, the data have been aggregated and analysed to form concepts 
which represent the broad themes (categories) of the topic which are 
grounded in the data (see p. 130).  
 
To better illustrate the findings on external stakeholder participation in OS 
processes and to fully utilise the grounded theory methodology, findings will 
be presented using the concepts as sub-headings, arranged under the two 
overarching data categories, „Relationships‟ (see Chapter 7.1, p. 171) and 
„Representation‟ (see Chapter 7.2, p. 197).  
 
Later in the presentation of the findings (see Chapter 7.6, p. 232) certain 
topical issues are addressed in isolation. These are current debates in the 
practice of OS and are included for two main reasons: 
 
1. To use the findings to engage with some of the main practical issues 
facing OS 
 
2. To derive practical use from the findings by balancing the more 
abstract and theoretical presentation of the data required by the GT 
approach. 
 
Concepts and categories  
Figure 4 (below) illustrates the main concepts arising from the data. They 
have been ordered within overarching categories of data to allow cross 
examination to occur. As mentioned, the findings chapter is built around 
these constructs, with each lending its name to a chapter sub-heading.  
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Figure 8: Concepts and categories 
 
This figure signposts the findings chapter, giving a clearer view of content 
structure and how the findings of the thesis interrelate in conceptual terms.  
 
The concept and category headings illustrated at Figure 4 are a combination 
of what Flick refers to as constructed and in vivo codes. The former are 
„borrowed from social science literature‟ and the latter are „taken from 
interviewees‟ expressions‟ (2006, p. 299, author's emphasis). 
 
 
  
Concepts
Category 1
Relationships
(Chapter 7.1)
Critical friend
(Chapter 7.1.1)
External 
stakeholder
(Chapter 7.1.2)
Concepts
Category 2
Representation
(Chapter 7.2)
Scrutiny
(Chapter 7.2.1)
Overview
(Chapter 7.2.2)
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7.1 Relationships 
The first category of concepts is named „Relationships‟. This is simply 
because of the interpersonal, inter-organisational and inter-party political 
characteristics of each of its component concepts. The following builds each 
of the concepts from the data, using the GT method of „constant comparison‟ 
to evaluate every emergent aspect of the concept.  
 
7.1.1 Critical friend 
The idea of „critical friendship‟ recurred frequently throughout the data and is 
a prominent feature in both practitioner and academic texts on OS (e.g. 
Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2007; Snape & Taylor, 2001). The concept 
provides one of the main methodological statements of OS and different 
authorities observed in the research emphasise „critical‟ or „friend‟ to different 
extents, although truly effective OS consists of both facets in fine balance.  
 
The „critical‟ aspect implies independent thought and sufficient separation 
from the executive to effectively hold it to account. Excessi ve criticism, 
especially that which could be viewed as petty and/or party political, was 
viewed across the case study authorities as counter-productive.  One OS 
chair expressed the view that OSCs should avoid poli tically contentious 
topics, believing instead that the correct forum for such discussion was the 
council chamber. Another stated that OS is not an „opposition‟. Therefore, 
„critical‟ in this context can be seen as one extreme on a continuum of 
criticism in local government politics; an extreme would be the „hard‟ criticism 
the ruling group encounters in the council chamber, often underpinned by a 
desire to undermine the ruling group and promote an alternative manifesto. 
Such „hard‟ criticism is motivated by a desire to improve services by, in the 
first instance, the usurpation of the ruling group, but is very often based on 
party political loyalties, especially where the whip is applied.  
 
Historical rivalries - party, interpersonal and policy based - may drive criticism 
of the „hard‟ variety, as may more parochial concerns relating to ward or 
divisional matters; this is in contrast to the „softer‟ critical approach adopted 
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by the ideal-type OSC, which is principally evidence-based and focussed on 
service improvement, as opposed to gaining power. The local media, 
regulators and inspectors are other sources of criticism of the council, and sit 
at varying points along the continuum of criticism to which executives and 
senior practitioners are exposed.  
 
The „friend‟ aspect of „critical friendship‟ encompasses the variety of criticism 
on offer from an OSC, and makes OS intervention palatable to an executive 
which need not heed its recommendations. On that basis, the friendship 
element is, in effect, a necessity if OSCs wish to be heard, and manifests 
itself in the need for OSCs to „drive improvement‟ and align themselves to 
corporate priorities, in a sense integrating themselves into the mainstream 
efforts of the council, as opposed to realising their independence by setting 
themselves apart.   
 
Based on observation of a particular OSC in one authority, it is not 
unreasonable to state that in this case the emphasis was excessively 
„friendly‟, possibly to the detriment of important aspects of any OSC‟s work. 
Principally, this would include the need to challenge and hold to account. It is 
unclear to what extent it is possible to effectively challenge and hold to 
account when the primary officer support to the OSC in question is the senior 
manager responsible in large part for the services under review, as was the 
case in this authority. On a positive note, it was obvious that the committee 
had the buy-in of senior officers, although whether or not this was tokenistic 
is beyond the scope of this research, given that the only method of 
assessment would be to observe the outcomes of the review in maybe a year 
or more time. Maer and Sandford describe some local authorities in which 
„the scrutiny process is mainstreamed as an automatic stage in policy 
development‟ (2004, p. 48); this is one such authority, and as the authors go 
on to state, in this type „councillors and officers from the two “sides” mix and 
exchange information far more freely‟ (Ibid.). Most OSCs work with a 
„corporate ethos‟ (Ibid.) but recognise the need to keep a healthy separation 
in order to function effectively as a check and balance to executive power: 
important questions about the independence of OS, access to pertinent 
 173 
 
information and accountability are brought into sharp focus when considering 
the implications of the type of OS support described above.  
 
Ashworth et al report similar issues in relationships at the regional level 
between the soon to be abolished Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) 
and Regional Assemblies with responsibility for scrutiny of them: 
„Relationships between the two organisations varied across regions but, 
overall, assemblies adopted a highly collaborative approach to conducting 
scrutiny‟ (2007, p. 206). Interviewees involved in the research described in 
one case excessive „chumminess‟ and, in another, too confrontational an 
approach. In both cases the implication was that excesses in the relationship 
– i.e. too adversarial or too „cosy‟ – led to negative outcomes for the scrutiny 
process. Too soft a relationship in one RDA / assembly relationship 
potentially „softened the impact of scrutiny reports‟ (Ibid., p. 207), whilst in 
others the opposite approach had led to, in different regions, a worsening of 
relationships culminating in „difficulties in obtaining key information from the 
RDA‟ and, in another, „RDA officials excluded from several key meetings‟  
(Ibid., p. 206). These are good practical examples of the negatives 
associated with excess in the scrutiny / decision maker relationship.  
 
Overemphasising the „critical‟ aspect of „critical friend‟ would lead to 
defensiveness on the part of all those involved in the work of the OSC. When 
no executive power can be exercised, the influencing role becomes 
paramount. It is obvious that placing the executive on a defensive footing is 
possibly the least effective way of influencing policy, especially in a politically 
charged environment where excessive criticism can be viewed as partisan. It 
seems evident that the most effective OSCs will be those that walk the line 
between criticism and friendship successfully, deploying different levels of 
emphasis on each in different situations. The challenge and accountability 
roles of OS perhaps lend themselves best to the „critical‟ stance, whilst 
reviewing services and making recommendations are more conducive to 
„friendly‟ ways of working, especially if the OSC concerned wishes to engage 
external partners in delivering service improvements.  
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One elected member interviewed stated that '[t]he big advantage of scrutiny 
is that you can look at one subject in some sort of depth which is very difficult 
for officers [to do] ... they've got the day job and a thousand other things to 
do and perhaps the politicians, equally ...  have plenty of other things to do as 
an executive member'. One of the main methods of „selling‟ the OS process 
observed involved approaching senior officers with that kind of argument, 
looking for areas where OSC intervention might benefit the work of the 
directorate. This necessarily involved a „friendly‟ approach tha t reflected the 
considerations expressed by the councillor cited above.  
 
The fact that senior officers need to be factored into the „critical friend‟ 
equation states a great deal about the way in which councils operate and 
decisions are made. It is almost comprehensively true across the case 
studies that senior officers are the main object of OS (although there are 
cases where executive members are very engaged in OS). Whilst there is 
still some recognition that OS is there to hold the executive to account , there 
appears to be amongst members no idea of an apparent contradiction in that 
the theoretical focus of OS is the executive, but in practice officers are 
primarily the stakeholders called to give account before an OSC. This may 
indicate one of several situations: 
 
 In a given case study the local authority is predominantly officer-led, 
with executive members providing a „rubber stamping‟ service for 
policies and decisions mainly emanating from the officer structure. 
 
 The senior officers are viewed as the agents of the executive and as 
such are tasked with implementing policy free from executive 
interference once the political decision has been made. It is therefore 
correct that, when OS is undertaken, it should be addressed to those 
principally responsible for implementing policy, i.e. senior officers. 
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 If an OSC wants to get to the heart of the issue, it should be 
approaching the experts; in most cases senior officers have higher 
levels of expertise on a given topic than their political masters.  
 
 The concern of OS is service improvement, which would be the realm 
of the expert officers; political questions which would engage political 
executives are best kept out of OS, as they are more suited to venues 
such as full council, etc. 
 
 Executive members may wish to avoid OS, for many potential 
reasons. For that reason they would rather allow their chief officers to 
speak on behalf of the service concerned.  
 
It is highly likely that no single explanation would provide a definitive answer. 
In each authority, especially those with cabinet systems, many different 
factors will combine. For example, some cabinet members in an authority 
may wish to avoid OS altogether for personal or political reasons. In the 
same authority a cabinet colleague might attend every meeting of the 
relevant OSC. Yet another cabinet member in the same authority may 
abrogate responsibility altogether for representing his or her portfolio to an 
OSC, and defer instead to the chief officer. This gives a mixed picture and 
adds to the difficulty in generalising on any OS arrangement in an authority or 
across authorities.  
 
On a practical level, in OSC meetings, the concept of „critical friendship‟ can 
be observed in the different chairing styles and approaches adopted by 
individual committee members. Personal attributes play a major role in the 
way in which a question is framed and in turn perceived. Some individuals 
are, by nature, challenging and passionate in their approach to questioning, 
whilst others are an exact opposite. A strong OSC chair is essential in getting 
the best from all involved in the process and has an especially important role 
in welcoming and introducing speakers to the committee. The way this is 
managed can set the tone for the entire meeting. Several of the OS chairs 
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interviewed stated that a key part of their role was to make attendees feel 
comfortable and able to participate. As the front man/woman of the OSC, the 
chair undoubtedly sets the tone for the entire encounter and a strong chair 
will monitor the approach of the other members of the OSC.  
 
Increasingly, in an age of partnership working, carefully balanced „critical 
friendship‟ will be crucial to the success or failure of OS in holding external 
agencies to account and promoting improvements across the public service. 
As there are fewer institutional inducements for partners to engage 
constructively, it may be that OS consciously adopts a „friendlier‟ approach 
towards them, with an emphasis on service improvement, as opposed to 
„critical‟ holding to account.  
 
Political relationships 
The phrase „political‟ relationship is used in this section to refer to relations 
between executive and non-executive members in the OS context. The 
section sits within the previous discussion of „critical friendship‟.  
 
Coverage of the political aspect of OS relationships is of fundamental 
importance to any appraisal of the topic, given the way OS powers and 
functions are framed in guidance and legislation, but also because of the 
number of member interviewees who stated that, quite simply, the role of OS 
is to hold the (political) executive to account. The shift towards partnership 
OS and a greater officer focus (as lines of accountability in council partners 
are not as clearly focussed on an elected figure, as in local authorities) is a 
more recent phenomenon, which was empowered by more recent Acts of 
Parliament1, although „external scrutiny‟ could be said to have originated  in 
the Local Government Act 2000.  
 
A theoretical discussion of political relationships must begin with the 
executive / non-executive and their respective roles within the organisation. 
Executives agree policy and make decisions, whilst non-executives scrutinise 
                                                 
1
 Police and Justice Act (2006); LGPiH Act (2007) 
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and hold to account, with a view to developing policy and driving 
improvement.  Whilst it is not possible to directly compare national and local 
arrangements for numerous constitutional, historical and political reasons 
(although many non-executive councillors refer to themselves as 
„backbenchers‟), it could be said that OSCs in their operation replicate the 
questioning and accountability (as opposed to legislative) role of the 
Commons, and the reviewing and policy developmental roles of departmental 
select committees.  
 
A commonality is the electoral mandate of the individuals tasked with 
carrying out the respective non-executive parliamentary and local 
government roles. Another is the potentially difficult relationship between 
executives and non-executives at both levels of government. Recognising the 
host of factors, both positive and negative, which shape the relationship 
between executive and non-executive representatives, is of great importance 
to a thorough understanding of OS in local government. The following 
negative factors emerge from the OS side of the executive / OS relationship:  
 
 On an inter-personal level, personal and/or political rivalries (both 
intra- and inter-party group) can be played out through OS.  
 Purely party political matters can become contentious issues 
between executives and OSCs which can have broader implications 
for cross-party working and its ultimate sustainability within an OSC.  
 Policy matters can be picked up through OS (especially by a powerful 
chair) and used to pursue particular issues that would be better 
pursued by means other than OS. 
 
The following negative factors emerge from the executive side of the 
executive / OS relationship: 
 
 Protectionism, manifested in the unwillingness to be subject to 
scrutiny for various reasons (on a very practical level, this could 
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include the avoidance of attending an OSC altogether) and, far less 
commonly, unwillingness to share data / officer time.  
 Misunderstanding the OS role, leading to fear of the unknown and 
ultimately disengagement. 
 Party discipline, the explicit interference of which has not been 
observed to a great extent in the research (i.e. reports of whipping in 
OSCs, etc.); however, implicit examples and reports of self–imposed 
group discipline were noted, especially on politically contentious 
topics. Several OSC chairs interviewed were vehemently opposed to 
any manifestations of party discipline within their OSC 1 
 
The main positive factors emerging from either side of the executive / OS 
split, were evident when the two sides framed their relationship in positive 
terms, i.e.: 
 
 Interpersonal rivalries are placed aside in the OS context 
 Purely party political matters, which would be better dealt with in 
party political venues, such as meetings of full Council, etc., are 
avoided 
 The use of OS to pursue „hobby horse‟ policy is avoided   
 Executive members operating in the more consensual, partnership 
dominated world of local decision making today, set aside 
protectionism and engage with non-executives via OS  
 There is an accepted incumbency upon both sides to combat 
misunderstanding and the positive approach and attitude of both 
sides to one another underpins a productive relationship  
 Party discipline has a place within local decision making (Copus, 
2004), but executives accept that for OS to be effective it must not be 
countenanced within the OS context  
 
                                                 
1
 During a meeting of an OSC observed, the especially strong OSC chair insisted that a 
member of his committee remove a party logo badge he had been wearing whilst 
campaigning earlier in the day.  
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The following examples from the case study authorities illustrate some of the 
negative factors in the executive / OS relationship, arising from the OS side. 
The case studies provide this perspective simply because of the focus of the 
research; any data on executive behaviour was derived from the indirect 
observation of the researcher and interviews with non-primary sources.  
 
Authority A: Inter-personal rivalries 
In certain cases OSC chairs held strong negative views about the 
overarching OS committee, comprising all OSC chairs, who were also 
members of the ruling group. It was felt that certain key members of the 
committee were using their position to curry favour with the cabinet. This 
manifested itself in excessive control over the respective OSCs‟ work 
programmes and output, underpinned by a strong constitutional position 
which stated that all reports from an OSC of the authority should proceed to 
cabinet via the management committee. On some occasions the latter was 
willing to reject reports with a list of changes to be made before it could 
proceed. This generated resentment amongst some of the chairs sitting on 
the committee, when their own OSC‟s report was censured by it. This 
situation often occurred due to the strength of the management committee 
chair, who on most occasions carried the debate (when debate occurred).  
 
It is possible to conclude that group discipline played a major part in this 
situation, as all of the OSC chairs making up the management committee 
were of the ruling group. There was very little challenge provided when a 
cabinet appointee to the management committee was able to alter reports 
before they were published. Interpersonal rivalries could therefore be 
observed on an intra party basis (in that the OSC chairs felt disempowered 
by the ruling OS member of their own party group), and from a different 
perspective, in the executive / OS relationship, where cabinet clearly wished 
to constrain OS both procedurally (in requiring that reports went via the 
management committee) and interpersonally, by ensuring that overly 
sympathetic individuals were able to chair the management committee.  
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It should be noted that, whilst in this set of circumstances an overarching OS 
management committee had certain negative impacts on the broader OS 
function of the authority, there are examples where such a body does not 
detract from the independence of OSCs. The main example of this is in one 
authority which has a management committee which does not have the 
power to veto its child committees‟ reports. This authority also has a more 
open political culture, with OSC chairs divided evenly between the ruling 
group and the largest opposition group. The parent committee also, 
therefore, has a degree of opposition representation on it. Members are used 
to working more collaboratively in other committees of the council, and the 
council itself is not overwhelmingly dominated by one political group. On this 
basis, the management committee can fulfil its remit without impinging on 
OSC independence, and the link with cabinet is maintained via a 
cabinet/scrutiny liaison member, an arrangement which maintains a 
constructive link between the two bodies. 
 
Authority B: Party political matters 
Authority B1 was a „fourth option‟ hung authority which changed hands 
acrimoniously when independents broke their coalition with the minority 
Labour administration and switched their allegiance to the Liberal Democrats. 
This caused a change in control which effectively destroyed the previously, 
albeit frai l, consensual approach of the council‟s constituent political groups.  
 
The catalyst for the change was the contentious issue of alternate weekly 
refuse collections, or „twin bins‟, whereby non-recyclable household waste is 
collected separately and on alternate weeks to recyclable refuse. Local  
Labour party policy in the area matched the national party‟s policy of support 
for alternate weekly collections; this stance was to the consternation of the 
independents who duly switched allegiance. The history of the issue was 
fraught with political tension and several headlines on the decision making 
and implementation processes had appeared in local newspapers which 
were embarrassing to the ruling coalition.  
                                                 
1
 Now defunct following reorganisation  
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Against this backdrop, the council‟s two OSCs had been operating in a cross-
party, collaborative manner in reviewing topics of concern to the area, with 
little impact felt from the heated debates in the council chamber. The change 
in control itself was not a major risk to the successful cross -party 
relationships within the two OSCs. The major risk arose when, in discussing 
the OSCs‟ work programmes in full counci l, one of the OSC chairs suggested 
that OS dissect the issue by revisiting every report written over a period of 
several years on the subject. Council then agreed the item as an addition to  
the relevant OSC‟s work programme.  
 
It was suggested at one point that previous employees of the council with 
involvement in the decision making process should be invited to attend an 
OSC to give account. The situation was a potential flashpoint for the relevant 
OSC, with party political issues barely contained within individual committee 
members. Very careful negotiation and a history of successful cross-party 
working carried the OS function through the episode, with possibly 
irreparable damage to working relationships narrowly averted. 
 
Summary 
One of the two overarching categories arising from the data is „Relationships‟ 
which in turn comprises two concepts: „critical friendship‟ and „external 
stakeholder‟. The previous section has discussed the concept of „critical 
friendship‟ in depth and found that it is a cornerstone of effective OS. Whilst 
the phrase is encapsulated within one of the Centre for Public Scrutiny‟s 
„Four Principles of Effective Scrutiny‟, it has entered the vernacular to a 
respectable extent, and it is certainly observable across the case study 
authorities in the way that OS is practiced.  
 
In terms of emphasis, it can be stated that each of the case study authorities 
emphasised „critical‟ or „friendship‟ to a greater or lesser extent. It is certainly 
possible to combine the two approaches, and the most effective OS functions 
will be flexible enough to adapt their approaches to different circumstances. 
Although the idea of „critical friendship‟ may sound counter-intuitive, it is an 
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excellent principle to adhere to when shaping policy through influence, rather 
than executive power. Too much criticism will result in a siege mentality by 
the executive, its agents (senior officers) and council partners, meaning that 
OS will be rendered irrelevant and without influence. Excessive „friendship‟ 
will result in an unchallenging rubber stamping exercise at worst, and at best 
a consultation mechanism guided by the nose towards acceptable 
conclusions.  
 
Of paramount importance to effective critical friendship is a member lead on 
the OS process. Only members have the mandate to demand change and 
exercise influence; where member capacity is weak, OS is weak. Although 
this is certainly true within the confines of the council and its services, a 
greater challenge for OS is in exercising influence and utilising the member 
led approach with partners and partnerships, where member legitimacy is not 
recognised as it is in local government. Issues around lines of accountability 
and conflicting loyalties amongst statutory external stakeholders, discussed 
earlier in the thesis, must be addressed for effective councillor „critical 
friendship‟ to exercise influence across the broader spectrum of public 
services.  
 
The following section covers the second concept within the „Relationships‟ 
category, „external stakeholder‟. Where „critical friendship‟ emerged as a 
guiding principle for the OS function, „external stakeholder‟ as a concept 
introduces the public service spectrum outside of the council‟s remit more 
fully into the debate. Whether a service user or provider, involved in OS via 
co-option or by giving evidence to a review, successful engagement with 
external stakeholders will determine OS‟s relevance in coming years. For 
example, in the field of health OS Coleman has suggested that greater 
patient and general public involvement could result in more influential OS 
processes (Coleman, 2007). This is particularly so in an environment 
characterised increasingly by service user empowerment and the next stages 
of partnership working, the latter including Total Place initiatives and more 
substantive moves toward shared financial and human resources. 
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7.1.2 External stakeholder 
The „external stakeholder‟ concept can be explored in depth through a range 
of variables arising from the data.  In terms of the nature of external 
stakeholder participation in the OS process, these variables include 
temporality, geographical situation, location, degree of knowledge or 
expertise, the qualitative and quantitative extent of the involvement, vested 
interest, involvement strategies and mandate. On a higher theoretical level, 
epistemological considerations concerning what constitutes „evidence‟ also 
arose.   
 
Temporality 
The duration of the external stakeholder involvement plays an important role 
in terms of how well OS is understood by all involved. Recurrent OSC 
witnesses may build up a picture of the OS process over time, based on 
knowledge of what is going on and an increased awareness of the strengths 
and limitations of the process. Witnesses may develop strategies to foil the 
OS process, one of the most common being the obfuscatory report which is 
often employed by experienced OSC witnesses (primarily senior council 
officers). One possible reason why senior officers may wish to be less than 
open with an OSC is provided by Professor Steve Leach: „Mainstream 
officers are unlikely to provide information which facilitates challenge of a 
policy or decision already agreed with (or destined for) the executive ‟ (2009, 
p. 13).  
 
In this case „mainstream‟ officers with a long te rm relationship with OS can 
become adept at handling OSCs, providing carefully selected information 
which does not conflict with agreed and proposed policy. As external 
stakeholder involvement is less likely to be ongoing, they are less likely to be 
able to develop such strategies. However, in some cases their own 
organisations‟ governing bodies may prove a similar challenge to that of 
OSCs, and similar coping strategies developed in these forums could be 
employed in the OSC setting.  
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This, of course, presupposes that external witnesses will want to hide 
information from OSCs when, in fact, the nature of much OSC work with 
external partners involves reviewing services to suggest improvements; a 
process which is not (or need not be) confrontational and elsewhere in this 
text has been characterised as the „friend‟ aspect of the „critical friend‟ role 
(see p. 171). The harder-edged „critical‟ aspect is more likely to be employed 
within the council itself when holding the executive and senior officers to 
account, although it should not be employed hastily.  
 
Role delineation 
In some cases, ongoing external stakeholder witness involvement was a very 
positive experience. An external stakeholder (a voluntary sector chief 
executive) involved as both a witness and a co-optee on an OSC, on a 
relatively long term basis, described her involvement as „mutually beneficial‟ 
as it raised her organisation‟s profile, gave her access to information and 
introduced her to councillors and senior officers. Her organisation also 
conducted research for the OSC concerned, which indicates that when 
discussing external stakeholder involvement in OS, the lines between OSC 
co-optee, OSC witness and OSC support/research are not always strictly 
demarcated, although an alternative viewpoint from a different authority 
states that they are: 
 
Scrutiny officer (Authority C): ... if I‟m there as an officer, I am there to 
answer questions from members and give evidence. If you‟re there as a 
partner you‟re either there ... answering questions, or you might be 
there as part of the committee, co-opted ... to ask questions. And I think 
it‟s important to keep that clarity of role. It‟s not a round-table 
discussion, it‟s not a policy development, we have advisory groups for 
that. 
 
The view quoted above has negative implications for OS as a forum for a 
more deliberative style of democracy, which would necessarily involve a 
more fluid dialogue and less formal distinction of roles. The examples given 
by the interviewee do indicate a continuum of roles in terms of external 
stakeholder involvement. At one end of the spectrum this would involve 
clearly demarcated remits and more specific expectations of each individual, 
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dependent upon the capacity in which they are involved in OSC processes 
(„hard‟ role delineation). At the opposite end of the spectrum there would be 
more fluid roles and less strictly defined individual remits („soft‟ role 
delineation). The first extreme was most often witnessed in formal committee 
session, especially in OSCs in the larger case study authorities. The principal 
forums/environments for this type of involvement are described in the 
following Figures 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 9: ‘Hard’ role delineation 
 
i. Formal committee session in a larger authority 
Larger authorities mean greater numbers of members sitting on OSCs 
and (typically) a larger number of officers and others in attendance. 
More people at meetings means a more pressing need on the chair to 
establish and maintain order and ensure that all have an equal chance 
to contribute. The need to move rapidly through a pre-published agenda 
adds to the time pressure.  
 
One of the most effective and appropriate ways to do this involves a 
more structured approach (a chair-maintained list of those waiting to 
speak during the meeting rather than a more relaxed approach) and the 
adoption of a formal „Q & A‟ style approach to questioning, etc. The 
structured approach lends itself, for logistical reasons, to a clearer 
distinction of roles.  
 
ii. Monitoring / holding to account / performance management role 
The type of work normally conducted in formal committee session 
(rather than a less formal working group) tends to be of the more 
procedural variety, concerned mainly with transparency, accountability, 
representation, etc. In this sense it is more a purely democratic 
exercise, with a less explicit focus on service improvement. In this 
setting the „formal‟ role of each participant is brought into focus, for 
example the non-executive (OS) members exercise their democratic 
role in holding key decision makers to account. Those giving account to 
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the OSC are aware of their democratic duty to be open and accountable 
in the expenditure of public money (whether they believe they are 
accountable to an OSC is another matter), and all those involved in the 
process are fulfi lling the „formal‟ requirements of their role in the 
interests of transparency, democracy, etc.  
 
In the less formal working group setting, which in larger authorities will 
be set up to undertake OS reviews, the focus is on service improvement 
to a greater extent. It has been observed that in this setting less 
emphasis tends to be placed on formal role distinction and more placed 
on working together to question and develop services through member 
challenge. There is certainly more deliberation and less „us and them‟ in 
the context of a smaller, less formal meeting. 
 
iii. Bureaucratic / reactionary organisational culture  
In a classical Weberian bureaucracy (Hughes, 2003, p. 21-24), present 
in many local authorities, there is likely to be a clearer delineation of 
roles and responsibilities within the OS context, reflecting the broader 
hierarchical arrangements in the council at large. An example of this is 
the director who will not allow the head of service to discuss his or her 
service with an OSC, despite the latter being far better informed in most 
cases than their superior when discussing „their‟ service. It is seen as 
proper that the senior manager, because of his or her super-ordinate 
role in the hierarchy, should attend OS to give account.  
 
Role delineation prevalent within the broader framework of the council 
is then replicated in the OS context because it is the default position. 
OSC chairs exhibit „chairman-like‟ behaviour and the senior manager 
exhibits „(strategic) managerial behaviour‟. Flexible and open ways of 
conducting OS are compromised where clearly defined roles are 
established. This behaviour has been observed in the different ways 
that OSC chairs engage with external and internal stakeholders. When 
very senior figures are in attendance many OSC chairs alter their 
behaviour noticeably. This is in contrast to the behaviour exhibited 
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when members of the public or others are in attendance. This is 
pragmatic chairmanship, but can also be attributed to power 
relationships based on organisational culture, personal gravitas, history 
and resources, and both formal and informal position/s within the 
authority. For example, existing organisational culture in three county 
councils prior to the introduction of OS was found by Sandford (2006) to 
have influenced subsequent OS arrangements in terms of committee 
structure, and the relationship with the executive and senior officers. 
The reversion to old-style local government behaviour and norms 
characterised by „hard‟ role delineation is an example of traditional (pre-
OS) organisational culture prevailing.  
 
Figure 10: ‘Soft’ role delineation  
 
Some of the best received OS by all concerned (including senior 
officers)1 involved sessions that engaged service users in conjunction 
with service providers.  Such sessions were observed breaking down 
fairly rapidly into non-hierarchical and deliberative sessions, with a 
dilution of formal chairing and due process. The meetings went from 
questions posed through the chair to senior officers, to ad hoc 
discussions with the service users involving both members and the 
senior officers concerned. Bringing service provider and service users 
together in the OS process allowed members to observe both sides of 
the debate and draw their own conclusions. As one scrutiny officer 
stated: „that's where consultation and engagement can play a part; 
you're testing evidence that you're hearing against other groups' . 
 
„Softer‟ role delineation has a key role to play in this regard. It was most 
frequently observed in working groups formed by larger OSCs, which 
are confined neither by the requirements to produce formal agendas 
and minutes nor the sheer size of the OSC and its accompanying 
logistical challenges (finding and securing appropriate meeting venues, 
                                                 
1
 Based on face to face discussions with senior officer participants, in confidence, 
immediately after the event.  
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circulating OSC papers/reports, etc.). Such informal OSC working 
groups were generally the setting for more fluid relationships between 
OS members and external stakeholders, although examples of this 
could also be observed on occasion across the full range of OS settings 
and processes: 
 
i. Smaller OSCs with fewer people present  
In the smaller district councils that were observed, less formality and 
role delineation existed within the work of the (smaller) OSCs. Even in 
formal committee session, much more open and flexible chairing 
enabled a more fluid relationship between participants. Larger 
authorities have been observed replicating this where formal committee 
sessions were skilfully chaired, and where OS was conducted in 
working groups of the main OSC (with less formality and fewer 
attendees).  
 
ii. Evidence gathering for scrutiny reviews  
A much less formal relationship with „softer‟ role delineation can be 
frequently observed when evidence is gathered for scrutiny reviews. In 
some respects the ethos of OSCs changes to reflect more the desire to 
improve services in a collaborative manner. As one scrutiny officer 
(Authority C) observed: „members want a dialogue with the managing 
director of [private company], but they want it in a constructive way. So 
they don‟t want to haul them in and ask them difficult questions ... It‟s 
actually what can we do together to improve services‟.  
 
This involves working in partnership with the witness attendee. Where 
attendees are external stakeholders, extra care in ensuring that they 
are welcomed and treated fairly has been observed. Formal committee 
sessions in which the purpose is primarily to hold to account (i.e. select 
committee style question and answer sessions) are characterised by 
role delineation and greater formality. In contrast, evidence gathering 
sessions by smaller OSCs and working groups of larger OSCs are often 
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more like focus groups, or problem solving groups, with much less role 
delineation.  
 
In these settings, in some cases, members actively defer to the 
participant in a manner which would rarely be observed in formal 
committee session. This was mostly in recognition of the expertise of 
the individual giving evidence, but it may also occur where members 
are unsure of the issue themselves and have limited casework 
knowledge to draw upon to „ground‟ the issue in constituents‟ daily 
experiences. This undermines the main benefit that councillors can 
bring to the OS process: local knowledge and awareness of residents‟ 
concerns in relation to services.  
 
The qualitative nature of external stakeholder involvement 
Various terms are employed to describe participants in the OS process, 
which in turn, can indicate the qualitative nature of their input. Terms range 
from „guest speaker‟ through to the judicial term „witness‟. Less 
complementary terms include „drum-bangers‟ and „usual suspects‟, typically 
employed when referring to members of the public with very specific, usually 
ongoing concerns, and serial attendees / complainants, respectively. The 
almost universal lack of public attendance at OSC meetings (with the 
occasional exception of health scrutiny) seems to have prompted borderline 
suspicion of any member of the public who does attend or show an interest in 
OS and/or its work.  
 
In contrast, professionals are generally accorded the status of „witnesses‟ or 
even „expert witnesses‟. The research has revealed that in the OS context, 
similar levels of deference are only accorded to the general public whe n they 
are service users able to provide insight. The attitude then is that their views 
are not unimpeachable and must be counterbalanced because of a risk of 
bias. Generally, the views of public sector employees are accepted with little 
reproach, perhaps suggesting that there is an unspoken belief in the 
professionalism and public service ethos of public sector senior managers. It 
also raises interesting questions in relation to the interface between local 
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politicians and bureaucrats, and the relative status and prestige of each in 
relation to the other.  
 
OS chair reference to members of the general public who may be interested 
in a particular piece of OS work is sometimes accompanied by vitriol about 
„drum-bangers‟ and „usual suspects‟. This is ironic particularly when viewing 
the web pages of many OS functions, where a range of inducements to „get 
involved‟ and „suggest a topic‟ enjoy prominent positions. Some OS chairs 
appear to have a clear conception of their OS role in relation to the general 
public:  
 
RB:  Do you think there's a role for the general public in [OS]? You know, 
people who may not have expert knowledge.  
  
Councillor (Authority D):   
No. You know this is not a public enquiry or something. This is 
about making the county system work better ... Otherwise, if you 
bring the public in you're back to, you know, opinions, axe-grinders 
and politics, and the outcome will be zero. 
 
Partly due to this, OS appears, generally, to have developed into a technical 
exercise which privileges expert advice and opinion. However, it could be 
argued that this is also a result of the way in which policy is developed in 
local government in general under the public management model (Corrigan & 
Joyce, 1997; Hughes, 2003; Massey & Pyper, 2005), with its focus on 
expertise. OS is clearly no different from the rest of local government in this 
respect. Privileging expert knowledge may have benefits, but perhaps 
hinders the development of a broader role for OS in engaging local people in 
the governance of their lives, due to the complexity of the topics and the 
language employed. This could be inevitable and is very likely to indicate a 
broader issue for the democratic renewal agenda and exhortations to involve 
citizens; the complexity of the public policy issues faced today may be such 
that it necessarily excludes from the debate all but experts in the fields 
concerned.  
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Presupposing that everything reported by senior officers and experts is 
beyond reproach and an accurate reflection of fact actually poses some risk 
to the integrity and accuracy of the OS process. For example, commentators 
have proffered various explanations of the different motivations of senior 
public sector officials. Thinkers in the public choice tradition (e.g. Niskanen, 
1971) have claimed that bureaucrats will by default seek to maximise the 
budgets of their departments as „a larger budget will mean greater status and 
higher salaries‟ (Marsh et al., 2000, p. 462). These motivations will, 
necessarily, impact negatively on senior officials‟ input into the OS process.   
 
However, Patrick Dunleavy‟s „bureau-shaping‟ model (1991) counters the 
public choice analysis with the claim that the status and quality of their work 
is the principle concern of senior officials and, when „faced with institution-
wide cuts, they reshape their bureaux into small staff agencies in order both 
to protect themselves and their agencies, and to allow themselves to 
concentrate on the policy-advisory role which they prefer‟ (Marsh et al., 2000, 
p. 462 emphasis added). Dunleavy‟s view is less pessimistic about the 
underlying motivations of senior officials, and implies that engagement with 
an OSC in policy development mode would be an enjoyable experience for 
an officer. A corollary of this would be better quality input into the process.  
 
The questioning of public sector officers in other agencies is qualitatively 
different from the questioning of council officers given the different 
relationships with the OSC. Senior council managers are officers of the 
council and OSCs are committees of the Council. There is therefore a strong 
professional imperative to respond proactively to an OSC when requested. 
External stakeholders have no such compulsion. Although OSCs are now 
endowed with statutory powers to scrutinise the LAA partners‟ performance 
in relation to LAA targets, senior managers in the employ of the partners may 
not see their lines of accountability including local authority OSCs, and could 
therefore engage in only a tokenistic manner to comply with statutory 
requirements.  
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The implication of this is that a more conciliatory tone is often adopted when 
scrutinising council partners. This is because the use of statutory powers to 
compel cooperation with an OSC could affect valuable relationships on a 
much broader and more fundamental level. On that basis, any OSC chair 
would have to consider at length the possible implications of relying on legal 
compulsion to engage with otherwise unwilling council partners.  
 
This leads to another key qualitative issue in the involvement of external 
stakeholders in the OS process: the extent to which the engagement is 
considered worthwhile and potentially effective. In this respect, the 
involvement of external stakeholders in the OS process can vary from 
tokenistic to substantive. External stakeholders‟ own perceptions of why they 
are being involved are critically important: 
 
I‟m also aware that they‟ve [council officers] got a job to do as well, so 
whether it‟s a case of ticking the box so that they can say yes, they‟ve 
consulted with a voluntary and community sector organisation or 
whether they genuinely want to get involved, I‟m not sure. Obviously it 
depends on the individual as well. Certainly to start with, when I first 
started this job I really got the impression that I was invited to all the 
different places so they could say that they‟d done it. You know, where 
they have to meet targets about consulting with voluntary and 
community sector organisations, I don‟t know. But now as it‟s 
progressed and the role has become more established, I think it is 
changing.  
 
(Voluntary sector partner (Authority A) involved at various stages as 
both a witness and co-optee on an OSC).  
 
The obvious aim of any OSC would be to ensure that any stakeholder 
participation was substantive. A particular example encountered by the 
researcher involved the discussion with an OSC chair (Authority D) of an 
event to involve young people, the aim being to inform the OSC‟s work 
programme. The chair was vehement that the event should be substantive 
and not tokenistic.  
 
It could be theorised that where the power and prestige relationship is 
balanced in favour of the OSC, the issue of tokenism arises. Certainly one 
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would not expect there to be any question of whether the involvement of the 
Chief Constable, for example, would be tokenistic. Every effort would be 
made to accommodate and question at a sufficiently high level. When 
involving less prestigious or powerful stakeholders there is more likelihood of 
box-ticking and tokenism. This is all the more likely in the context of strong 
command and control from the centre in the form of performance indicators, 
audit and inspection, which may present requirements to engage with 
voluntary groups and the public. Indeed, box-ticking is equally likely to take 
place in the OS process than in other council services. Possibly apocryphal 
tales from across the public sector of „gaming‟ the system to achieve better 
inspection results (Seddon, 2008) do have their OS equivalents: for example, 
the researcher has heard first-hand how one OSC engineered a call-in (the 
first ever at the authority) before their authority‟s Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment.  
 
The qualitative nature of external stakeholder involvement varies according 
to the formal institutional arrangements in place. OS was intended by the 
Labour government to be a new and flexible way of working which broke with 
some of the more staid practices of the committee system and, as such, 
should potentially be more open to good quality external stakeholder 
engagement. Under the committee system, formal reports and 
recommendations from officers were considered in policy committees. The 
nature of the work dictated that the way of working was structured, formalised 
and dictated by due process. The OS process has mutated from this, 
although aspects of the previous system are sometimes still present in the 
procedural elements of it and, in some ways, of conducting OSC business. 
This in turn can hamper the aforementioned potential of OS to involve 
external stakeholders in a substantive and qualitatively different manner.  
 
There is certainly a tension evident between the procedural requirements 
placed on OSCs and the need to be innovative in gathering evidence and 
examining issues: 
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Scrutiny officer (Authority C): [OSC] is still a formal committee of the 
council where we have to follow procedures. You know, so for example 
if there is a confidential matter we‟d have to exclude the public and the 
press. So we can‟t get away from that and I don‟t think we should 
because it has a formal role. 
 
When the need for speed and efficiency arises (as in the case of scrutiny 
reviews) many OSCs simply form working groups which meet outside of the 
formal committee structures. They are not constrained by the formalities of a 
properly constituted committee, and can therefore interview witnesses (in 
some authorities, controversially, in private), conduct site visits, meet the next 
day (without the requirements to publish agendas and give notice, etc.) and 
enjoy a range of other flexibilities. Chairing styles and participant involvement 
are, similarly, more relaxed and are genuinely representative of a new way of 
working, at least in the context of OS working groups.  
 
The qualitative nature of external stakeholder involvement also depends 
upon the pre-existing relationship with the OSC, which can vary across a 
wide range of interlinked variables:  
 
 Formal relationship: Co-optee – witness  
 Employment sector: Public – private – third – none 
 Knowledge / experience 
 Personality 
 Etc. 
 
Many variables and factors will affect an individual‟s input and perception of 
OS, making it difficult to generalise or theorise on the subject. However, 
referring back to the previously mentioned technical nature of OS, it can be 
stated that it is unlikely that an individual without a given level of knowledge 
and experience would be a welcome participant in the work of an OSC. 
However, co-optees tend to be especially valued:  
 
RB:  Would you say that external stakeholder participation is a priority 
for you? 
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Councillor (Authority C): Yes, it‟s one of our priorities, yes it is. I mean 
all, all members here are elected. Right, so they have a mandate 
basically from our communities to come and represent them and be a 
voice. But you know, we don‟t know everything. You know, we don‟t 
know everything. And our co-optees usually have a particular skill or a 
highly developed interest in, in the subject ... and we can learn from 
them. 
 
RB: Does the electoral mandate of the elected member set you apart in 
any way from the co-optees? 
 
Councillor: No it doesn‟t, because we are, we say we‟re non-political. 
And we‟re not, we aren‟t political, in as much as, you know, there‟s no 
party lines being drawn here, there and everywhere, no pressure put 
onto people to do anything, you know. So when our co-optees and 
members of the public come in and they want to ask a question or want 
to give some evidence, it‟s what they want to say. And we take that on 
board as we‟ll have invited them to do so, so you‟ve got to listen and 
they are equal. Must try to make sure that our co-optees feel as if they 
are an integral part of the committee, the same as a member, or 
otherwise what‟s the point in being there?  
 
Examining the views of external stakeholders who have been involved in OS 
processes was a particularly informative aspect of the research which 
provided a decidedly mixed picture. One voluntary sector employee with 
good knowledge of an array of issues facing the relevant area was 
particularly unflattering:   
 
RB: Do you think there‟s a role for members in questioning witnesses 
and getting involved in debates?  
 
External stakeholder (Authority A): I sometimes feel quite embarrassed 
by councillors, for them. Just, I don‟t know just, you know, as I say I 
sometimes feel like they don‟t really have a clue, they don‟t really know 
what it is they‟re supposed to be doing. Sometimes, well, what I see is 
really basic points or things they seem to have just completely missed. I 
don‟t know whether a unique type of people are councillors. 
 
RB: Do councillors bring anything to that kind of meeting, where you‟re 
questioning people? 
 
External stakeholder: Oh I‟m sure they do, yes. I‟m being too harsh. 
Yes, I mean as I say some councillors are absolutely fantastic. [OSC 
chair] is fantastic, incredibly knowledgeable, incredibly passionate, 
really wants to make a difference and I think he really feels that he can 
make a difference as well. Unfortunately councillors like him are few 
and far between in my personal experience. So yes. 
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The points raised elaborate one of the key challenges facing OS in a 
professionalised and managerial public policy arena: the role and status of 
the lay perspective. Councillors have, traditionally, been viewed as electorally 
mandated and therefore able to provide a legitimate and representative view 
on behalf of their constituents; however, is the electoral mandate sufficient in 
the modern world? Dialogue with an external stakeholder suggests an 
alternative form of representational legitimacy: 
 
RB: Throughout this interview I‟ve picked up a theme that you‟re 
[voluntary sector organisation employee] there representing people‟s 
interests. To me also councillors are there to represent people‟s 
interests. Now, you don‟t seem to think councillors are very well 
equipped to do that. What makes [her voluntary sector organisation] 
uniquely placed to ... be able to do that? 
 
External stakeholder (Authority A): Because of the people that we‟re 
seeing, because of the people who are coming to see us. I know that 
people go to councillors as well to discuss the problems and I don‟t 
know how councillors record the people who come to see them or how 
they collate the information, but we have a very, very sophisticated 
system which means that I can instantly access who‟s coming to where 
with what problem. How it was resolved, what the issue was, how the, 
how they got into that situation in the first place. I‟m sure that councillors 
are representative of the people who voted them in and who wanted 
them there. I don‟t know any demographics of people who come to see 
us, I don‟t know if they vote or who they vote for, but I would suggest 
that possibly they don‟t, because they don‟t see any point in it because 
they don‟t think that these councillors are representing them.  
  
Expressed above is the idea of a competing legitimacy based upon 
technology and expert knowledge of the issues facing a particular 
demographic. Councillors may have greater legitimacy across a wider range 
of governance activities; but in the context of a particular scrutiny topic or 
review, does the subject expert enjoy a greater legitimacy than the elected 
member, who may not enjoy similar expertise? The question for OS would be 
more usefully put in the following terms: How can electoral legitimacy be 
placed on a par with technical legitimacy when scrutinising esoteric and 
specialist subjects? The question is not simply academic, but has practical 
implications for the credibility of OS and the ongoing engagement of experts 
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in the OS process.  In chapter 8 (p. 252) deliberative democratic processes 
are described as a potential response. 
 
The question is particularly relevant given the increased levels of mistrust 
arising from the recent scandal involving MPs‟ expenses. The reputation of 
councillors has suffered less than that of MPs, but a spill -over effect has 
occurred (LGC, 2009, p. 7) whereby questions of councillor i llegitimacy are 
strengthened as the already common perception of self-interested politicians 
gathers purchase. The end result for OS is that the balance tips further 
towards expert legitimacy in decision-making. Even if OSCs were endowed 
with extensive powers, attracted consistent media attention and their purpose 
widely understood, their essential legitimacy would be compromised by the 
current and almost unprecedented unpopularity of politicians and politics as a 
brand. This wouldn‟t be so important if senior council decision-makers and 
external stakeholders were somehow insulated from the scandal or were able 
to detach from it in their dealings with OS. However, this is obviously not the 
case, as all are taxpayers and consumers of media. The likelihood of OS 
enhancing local democracy through public participation and greater 
emphasis on deliberation in the democratic process, in line with the 
requirements of the democratic renewal agenda, is therefore severely 
compromised by its fundamental association with mainstream politicians and 
politics. This is unlikely to improve unless a fundamental change in public 
opinion takes place.  
 
7.2 Representation 
The second category of concepts emerging from the data is named 
„Representation‟. Fundamentally, councillors exist to represent their 
constituents, but how representation is practiced has altered under executive 
political management arrangements. Technically speaking, under the 
previous committee system, all councillors had a voice in the decisions that 
were made. Of course, in practice, the party whip and group discipline meant 
that often decisions were taken before committee meetings, leaving 
members little scope to exercise independent judgement once a line had 
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been agreed. It is not hard to imagine the protracted process that decisions 
would be subject to, with particularly contentious reports presented to several 
committees before approval was received.  
 
The executive system, in contrast, could in some cases speed up the 
decision making process, with informal schemes of power delegation 
foregoing the requirement on senior officers to verify decisions with the 
relevant portfolio holder. In terms of efficiency this is to be welcomed, but 
some question whether the democratic cost of locking the majority of 
councillors out of decision making is too severe. In this regard the response 
of the OSC is paramount. Where effective oversight is required before a 
decision is made, the OSC must be equipped with the cabinet forward plan, 
ready to time its intervention and deliver an evidence-based and non-party 
political appraisal of the issue to provide the requisite challenge. Where 
services are found to be lacking, OSCs must be able to draw upon the 
resources needed to scrutinise effectively on behalf of residents. Both of 
these processes fall within the representative role of elected members; 
indeed, during interview none suggested any incongruence between their 
role as representative and their role as scrutineer.  
 
It can be concluded that different modes of representation exist: the 
aforementioned committee system model of representation, whereby 
members represented the views of constituents via the exercise of a vote and 
a portion of executive power; and the current system which means that non-
executive members hold their executive counterparts (and other powerful 
figures across the public sector) to account on behalf of the voters. The latter 
system of representation has been expanded through the introduction by 
central government of concepts such as „community leadership‟ (Centre for 
Public Scrutiny, 2007, p. 12; DETR, 1998b; Stewart, 1999). Such concepts 
have not yet appeared to have gained purchase „on the ground‟, as few 
members referred to it explicitly during the research. Non-executive members 
have, however, developed specific views about the „scrutiny‟ element of their 
OS representative role. The diversity of these views is stark, and the concept 
is explored in-depth in the following sub-chapter. 
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7.2.1 Scrutiny 
„Scrutiny‟ has taken on different meanings in different authorities. It and its 
counterpart „overview‟ are used, depending on the authority, in combination 
or in isolation. In one of the case study authorities, scrutiny was taken to 
mean „after the event examination of an issue or policy‟. Scrutiny commi ttees 
co-existed with policy development committees which looked at nascent 
policy, a task which some in the authority conflated with „overview‟. A vital 
distinction is that the policy development committees examined pre-
implementation policy in a party political environment chaired by the relevant 
cabinet member; meetings were also not held in public. „Overview‟ would 
differ in that meetings would be public, non-party political and exclude 
cabinet members from joining the committee.  
 
In other authorities, „overview‟ and „scrutiny‟ were combined with often a 
limited pre-decision / pre-implementation policy development role. Policy was 
also developed through the „scrutiny‟ activity that was undertaken, whereby 
evidence was heard, sites were visited and good practice from elsewhere 
examined; the culmination of this evidence-gathering usually being a report 
and recommendations for service improvement. Indeed, acceptance and 
successful implementation of the recommendations, to many, constitutes 
policy development, whereas to others it doesn‟t. To illustrate the rather 
esoteric distinction between post-implementation policy development via 
„scrutiny‟ reviews, and pre-implementation policy development from the 
outset, a graphical representation is given below: 
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Figure 11: OS interventions in the policy making process 
 
The above is probably the most prevalent view within the authority of what 
„overview‟ and „scrutiny‟ are, with the majority of OS activity observed and 
discussed by interviewees of the retrospective „scrutiny‟ variety, i.e. 
examination of policy and practice with a view to recommending 
improvements. Scrutiny reviews are the most highly recognised output of the 
OS process, and are widely seen to be the most valuable, assuming they are 
done well, as with the best of intentions, ill-conceived or poorly executed 
scrutiny reviews can have an extremely deleterious effect on local 
relationships. External stakeholders involved in the OS process seemed 
aware especially of the potential negative impact of investigations, although it 
should be stated that the occasional opportunity to quiz senior council 
officers seemed to be an adequate inducement to participate.  
 
Very careful management is usually required to prevent an instantaneous 
negative impression of a scrutiny review and its motivations. Uninformed or 
misinformed senior stakeholders with a limited understanding (and 
sometimes those with a perfectly adequate understanding) of what the 
scrutiny review aims to achieve, can put up barriers and effectively refuse to 
buy-into the process (despite any tokenistic participation they may indulge 
in). Senior officer buy-in is crucial from two perspectives: they are expected 
to provide accurate and timely evidence; and, perhaps most importantly, they 
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are the ones who will be tasked with implementing recommendations. When 
OS is often poorly resourced, every stakeholder must be on board with the 
process; this is especially true when there is no executive power endowed in 
the committee producing the recommendations.  
 
Senior officer involvement 
It is hard to ascertain from the data why senior officers require such careful 
handling when affected, or likely to be affected by scrutiny activity, as has 
been indicated by the findings. The most obvious explanation is that services 
invested with personal time, effort and emotion are in the spotlight to a 
greater extent than would otherwise by the case. Service managers may not 
be aware of or appreciate the non-party political ethos of OS, and may be 
concerned about attacks grounded in political expediency. Further concern 
about the use and potential misuse of data can be justified when, for 
example, seasonal variations in quantitative performance indicators are 
misconstrued as systematic flaws. Perhaps most importantly of all is the 
reputational risk involved in being subject to any kind of scrutiny. When a 
service is assessed as high performing under a corporate assessment, a star 
rating is assigned which can contribute significantly to a manager‟s CV. The 
profile of OS is, as yet, insufficient to bestow similar personal benefits on high 
performing managers, although the opposite is true: a poor verdict from an 
OSC can damage reputations. Therefore, in terms of cost / benefit OS 
involvement in service improvement is, in the view of some, best avoided. 
The research was not aimed at addressing this question, but clearly it has 
implications for external stakeholder participation in OS processes.   
 
The research has shown „scrutiny‟ to be an essentially technical exercise, 
and on that basis it is hard to overstate the role that senior officers play in the 
process. The data have shown that where OS has effected change, it has 
been with the buy-in of the most senior officers of the council. This is simply 
due to their role in supplying the technical information required to scrutinise, 
their policy and strategic advisory role to „their‟ cabinet member, and their 
role in implementing the recommendations of OS. An example given by an 
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OS chair (Authority D) illustrates the pivotal role senior officers play in 
allowing OS to effect change (often despite the executive‟s support):  
  
...that whole report got simply rejected out of hand [by cabinet]. 
However, having said that, the officers ignored it [the cabinet decision] 
altogether and created an action plan which is actually steadily being 
implemented now without any cabinet recommendation ... Well, I mean 
we can't say too much about that you know, because we wouldn't want 
to put officers in a difficult position ... You've got to use the system 
haven't you? Just because something's right doesn't mean it's going to 
happen. Local politics is about working the system, having confidence 
between people and establishing confidence of officers because they're 
the ones who have real power in that they can actually do things 
because they control budgets don't they?  
 
The same interviewee also stated that politics can be divorced from scrutiny 
as scrutiny is, as mentioned, a technical exercise. The interviewee (an OSC 
chair) described his own experiences of policy development in a hung 
authority, claiming that policy development was less contentious. This is 
similar to the picture that emerged of the hung authority studied in this 
research (Authority B). OS members worked coherently together and 
effectively sidelined party politics, even when scrutinising a particularly 
contentious issue. The small OSC on which they sat lent itself to personal 
relationship development, which may have been a factor in the effective 
cross-party working observed.  
 
Other factors of note included the „fourth option‟, or streamlined committee 
system political management arrangements, which meant that the OSC‟s 
attention was focussed on several policy committees rather than a single 
executive individual or body. Members were used to negotiating and building 
consensus to get decisions made in the policy committees and in full council. 
However, the large independent contingent were key power brokers, and a 
previously (generally) consensual council was split (irrevocably, thanks to 
then imminent local government reorganisation and the subsequent 
dissolution of the council), because of a shift in the support of the 
independents from the minority ruling group to the biggest opposition group 
over the highly charged issue of alternate weekly refuse collections, which 
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resulted in a change in political control. The fallout and consternation 
amongst members from this was considerable and the effects were felt in the 
council‟s two OSCs, one of which was tasked with investigating in depth the 
reporting process leading up to key decisions made by the then ruling 
coalition. This was a highly party political issue and was not normally a topic 
that would be considered suitable for OS by councillors.  
 
The importance of senior-level buy-in to the OS process has been discussed, 
as too has the increasingly technical nature of OS deliberations. These are 
important factors, but one underdeveloped, yet noteworthy line of enquiry 
that emerged from the research relates to an ambiguity over the role of OS: 
 
 ... because OS is slightly incoherent in many LAs and is certainly 
incoherent in this authority, it‟s hard to actually tease out what 
councillors want and therefore what tool is most appropriate to let 
them get what they want.  
 
RB:  When you say it‟s incoherent what do you mean? Can you 
elaborate on that?  
 
Councillor (Authority A):   
Yeah, I don‟t know of any time in the last five years when anybody‟s 
been able to tell you what the purpose is of OS in this authority. I 
don‟t know of any time in the last five years when there‟s been any 
kind of agreement throughout the council on what the proper role 
for OS should be.  
 
 
RB:  Is that among members, officers or both?  
 
Councillor:  
I think both. I think members have seen OS as part of a power 
struggle between the non-executive members of the council and the 
executive. We‟re talking about an authority with a very strong 
leadership group, where the leader and the deputy leader speak 
with one voice and where anyone who wants to be part of the 
executive has to really consent to that and go along with it. As a 
result, members outside the executive, especially the leadership 
group of OS, have almost seen themselves as being the real 
opposition. Bear in mind that we‟re talking about an authority where 
all the scrutiny chairs are held by members of the ruling group, you 
know? But, it does lead to his kind of opposition within the ruling 
group taking over the scrutiny chairs for themselves and using it to 
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kind of act out their power struggles within the ruling group, rather 
than in the interests of OS.  
 
RB:  That is an interesting perspective. So it‟s party political but not 
between the parties, it‟s party political within the dominant party 
group? 
 
Councillor:   
It‟s intra party rather than inter party, yeah.  
 
Such confusion and maltreatment of the OS process would, perhaps, be 
more destructive in a function focussing on the „big‟, often ideologically based 
policy questions. For example: „As a council should we tax and spend?‟ If this 
was the case, then members could appropriate OS in order to promote and 
grant evidential legitimacy to essentially ideological stances. However, in 
reality, there was very little questioning of this variety observed, members in 
general focussing instead on technical detail (e.g. „what are we doing about 
...?‟) with some regard for outcomes.  
 
7.2.2 Overview 
One scrutiny officer (Authority A) interviewed described „overview‟ as an 
„almost philosophical activity‟ encompassing anything that members may 
deem appropriate in order to represent their communities. In general, as a 
concept „overview‟ is very open to the point that it is often rejected as a label 
altogether, with some involved in the OS process referring simply to 
„scrutiny‟. This is not just a matter of brevity, as several authorities separate 
the role they attributed to „overview‟ - pre-decision policy development - out 
from the scrutiny process (see p. 200). This is one way of conceptualising 
„overview‟: the point in time at which non-executive members in their broader 
OS capacity get the opportunity to evaluate policy. In this sense „scrutiny‟ is 
undertaken after the executive has agreed the policy and it has been or is 
being implemented, whilst „overview‟ is undertaken as policy proposals are 
being developed, before they reach the executive for a final decision. 
„Overview‟ has also been seen by some as more outcome-focussed and 
strategic, as opposed to the focus on minutiae often necessitated by 
„scrutiny‟.  
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Other ways of framing „overview‟ include reference to the particular work 
undertaken. For example, in some instances, „overview‟ was used to 
describe performance management by an OSC; this could be labelled as a 
task-based approach to defining overview. An equally prevalent view is that 
overview and scrutiny are inseparable in practice, regardless of the definition 
of overview applied. For example, when applying the „point-in-time‟ approach 
to defining overview, which places the activity at a specific point in the 
process of fledgling policy development, an OSC in performing scrutiny 
produces recommendations which go on to develop further (either brand new 
or rehashed) policy in the pre-decision stage.  
 
Parsons describes this in general terms: „ In reality, the distinction between 
analysis for policy-making and evaluation of policy is not well demarcated. 
The evaluative studies of policy feed into analysis of problems and policy 
issues and vice versa‟ (1995, p. 382). This clearly suggests that a marked 
distinction between „overview‟ and „scrutiny‟ on the „point in time‟ basis 
represents a false dichotomy. However, that such diversity of opinion and 
practice in local authorities has emerged signifies the flexibility of OS. The 
significance for external stakeholder participation of each approach to 
overview is explored in the following sections. 
 
Point-in-time approach to overview 
Placing „overview‟ at one point in a policy development continuum is a neat 
and superficially attractive method. The underlying principles behind it are: 
 Policy making is a linear process with single and discrete outputs 
(i.e. the policy making process as a production line mandated by the 
political executive, rather than a loop involving numerous parties 
including implementing officers): officers draft policy which goes via an 
OSC to the executive. The OSC comments on the proposals and feeds 
its opinion into the executive‟s deliberations on the matter.  
 It should be evidence based 
Ideally the OSC will have had sufficient time and resources to gather 
evidence on the issue to underpin its policy recommendations. 
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 It should be transparent 
Due to their electoral mandate, and/or a general commitment to 
openness, non-executive members have the right to see what is being 
proposed. 
 Consensus is desirable  
Either a wish to dilute responsibility for the policy outcome or a general 
desire to consult widely leads the executive to the view that consensus is 
desirable.  
 
In this model OS plays a role in developing the foundations of a new policy. 
As the policy beds in and evidence as to its efficacy begins to emerge, the 
OSC concerned may later revisit the policy in „scrutiny‟ mode and develop it 
further via recommendations to the executive.  
 
Another view (not strictly at odds with that described) is more inclined to see 
the policy making process as a loop involving numerous stakeholders, 
viewing executive sign-off as a merely a single stage in the policy process 
and therefore accord less importance to OS involvement from the outset. 
Subsequent OS attention produces recommendations, ideally based on 
sound evidence, which go on to develop given policy further.  
 
Executive agreement of such recommendations is only the first stage in OS 
delivering improvements for service users and existing policies and 
procedures which are regarded as „business as usual‟ may be the hardest in 
which to effect change. This can be evidenced by a number of examples, 
cited both anecdotally and by interviewees, of OSC recommendations being 
agreed wholesale by the executive, only for them to effect minimal changes 
in frontline services. Also, in congruence with this is Gains et al‟s (2008) 
verification of Dunleavy‟s bureau shaping model in local authorities. The gap 
between getting recommendations agreed and having them successfully 
implemented is large, and can only be narrowed by ensuring the support and 
understanding of those tasked with implementation: senior officers. Where an 
OSC is in a position to develop the foundations of the policy in its earliest 
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stages, there is perhaps the greatest opportunity to influence service 
delivery. This is in keeping with a view long held by systems thinkers that you 
cannot inspect quality into a product; rather it must be built in from the outset 
(Seddon, 2008).  
 
The application of systems thinking to the public sector is currently 
fashionable, especially in light of recent failures and criticism of „command 
and control‟ inspectorates such as the Audit Commission and Ofsted. If 
credence is given to the idea that quality is either absent or inbuilt from 
conception, overview of the pre-decision variety could be seen as potentially 
the most effective method of non-executive councillor involvement in shaping 
local policy. Examples of external stakeholder involvement in this variety of 
overview (policy development from the outset) did not arise in the research. 
As with all external stakeholder involvement, the value would be in hearing a 
range of perspectives in a deliberative process that OSCs can orchestrate. 
This in turn augments the evidence base upon which recommendations are 
developed.  
 
External stakeholder participation in policy development from the outset (in 
this context „overview‟) is, potentially, more contentious than in other OS 
activities. As this form of „overview‟ is the precursor to a political decision, 
issues of mandate and legitimacy impinge on otherwise fairly uncontroversial 
external stakeholder involvement. Where an OSC has the time and 
resources to develop an evidence base, external stakeholders can prove 
invaluable, especially where they have prior experience of receiving a similar 
or related service. Experts may be too easily viewed as implicitly political in 
their views, especially on highly contentious topics, and always pose the risk 
of lending their considerable weight to a strong counterargument at odds to 
the executive position.  Also, a strong evidence base is only one part of the 
decision making process (Sanderson, 2009, p. 699), and what constitutes 
„evidence‟ is subject to epistemic debate, specifically „whether one valid claim 
to provide evidence is superior to another‟ (Stoker & John, 2009, p. 357). 
Therefore, however well considered and inclusive the evidence gathering 
process, political expediency or other considerations may lead the political 
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executive to, at worst, ignore an OSCs recommendations outright in a 
policy‟s formative stages, especially if any external stakeholder involvement 
was ill-conceived.  
 
7.3 Evaluating external stakeholder participation  
The literature review introduced Fung‟s (2006) „democracy cube‟ (see p. 79), 
which provided a more thorough analysis of stakeholder engagement than 
existing one-dimensional models (Arnstein, 1971, etc.). The following section 
will attempt to locate the various different degrees of involvement of external 
stakeholders in OS processes within Fung‟s schema, which uses three 
variables: 
 Participants  
„Diffuse public sphere / everyone‟ to „expert administrators‟  
 
 Communication and decision mode  
Ranging from „listen as spectator‟ to „technical expertise‟  
 
 Authority and power  
 „Individual education‟ to „direct authority‟ 
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Fung’s democracy cube 
 
Participants 
The external stakeholders themselves ranged from „lay stakeholders‟ through 
to the „expert administrators‟ as described by Fung (2006, p. 67-68). In the 
case of the former, the venue tended to be health scrutiny meetings, which 
attracted interested relatives and patients when considering substantial 
variations to NHS services in an area. Where this takes place, the 
participation is protective and seemingly unconcerned with broader questions  
of citizenship, voter education and direct democracy. Broader residual 
benefits of this variety may emerge from the participation, but the immediate 
concern is the preservation of services as they are.  
 
The research revealed in OS processes none of Fung‟s more open varieties 
of participation, the most open encountered being the „lay stakeholder‟ type. 
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„Lay stakeholder‟ involvement was observed in one of two variations, as a co-
opted member (whether formal or informal, permanent or time limited) of an 
OSC, or as a „lay‟ witness to an OSC. A good example of co-opted „lay 
stakeholder‟ involvement in OS processes occurred in Authority B, an OSC of 
which embarked upon a review of a topic concerning community safety. The 
OSC co-opted the local Neighbourhood Watch Liaison Officer to add his 
knowledge to the review. This was essentially a lay person tasked with 
liaising between neighbourhood watch panels and the police in a part-time 
role and he gave time and commitment to the review. His network of contacts 
benefited the process, as did his knowledge of the issues. This was 
accompanied by a healthy „distance‟ from mainstream policing, which 
allowed him to challenge in a highly constructive manner.  
 
„Lay stakeholders‟ have also been observed providing evidence to a n OSC 
(Authority C); in this case it was an individual who wished to communicate his 
experiences as a user of child and adolescent mental health services. The 
flexible and welcoming manner adopted by the OSC chair allowed the 
obviously nervous young person to voice his opinions on the services that he 
received. It was later stated by a strategic manager in conversation with the 
researcher that this had been one of the more useful OS sessions he had 
attended at the authority, and attributed that directly to the service user 
perspective gleaned.  
 
„Professional stakeholders‟ have been observed adding enormously to the 
effectiveness of an OSC (Authority D) within the context of a particular, quite 
specialised agenda item. The professional in question ran a charity which, in 
a direct manner, tackled the fallout from a particular widespread issue facing 
children and young people. She was asked to attend a meeting of the OSC 
as an expert advisor, given her considerable experience of helping young 
people deal with the issue. The individual was silent throughout the session 
until the relevant item was due to be discussed. At this point she deployed 
her knowledge and expertise on the issue to augment the questioning of the 
rest of the OSC. The same meeting also involved a group of young people 
who were presenting on the subject in question. Accompanying the young 
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people were managers of the service with which the young people were 
involved; a senior manager with strategic responsibility for the service was 
also present.  
 
The OS processes discussed and observed in the four authorities included 
only some of the „participants‟ of Fung‟s schema. However, the 
aforementioned OSC meeting incorporated in one session the full range of 
participants previously observed in the research: 
 Lay stakeholders (the young people concerned and statutory co-
opted members on the OSC) 
 Professional stakeholders (frontline managers accompanying the 
young people and the OSC‟s expert advisor)  
 Professional representatives (non-executive councillors) 
 Expert administrators (strategic management) 
 
The particular agenda item which brought this array of external and internal 
stakeholders together occurred late on in the meeting, and attitudes and 
formalities appeared to be relaxed somewhat. This contributed to a much 
more deliberative approach by the OSC, perhaps necessitated by the 
youthfulness of some of the participants, but also perhaps to elicit the full 
range of views from those assembled.  
 
Interestingly, this was the most deliberative formal commit tee session 
observed in the research. Ordinarily, the more deliberative sessions involve 
smaller, less formal gatherings of OSC members, as when working groups 
are formed to undertake OS reviews. The young people were the focal point 
of the discussion and were enabled by very effective chairing to have their 
say and challenge some of the attitudes elected members of the OSC were 
expressing. Informal feedback from the session was highly positive, with the 
strategic manager echoing the comments of her counterpart in the other 
authority previously mentioned. Her view was that the involvement of service 
users had played a fundamental role in the success of the session and had 
added valuable insight to the deliberations.  
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The expert advisor stated to the researcher how valuable the networking 
opportunity had been, stating that she had made „new friends‟ in the OSC 
members, had promoted her cause and developed her knowledge of how the 
council operated. The individual also agreed to act in the same capacity 
whenever the issue is revisited. The young people also had the opportunity to 
feed back and were generally positive, although there were issues with 
particular questions that were asked and assumptions that were made by 
certain OSC members.  
 
Communication and decision mode 
Fung outlines six elements of participant interaction, the first three of which 
are modes of communication, which „often do not attempt to translate the 
views or preferences of participants into a collective view or decision‟ (2006, 
p. 68); the remaining three are modes of decision making:  
 Listen as spectator 
 Express preferences 
 Develop preferences 
 Aggregate and bargain 
 Deliberate and negotiate 
 Technical expertise 
 
OS processes have been found to occupy mainly the „aggregate and bargain‟ 
and „deliberate and negotiate‟ modes. External stakeholder participation has 
been found to occupy primarily the latter mode, whilst the former is usually 
the preserve of full-time members of the committee when debating 
contentious issues, perhaps with a party political element involved, with a 
view to developing an agreed line.1 In political theoretical terms „deliberate 
and negotiate‟ „has been elaborated and defended as a deliberative ideal of 
democracy‟ (2006, p. 69) (see the chapter on deliberative democracy, p. 100, 
for a fuller account).  
 
                                                 
1
 In the event of the call-in of an executive decision, for example.  
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Lay stakeholders, in some instances, attend in the „ listen as spectator‟ mode 
and occasionally „express preferences‟ to the OSC. A major risk arising from 
the expression of participant preferences is that OSC members over-
emphasise them, especially if they have been strongly expressed or come 
from an individual with particular legitimacy (see p. 216 for a discussion of 
legitimacy in the OS context). Triangulation is especially important in this 
regard; if numerous external stakeholders are expressi ng the same 
preferences this has greater claim to be „evidence‟, and can legitimately 
provide the foundation for a recommendation.  
 
An example of this arose during a recent scrutiny review session (Authority 
D) in which one group of stakeholders, concentrated in a specific locality, 
who could be termed „frontline‟ service providers (although this is a 
contentious concept) expressed vociferous opinions on a particular matter. 
The opinions expressed were supported by existing research and common 
knowledge of the issues; however, members of the scrutiny review group 
were advised by the scrutiny officer to interview the external stakeholders‟ 
counterparts in similar areas, despite the testimony given being compelling 
and evidence-based. The danger was that the views of this single group of 
external stakeholders would be seen as insufficient to legitimate a scrutiny 
recommendation. Decision makers asked to accept and implement 
recommendations based solely on this testimony could issue the following 
challenges: 
 The individuals concerned have a specific grievance which is atypical 
and does not constitute a „broader picture‟ of reality. Interestingly, the 
group concerned had a history of speaking on the subject, and had 
almost undermined their own legitimacy in doing so  
 The town/vi llage in which these individuals are located is but one of 
many communities within the council‟s geographical area and broader 
lessons cannot be extrapolated from its experience 
 Councillors on the review group may have a particular bias towards 
the external stakeholders‟ specific area, due to involvement in policy 
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decisions affecting the area, matters in the area of relevance to their 
own constituency, etc. 
 Extra provision could have been made for this particular community 
since the review group heard from the external stakeholders. This, to 
an extent, invalidates their concerns, but they don‟t know it yet, as the 
extra resource could take a while to be released / take effect / etc.  
 
Given the importance of senior officers in the success or failure of the OS 
function, it is important to note that their concerns around external 
stakeholder involvement in OS often relate to those attending to „express 
preferences‟. The view appears to be that individuals with a specific 
grievance will use OS to amplify their very specific concerns, possibly gaining 
the support of a full OSC in the process. Whilst this is a possibility, a properly 
chaired and supported OSC will be aware of the need to balance conflicting 
views before reaching a conclusion.  
 
A major theme of the research has been the technocratic image of OS across 
the case study authorities. Fitting with this is the fact that in complex 
deliberations in the OS setting, the more specialist the participant on a given 
topic, the more frequent his or her contribution to the proceedings appears to 
be. The quality of the input is a different question, and is contingent upon the 
individual‟s attitude to OS in general, and in particular, his or her attitude to 
OS involvement with the particular given subject. For example, OS 
involvement in a relatively uncontroversial topic, which would lead to a good 
evaluation of the subject, would probably be welcomed and the quality of the 
specialist‟s input would reflect that. However, a potentially career damaging 
OS investigation could lead to the deployment by the specialist of a number 
of defensive strategies when facing the OSC concerned.   
 
Lay stakeholders are, perhaps, likely to bring a personal agenda to the fore in 
OS deliberations, especially given that there is no economic or statutory 
reason for their attendance; that they are motivated enough to attend must 
indicate a set view on a given topic. They may be less able to contribute 
specialist knowledge, but they can inject reality into deliberations. During 
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interview many OS chairs expressed concerns at the „personal agenda‟ risk, 
although there are many more that view lay stakeholder involvement as 
welcome; it is not clear, in some regards, if OS chairs have particular 
strategies of their own to tackle any imbalance in evidence or overt bias. 
What has been ascertained is that many OS chairs are aware of the risks of 
lay stakeholder bias and it can, therefore, be assumed that because 
awareness is present, informal strategies must be in place.  
 
What is less certain is the ability to filter material delivered by senior internal 
and external stakeholders in the „deliberate and negotiate‟ mode. As topics 
become more complex within the deliberative forum, the emphasis will shift 
increasingly towards internal or external specialists in the process of OSC 
opinion formation. This resonates with Margaret Kohn‟s concerns referenced 
earlier in the thesis, that socially constructed „reasonableness‟, essentially 
the terms of the debate, „usually benefits those already in power‟ (2000, p. 
409). Where specialists from different sectors meet in the OS setting and 
concur during OSC deliberations, OSC members are ideally placed to 
challenge the orthodoxy using their own local knowledge and the 
experiences of service users as a counter where necessary.   
 
Authority and power 
OS processes typically fall within Fung‟s „communicative influence‟ and 
„advise / consult‟ stages of authority and power, although exceptions to this 
occur when OSC chairs use the process to act as an informal bastion for the 
executive. In this situation a strong chair would be able to use OS reports 
and recommendations to, subtly (or not so subtly), bolster the executive‟s 
policy positions or decisions. This „capture‟ of OS by the executive is more 
likely to occur where the opposition group is weak and/or there is a high level 
of conformity within the ruling group. It is also likely to occur where an OSC 
chair has strong links with the executive, on a personal or professional level. 
That many OSC chairs view the period as a non-executive as a rite of 
passage which culminates in a position on the executive body could underpin 
a decision to misuse their OS role. Many such local politicians with ambitions 
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to occupy an executive position may wish to ingratiate themselves with the 
executive, or at least provide as little effective challenge as is possible. This 
would be to smooth the progression from the rank of non-executive.  
 
Ironically, this misappropriation of OS would push the function up Fung‟s 
scale, meaning that it would „co-govern‟ with the executive, albeit on an 
informal and entirely inappropriate basis. Effective challenge would be absent 
and opposition members in particular would likely feel disenfranchised and 
disengaged from the process. Whilst this type of misuse of OS is likely to be 
rare, a variety of milder acquiescence with the executive is much more 
common. This could, for example, manifest itself in a scarcity of called-in 
decisions, call-in being the process by which OSCs can temporari ly halt the 
implementation of executive decisions whilst an OSC investigates the issue 
further. Only a certain amount of time is available for the OS investigation 
and the executive is under no obligation to heed the findings. Nevertheless, 
call-in is one tool available to OSCs which can be used to place them on a 
stronger footing in relation to the executive. A lack of call-in can signify 
unwillingness to challenge, and on that basis, would weaken OSCs on 
Fung‟s „authority and power‟ measure. 
 
7.4 Electorally mandated vs. expert legitimacy  
Legitimacy is vitally important to the development of public policy in a 
democracy. OSCs, populated by elected members, are endowed with the 
democratically mandated legitimacy accorded by the ballot box. This is 
largely underpinned by the „representativeness‟ of those endowed with it, as 
determined by the electorate, which in varying degrees may comprise, 
amongst other things: 
 Local knowledge of a constituency 
 Proven affinity with residents‟ concerns  
 Political party affi liation 
 
Elected members can obviously benefit from additional forms of legitimacy in 
particular circumstances, conferred by membership of a stakeholder group 
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(e.g. business owners), charitable / community work or professional 
knowledge acquired in gainful employment. This „circumstantial legitimacy‟ 
(namely that in formal public policy-making it adds legitimacy in certain 
circumstances) is often drawn upon in OSCs (or working groups of OSCs) 
conducting scrutiny reviews (e.g. an educationalist may be the ideal choice 
for a review of some aspect of educational provision). These examples are 
only a few of the many different varieties of legitimacy drawn upon to 
augment and validate the work of OSCs in different contexts, others include:  
 Prior knowledge of the issue, service or external stakeholder 
concerned 
 Experience (e.g. councillors with previous experience of an issue in 
their case work) 
 
„Rapporteurs‟,1 OSC members tasked with independently pursuing a 
particular topic or piece of work, are often assigned on the basis of some 
perceived legitimacy, although personal interest in the topic is often enough 
to validate a particular member‟s „rapporteur‟ role. In the case of the 
„rapporteur‟, legitimacy in the role is developed as knowledge of the subject 
increases. This, in turn, can be of great benefit to the rapporteur‟s committee, 
providing, for example, a ready-made network of experts in the subject area.  
 
The democratic mandate has been viewed as an increasingly compromised 
source of legitimacy in the context of lower turnouts and mass 
disenchantment with the political process (Pattie et al., 2004); a situation 
undoubtedly exacerbated by the expenses scandal, although councillors 
have managed to avoid a lot of the ill-feeling, at least to an extent (LGC, 
2009). Electoral legitimacy underpins a politician‟s claim to represent his or 
her constituents, but legitimacy bestowed by popular election co-exists and 
sometimes conflicts with the „expert‟ legitimacy of the senior officer. The 
                                                 
1
 The phrase „rapporteur‟ is one of many used to describe a member tasked with a acquiring 
a particular body of knowledge, or championing a particular piece of work on behalf of a 
committee, council, etc.  
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senior public official,1 as a full time employee immersed in the issues and 
shaped by professional knowledge, experience and values, is endowed with 
expert legitimacy which is a serious counterbalance (or indeed complement) 
to the electoral legitimacy of the councillor. 
 
Parsons states that „[i]n terms of public policy, professionals clearly have a 
key role in the production and dissemination of knowledge and in the 
interpretation and implementation of policy at “street level”‟ (1995, p. 154): 
the role of the professional in OS is, therefore, hard to overstate. From 
providing knowledge to implementing OS recommendations, senior officials 
play a key role. Under new public management, the empowerment of 
managers and further blurring of the roles of politicians and public managers 
has posed questions for the working relationship and competing legitimacies 
of the two: „Public managers are now involved in matters of policy, they are 
also involved in matters of strict politics, they are more often personally  
responsible for matters and will pay by losing their jobs if something goes 
wrong‟ (Hughes, 2003, p. 58).2  
 
In practice, the interplay between electoral and expert practitioner 
legitimacies is usually functional and complementary, a fact perhaps 
historically supported by the Maude and Bains Reports into local government 
management structures, both of which argued that the policy / administration 
dichotomy was false (Jackson, 1976, p. 139). This functional analysis could 
lend purchase to the idea of a member-officer „dynamic dependency‟ and a 
consequent interplay of professional (expert) and representative legitimacies. 
The relevance of this to the practice of OS is threefold: 
 When making recommendations for service improvement on often 
very technical matters, under what circumstances can the electoral 
legitimacy of the OSC challenge officers‟ expert legitimacy where 
findings conflict with established norms? 
                                                 
1
 The terms „senior officer‟ and „professional‟ are conflated here, as by deign of their position 
they are at the very least professional managers (others may also be social work 
professionals, etc.); see Parsons, 2005, p. 154 for a discussion.  
2
 The removal by the then Children‟s Secretary of Haringey LBC‟s Director of Children‟s 
Services in light of the Baby Peter tragedy illustrates the prominence in some circumstances 
of professional accountability over political accountability.  
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 Where should the efforts of OSCs be directed – the political executive, 
the council‟s senior officers, or both?  
 Notwithstanding statutory powers, can OSCs legitimately make 
recommendations to bodies external to the local authority with already 
existing lines of accountability? 
 
The research has shown that in the case of the first bullet point the evidence 
base is of vital importance. Evidence in this sense includes the case work of 
the elected members and the findings of various types of investigation 
undertaken by OSCs, such as interviews and site visits. The non-party 
political nature of OS means that the evidence base (ostensibly) isn‟t 
manipulated to suit party-political agendas, and it can, therefore, be used to 
shore-up and reinforce the conclusions and subsequent recommendations of 
an OSC. The strength of the evidence base and the legitimacy of the 
recommendations can be seen as inextricably and positively linked. 
 
In terms of where the efforts of OSCs should be directed, a recurrent theme 
of OSC chair interviews conducted was that the role of OS is to hold the 
executive (political leadership) to account. However, observation of the four 
case study authorities, plus experience of numerous others, has shown that 
OSCs are almost uniquely officer-focused; in turn, OS has become a highly 
technical exercise. It can be argued that the sheer complexity of public 
service provision has played a major role in this development, as has the 
ongoing disempowerment of local government in general, the desire to 
bypass local political leadership in favour of direct and participatory forms of 
public involvement in local governance, the amount of work increasingly 
undertaken in partnership, central government regulation and performance 
management, outsourcing, and the amount of activity carried out under the 
direct auspices of Whitehall departments, with little or no room for local 
initiative (local administration, as opposed to local government).  
 
Under these constraints it is unsurprising that local politicians attempting to 
exercise executive power are hidebound by a wash of regulation and 
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centrally determined powers, a hugely bureaucratic and potentially 
duplicative (especially so in two-tier areas) partnership framework, and the 
increasingly complicated and often internally conflicted needs of their 
localities. Poorly remunerated and time stretched council leaders and cabinet 
members will, in these circumstances, usually be playing catch-up, and will, 
inevitably, be reliant upon the full time officers in their employ to guide and 
advise on matters of both local and national policy and service delivery. 1 As 
service delivery becomes a more complicated activity, to get any kind of idea 
about what is going on, OSCs have to refer increasingly to senior officers.  
 
However, senior official involvement in the policy-making process has been 
viewed as far from unproblematic. As briefly examined earlier (see p. 216), 
the public choice school, for example, has taken a negative view based on 
the supposed inherently self-interested behaviour of senior figures (Dowding, 
1996). Gordon Tullock (1976) drew from the public choice assumption the 
following conclusions (see Parsons, 1995, p. 307-308):  
 Excessive promises are made by political parties in order to win votes 
 Deals are made by power-wielding politicians to secure support; this 
consequently pushes up the budget 
 The bureaucrat‟s desire for larger bureaux and budgets is based on 
their own self-interest, rather than the interests of the public  
 Liberal democratic political processes aren‟t controlling political and 
bureaucratic power growth (of particular importance to OS) 
 
On the final point, the research has revealed a mixed picture. OS chairs have 
varyingly revealed a strong ability to temper the political executive and its 
attendant senior officer structure, and less positively, a feeling of relative 
weakness vis-à-vis the executive. Two of the OSC chairs recognised by 
many as being highly effective, stated their own view that they were in a very 
strong position: one based this on access to information, the other on the 
ability to influence across a broader spectrum of local public policy. On the 
                                                 
1
 An interesting example of this is a recent (September 2009) Children and Young People 
Now survey of children‟s services lead members, which found that of the ten questioned, five 
were unaware of the ContactPoint database or where they stood on the debate around it. 
See http://www.cypnow.co.uk/bulletins/InCare/news/936916/?DCMP=EMC-InCare 
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preceding points, if the public choice view is heeded then OSCs should be 
constantly on the lookout for oversized departments and excessive budgets 
or, at the very least, evidence that more can be done with less in terms of 
service delivery.  
 
Anthony Downs (1967) developed further the public choice school of thought 
in his study of the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation. This led 
to his argument that the many different types of official he identified are 
motivated by, depending on the particular type, complete self interest (power, 
money, etc.), or a mixture of factors such as loyalty, pride in own 
performance and/or the public interest (Parsons, 1995, p. 309-310). OS 
operates on the premise of democratic openness and accountability. The fact 
that senior political and managerial figures attend and give, at least 
superficially, an accurate and plausible account to an OSC seems to suggest 
that the latter mixture of factors play a major, if not primary, role in their 
motivation. Legislative requirements to attend OSCs may underpin their 
attendance and cooperation, but it would be relatively easy for senior officers 
and members to attend as a token gesture and not offer substantive 
engagement. The research observation process has shown that this is not 
the case and the senior stakeholders (both internal and external) that have 
attended have done so seemingly in good faith. This of course need not 
entirely negate the set of motivations which could be described as purely 
„self-interested‟. Indeed, the research has shown that substantive 
engagement with an OSC can be embarked upon to fulfil the requirements of 
self interest, especially where an assumed mandate (tempered by the fact 
that OSCs wield no executive power) can be sought in the „rubber stamp‟ of a 
visit to an unchallenging or otherwise tame OSC.  
 
Niskanen‟s contribution to public choice theory sees those working in 
bureaucracies as naturally inclined to maximise budgets and bureau size 
(see Parsons, 1995, p. 310-311), a theory challenged and revised by Patrick 
Dunleavy‟s (1991) „bureau shaping‟ model. The research has shown that 
Niskanen‟s variety of public choice theory is not prevalent amongst those 
interviewed: the idea that self serving bureau / budget maximisers populate 
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the ranks of public sector officialdom is not commonplace, at least when 
discussing it through the prism of a discussion on OS. Whether this view is 
articulated in different contexts (for example party group discussions) is not 
clear, and is beyond the scope of the research. What can be speculated is 
that public choice theory has „had its day‟, and with the new p ublic 
management status quo embedded there is, in general, an implicit 
acceptance (amongst those interviewed) of the general integrity and public 
mindedness of senior officials (views of the general public on the perceived 
honesty of a range of public figures are shown in chart 2, p. 77), enforced by 
frequent inspection, codes of conduct and increasing levels of public scrutiny.   
 
Dunleavy‟s bureau-shaping model describes the behaviour of bureaucrats in 
far more complex terms than merely the desire to maximise their 
departmental budgets. He has shown that senior bureaucrats „have been far 
more concerned with shaping their departments and budgets so as to 
advance their interests in the same direction as politicians and the business 
sector‟ (Parsons, 1995, p. 317). Parsons goes on to describe the model as „a 
far better fit with the experience of bureaucracy in contemporary society‟, as 
opposed to the public choice argument of Downs and Niskanen, which „has 
proved more powerful as a normative model than as an explanatory or 
descriptive one‟ (1995, p. 320). In order to focus the discussion solidly on the 
central concerns of the thesis, it is worth noting that Gains et al., in their 
recent work on bureau redesign following the new political management 
arrangements of the Local Government Act 2000, found that Dunleavy‟s 
bureau-shaping model is „a plausible account of the underlying preferences 
for the [political management] reform, which ... created a more congenial 
executive structure for the bureaucrats to work in‟ (2008, p. 659).  
 
Interestingly, Gains and colleagues find that bureaucrats are „more satisfied if 
they observe more effective overview and scrutiny committees‟ (Ibid., p. 655), 
which the authors speculate may be grounded in a prior belief in strong 
accountability or a view that better scrutiny leads to better performance. The 
authors go on to state: „ It may also be the case that the positive ascription of 
overview and scrutiny committee effectiveness occurs when it conforms to 
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bureaucratic goals, norms and routines and is negative when it disrupts them‟ 
(Ibid., p. 656). It is possible to ascertain two points of particular relevance to 
this thesis from the work of Gains et al. Firstly; the bureau-shaping model has 
proven its usefulness as a descriptive model in the post Local Government 
Act 2000 world of political executives. Secondly; based on the last quotation 
from Gains et al., bureaucratic attitudes to OS may, by default, be welcoming 
or at least ambivalent, providing OS activities are non-disruptive. If this is the 
case, then a paradoxical situation may arise whereby wholesale change 
prompted by OS activity, even if it is for the better, may be met with 
ambivalence or even hostility. Unsurprisingly, hostility can emanate from the 
political executive where shortcomings are highlighted that are at tributable 
directly to ruling group policy, as opposed to failures in implementation 
(which can be disowned by politicians). According to the speculation of Gains 
et al., hostility can also arise from the „apolitical‟ officer structure where senior 
bureaucrats‟ carefully „shaped‟ bureaus are redesigned, strategically or 
operationally redefined, financially disinvested, etc. as a result of OS 
activities. Closer partnership working between senior figures may therefore 
lead to a replication of this view across the public sector bureaucracies under 
a statutory duty to cooperate. Where OS is empowered increasingly to look 
at external agencies and outcomes traditionally viewed as beyond the 
purview of local authorities (law enforcement for example), substantive 
change prompted by OS, where it is allowed to occur, may be viewed with 
hostility by senior non-council officials. This may be especially true where 
existing scrutiny/accountability arrangements are in place (for example the 
Police Authority), which may lead, perhaps justifiably, to claims of duplication.  
This gives rise to a refrain heard on occasion from scrutiny officers, that a 
single scrutiny entity populated by elected members should be tasked with 
scrutiny across the public sector (and beyond, to utilities, etc.). In contrast, 
where OS chairs have commented simply on the more limited context of 
increasing external OS powers (not the radical proposal from scrutiny 
officers) they have been, perhaps surprisingly, less positive. Their concerns 
were grounded in not wishing to raise expectations amongst their 
constituents, given that partners only have to „have regard‟ to OS 
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recommendations; a notoriously imprecise requirement, at least in the view of 
practitioners.   
 
Legitimacy bestowed by external stakeholder involvement 
External stakeholders can add their own forms of legitimacy to the OS 
process, whether they are implementing OS recommendations, consulted by 
OS, involved as witnesses or as co-optees. External stakeholders provide 
external challenge and ask the questions that elected members may not 
even consider relevant. The key output from a scrutiny review is the 
recommendations, built upon a solid evidence base upon which legitimacy 
depends. When relevant experts or service users have been involved in the 
process, in whatever capacity, the passage of recommendations through the 
council executive and on to implementation is smoothed to a greater extent, 
thanks to their legitimating knowledge or expertise.  
 
At this point an example of external stakeholder participation and the variety 
of legitimacy accorded will be examined. The example returns to the young 
person with additional mental health needs delivering an account of his own 
experiences of service delivery. This was in an OSC meeting (Authority C) 
gathering evidence for a review and several senior officers were present. 
Following the meeting, the author discussed with one of the senior council 
officers how he thought the meeting went; he confided that the main thing 
that he got from the meeting was the input from the young person. It is easy 
to see in these circumstances the value of external stakeholder participation 
in OS processes. The young person lent legitimacy to the OS process 
underpinned by his own experience of frontline services – an invaluable 
perspective for a service provider.  
 
This variety of legitimacy is quite different (and in some cases more potent) 
than the legitimacy accorded by expert involvement in OSC deliberations, 
which is based upon specialist knowledge, experience or a network 
especially conducive to the enquiry concerned. In some cases, and in reality, 
the legitimacy accorded by some experts could easily be challenged when 
one considers the numerous motivations and incentives to advise or inform 
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an OSC one way or the other. The converse may, however, also be true – 
some may genuinely engage with the process in an open and productive 
manner.  
 
Another challenge to the legitimacy accorded by individual expert input is 
grounded in the underlying principles of deliberative democracy, i.e. that no 
one voice can provide a definitive account, rather, an inclusive and 
deliberative process should be utilised in public policy-making. The rise of 
participatory budgeting, citizens‟ juries and neighbourhood forums adhere to 
the deliberative principle, and it is argued here that OS would do well, 
especially when undertaking scrutiny reviews, to involve as wide a range of 
experts and non-experts as possible. This would only provide the 
underpinnings of a more deliberative process, as the correct venue and ethos 
would have to be established to create an inclusive and deliberative 
environment (see p. 252 for proposals in relation to this).  
 
It has already been argued that OS is a deliberative process, in that 
committee members deliberate amongst themselves on evidence they have 
heard, and that it is especially conducive to further development in this 
regard, ultimately leading to a more inclusive (involving partners and the 
public) and wide-ranging (involving the full range of public services) form of 
deliberation within the confines of the process (see p. 115). In none of the 
case study authorities could it be said that conditions for a truly deliberative 
democratic form of OS were the norm. OS appears to be a process bound 
essentially by procedure, especially in the larger authorities where traditions  
and old practices of the committee system still prevail.  
 
Why is this so? In the case study authorities to varying extents there are 
strong and arguably quite necessary conservative elements grounded in the 
requirements of due process and legality. These elements clash with forces 
for change of the type that drives innovation in OS. Even where there is no 
explicit procedural barrier to an innovation taking place, organisational culture 
often proves inimical; this throws up a de facto barrier to any radical 
development of OS. For example, for a truly deliberative democratic OS 
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session to take place in the formal committee setting would be extremely 
difficult from a logistical and administrative perspective. The correct venue 
would have to be found, assumptions about the „proper‟ way to do committee 
business would have to be challenged and a way of taking minutes that 
captured the event formulated. The role of the chair and committee members 
would be revised and perceptions of the process managed – basically a 
cultural sea-change would be required for a formal committee session to 
incorporate deliberative democratic forms.  
 
However, informal working groups set up by the parent OSC are generally 
not subject to the same formalities as a formal committee session. Therefore 
in the hands of culturally unencumbered and experimental councillors they 
could provide a home for enhanced deliberative processes. Smaller 
groupings and flexibility in terms of minuting requirements, chairing 
arrangements and venue selection mean that working groups can be real 
vehicles of substantive external stakeholder engagement in OS processes, 
possibly utilising enhanced deliberative means to augment and quality assure 
evidence-bases.  
 
Enhanced deliberation in the OS context would involve deliberating with a 
broader cross-section of stakeholders, rather than just the working group 
deliberating on the evidence base independently: service users and experts 
would be drawn into the deliberative process. This would help realise the 
principal of „critical friend challenge‟ by staging an inclusive process centred 
on service improvement, and help reconcile differences in the constituent 
parts of the evidence base by discussing it in aggregate form. It has already 
been stated that OS has developed into a highly technical process which has 
heavily privi leged the involvement of experts, a development which will 
obviously not provide clear-cut answers for every policy issue considered. 
Parsons develops this point:  
 
... knowledge has become more pluralistic: for every expert who says A, 
there are experts who can say B with equal claim to professional or 
expert authority. This inevitably means that “expertise” or professional 
standing must be viewed as an integral part of the political 
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argumentation which takes place. Thus experts and professionals 
should not be seen as a distinct separate class or structure within the 
policy-making process, but inextricably enmeshed with power and 
politics. (1995, p. 158) 
 
To work with the knowledge pluralism that Parsons describes, OSC working 
groups must quality assure their work to ensure that as near as possible a 
consensus emerges on issues arising in the scrutiny review process. One 
effective way of achieving consensus is to deliberate on the evidence in 
conjunction with relevant external stakeholders, both experts and service 
users. Complimenting this process exceptionally well is the electoral mandate 
of the working group members, who can arbitrate and ultimately avoid the  
„[w]asted time, procrastination and indecision‟ (Shapiro, 2003, p. 121) that 
can result from deliberative processes.   
 
7.5 Strengthening external OS: the implications 
The complexity of modern policy making is brought into sharp relief when any 
local partnership „map‟ is observed. Especially in two-tier local government 
areas, the picture is muddled and lines of accountability are convoluted. 
Taking the example of a two-tier local government area; each district will 
have its own Local Strategic Partnership (LSP), which in turn will have 
thematic partnerships reporting to it (usually related to economic 
development, environmental sustainability, social inclusion, etc.), all of which 
bring together the main public service providers in the area. Sitting astride 
the district partnership arrangements are the county-wide arrangements, 
which again consist of an overarching LSP with numerous thematic 
partnerships. All of these are expected to be interlinked and deploying their 
resources to achieve broadly the same, relatively uncontroversial, policy 
goals. Government Offices for the regions are the mouthpiece of central 
government and add to the already complicated picture, as do regional 
bodies which exercise control over strategic health service matters, elements 
of spatial planning and economic development, etc. Quangos also exercise 
considerable influence.  
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In sum, local authorities amount to one actor amongst many, and their 
proportion of local public expenditure (national and local) is relatively trivial, 
as the Total Place pilots are beginning to reveal. The implication of this is that 
councillors are actually in control of very little in terms of broader public 
service provision in a given area. When the „ring fencing‟ of funds (such as 
monies for schools) within overall local authority budgets is considered, the 
proportion under direct control of elected representatives declines further. 
This leaves councillors in the strange position of holding public office, with a 
mandate from the electorate, yet unable to enact any major change in their 
area. The ultra vires doctrine hampers their competencies further, as do legal 
difficulties surrounding the actual scope of the „wellbeing powers‟ enshrined 
in the 2000 Local Government Act.1 Discussions around a general power of 
competence which, if implemented, would help to an extent, still do not 
address the fact that over major areas of service provision, elected local 
government has no direct control. Although this circumscribes the powers of 
executive members, who are left attempting to influence the shape of their 
areas through partnership working, it does not alter the reality of non-
executive members of OSCs. As these councillors are resigned to influencing 
rather than directing, they find themselves, rather ironically, better placed 
than their executive counterparts to shape services in their locality.  
 
As new powers already discussed are incorporated into existing ways of 
working, it may be that increasingly counci llor control over service provision 
in their areas is exercised through non-executive OS. Proposed new powers 
over public utilities and over council partners in general (rather than only in 
relation to their efforts around local improvement targets) should develop this 
further. Under these powers an OSC would have a potentially greater 
influence over partners and utility providers than the executive. It is 
interesting to note that the proposals, at the time of writing, allow for 
executive councillors to sit on OS groups that are reviewing public services; a 
proposal that has been met with opposition from OS practitioners as it defies 
the executive / non-executive split. This could be construed as an 
                                                 
1
 The case of the London Authorities Mutual Association (LAML)  
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acceptance of the fairly limited powers of executive members over service 
providers other than the council. Allowing them to sit on OS groups is clearly 
seen as a way to address this imbalance. It can be argued that OS is in a 
stronger position than the executive when it comes to reviewing and even 
influencing external services, but there are still broad issues facing OS when 
it acts in that capacity; these are explored in the following subsections.  
 
Accountability fatigue 
All public service providers are subject to scrutiny of some variety. Bodies 
such as the local constabulary are subject to lay scrutiny by its Police 
Authority, which also has certain executive responsibilities, such as budget 
setting. If organisations have no such arrangement for lay scrutiny, they will 
still be scrutinised by various inspectorates such as Ofsted and the Audit 
Commission. It is usual for public service providers to be scrutinised from 
various sources, representing „top-down‟ (central government audit and 
inspection), „bottom-up‟ (OSCs, NHS Local Involvement Networks, Police 
Authorities, etc.) and horizontal (peer review, shared plans, etc.) 
accountabilities. Extended OS powers over public agencies other than the 
council have led to claims of excessive scrutiny. One Assistant Chief 
Constable revealed his personal concerns over duplication and time away 
from the day job to service the demands of the multitudinous scrutiny bodies 
he faced. His concerns were exacerbated by the potential for districts and 
county council OS functions in his area to require his presence.  
 
Scrutiny officers have been at pains to ensure that protocols and effective 
communication between OSCs are in place, in order to avoid excessive 
demands on the time of busy professionals. Nevertheless, on occasion the 
appearance of figures such as the Assistant Chief Constable would be 
entirely appropriate, and in these circumstances there is a clear 
understanding (especially amongst scrutiny officers) of the need to scrutinise 
in a non duplicative and joined-up manner. On a practical level this could 
involve convening a working group of one OSC, which would involve 
members from each of the other councils. A more formal route would be to 
constitute a joint OSC under new statutory powers. This type of arrangement 
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would enjoy formal OSC powers, but in reality it could be unwieldy, 
bureaucratic and the statutory powers quite unnecessary unless relationships 
had broken down substantially.  
 
Existing lines of accountability: potential for conflict? 
Taking the case of the constabulary further, another issue for OS of external 
stakeholders is potential conflict with existing lines of accountability. As 
stated, Chief Constables already operate within a well established 
accountability framework. The most common question the researcher has 
encountered is, „where does local authority OS fit into that framework?‟ An 
answer to this question which avoids duplication and excess bureaucracy is 
hard to identify. However, the question‟s underlying assumption is that OS 
must justify itself to the police force, when a more democratic way of framing 
the question would assume that the police force should have to justify itself to 
the OSC.  
 
Exploring the concept further reveals that if a „scrutiny of place‟ is to develop, 
the role played by the police, NHS and others must feature in OS elected 
members‟ overview of an area and its service provision. The Police Authority 
and similar could be said to provide a very specific, service focussed variety 
of scrutiny which is increasingly obsolete, given the move towards shared 
services, pooled budgets, joint commissioning and the Total Place agenda. 
Local authority OSCs should therefore be recognised by all public services 
providers as a legitimate, electorally mandated means to scrutinise across 
the board, asking questions around how services are joining-up and how best 
value for money is to be achieved. It is also incumbent upon OSCs to ensure 
that their interventions are timely, intelligent and well-conceived, with the 
absolute minimum party political interference. Evidence emerged from the 
research that OS functions are positioning themselves to be able to take 
advantage of the new focus on external stakeholders, with the majority of the 
case study authorities either having or moving towards a thematic alignment 
for their OSCs, as opposed to the more traditional alignment towards 
directorates or cabinet portfolios.  
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OS members’ own reservations 
Councillors are driven by motivations other than the achievement of broader 
or more effective OS. Several councillors interviewed were at best 
ambivalent about an extension to OS competencies because of the lack of 
ability to force those external agencies that are subject to OS to act. Some 
stated that they did not wish to raise expectations amongst their constituents. 
Others are so embroiled in other duties that they see an extension of OS 
powers as an extra burden to be avoided; sometimes the extra duties 
themselves could lead to questions raised about potential conflicts of interest. 
It is possible to theorise that elected members themselves see their role as 
concerned uniquely with the local authority. When the senior members of 
their party groups occupy the top positions on the local authority, it may be 
unrealistic to expect their attentions to be focussed elsewhere, when their 
group has the ability to influence the direction of the council‟s array of 
services. There could also be a strong disincentive to scrutinise external 
stakeholders in case damage is caused to relationships with the council‟s 
executive. There is also a significant risk of exposing the failings of one‟s own 
political group if an external stakeholder speaks openly to an OSC. 
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7.6 Practical lessons from the research 
 
Scrutiny support  
The role of the scrutiny officer is worthy of research in itself, as dedicated 
officer support is of vital importance to the success of OS. Coleman et al 
(2009) reinforce this point whilst drawing linkages between the development 
of, and existing arrangements for, statutorily enforced OS of the NHS, which 
the Health and Social Care Act 2001 introduced, and the developing world of 
external OS which is potentially much broader ranging. The authors describe 
the importance of proper resourcing for OS, including dedicated officer 
support, the expansion of co-option and the greater use of external research. 
They conclude that successful management of relationships with both 
internal and external stakeholders will accompany an awareness raising and 
educational role for scrutiny officers, if external OS is to develop as an 
effective force for change. The research conducted for this thesis found 
willingness on behalf of scrutiny officers to develop this agenda, meaning that 
an important part of putting effective external OS arrangements is in place.  
 
The scrutiny officer role could be described as facilitative and also, as with 
many other aspects of OS, a balancing act. Effective OS is member-led and 
the ideal-type OS member / officer relationship would replicate that normally 
found only in the upper echelons of the authority. The scrutiny officer must 
allow members to lead the process but should not withhold their advice and 
support simply to satisfy that requirement. Very few officers at a relatively 
junior level get as much exposure to councillors and senior officers. For that 
reason alone, the typical scrutiny officer possesses considerable „soft‟ skills, 
primarily involving diplomacy, influencing and networking. Scrutiny officers 
must be excellent communicators able to write concise reports which will 
often summarise complicated information; they must be credible individuals 
in the eyes of both senior politicians and officers, liaising and balancing the 
requirements of both as required. Research skills are paramount, but above 
all else scrutiny officers when required must be resilient and politically astute; 
this is a major consideration when supporting an OSC which has raised 
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controversy. As the officer contact for the OSC, the scrutiny officer must be 
ahead of the game in either preventing controversy in the first place, or 
engaging in damage limitation in the worst case scenario. In this sense, the 
scrutiny officer is a full time envoy for the OS function. 
 
The role of the scrutiny officer varies considerably in the four authorities. On 
a basic level the role entails the facilitation of the OS function, but how that is 
undertaken depends upon the culture of the authority, the capacity of elected 
members and the resources available to support OS.  
 
OS was intended to be member-led, as the 
CfPS‟s (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2007) 
third principle of effective OS1 describes:  
1. Provides „critical friend‟ challenge to 
executive policy-makers and decision-
makers  
2. Enables the voice and concerns of the 
public and its communities  
3. Is carried out by „independent minded 
governors‟ who lead and own the scrutiny 
process  
4. Drives improvement in public services  
Because of this, scrutiny officers walk a fine 
line when attempting to faci litate the 
process. The danger is that too much 
influence dilutes the member lead, too little 
influence can potentially lead to „drift‟, 
unfocussed or ineffective OS. Two of the 
case study authorities displayed extremes in 
                                                 
1
 See: http://www.cfps.org.uk/about  
 
 
 
Committee model – where 
committee officers, who 
also support other political 
forums, such as the 
executive, provide support 
to the full council and so 
on. 
 
Integrated model – where 
support is provided, on an 
ad hoc basis, from a variety 
of sources, including 
committee services, 
officers within departments, 
and corporate policy 
officers. 
 
Specialist model - support 
is provided by a scrutiny 
support unit with dedicated 
officers, who only work to 
the overview and scrutiny 
function 
 
(From: Centre for Public 
Scrutiny, 2008, p. 6) 
Table 5: CfPS models 
of scrutiny support 
 234 
 
terms of scrutiny officer input. The first had no dedicated scrutiny support 
other than a single officer who facilitated the process as one part of a much 
broader remit.1  
 
The integrated / committee model of scrutiny support 
One authority (Authority C) adopted an integrated / committee model (see 
Table 5). The OSC in question borrows often very senior officers to support 
the process. The senior officers are then involved in scrutinising their own 
services in the context of a scrutiny review. The researcher observed in an 
OSC meeting a very senior local authority social care professional suggest to 
the OSC a possible recommendation relating directly to her service. The 
OSC had little to say in relation to the possible recommendation. There is no 
problem with participants contributing in such a manner to the OS process. 
However, the matter becomes more complicated when the person in 
question is directly supporting the OSC (not merely contributing to the work 
of it) and is also a very senior officer in the service under scrutiny.  
 
Whilst many members of the authority interviewed wished to emphasise the 
constructive and non-confrontational nature of OS, it has to be questioned 
whether the situation described above is a conflict of interest, and whether or 
not it constitutes effective OS. Interestingly, the same OSC had a very open 
interpretation of the formal procedures adopted in its meetings, which were 
heavily populated by senior council officers and some public sector external 
stakeholders. The officers present asked questions in the manner of 
members of the committee, although the key difference was the nature of the 
questioning, with officers asking more probing and technical questions. 
Members, in contrast, often appeared ill-informed and too willing to digress 
from the discussion at hand. It appeared that in some cases the focus of 
members was not strategic or even relevant to the topic; instead members 
raised „hobby horses‟, usually constituency issues, in the meetings.  
 
                                                 
1
 The authority‟s approach to scrutiny support combines the „committee‟ and „integrated‟ 
models, as described by the CfPS.   
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Officer questioning was informed but unchallenging, which is understandable 
given that their role, presumably, was to facilitate the work of the OSC, rather 
than do the work for it. Unfortunately, members failed to capitalise on the 
insights offered by officer questions, seeming, instead, overly reliant upon 
them. Public sector external stakeholders usually gave presentations and 
then left after some cursory questioning. Some value was observed on the 
occasions where service users addressed the OSC. The format and layout of 
the room seemed especially conducive to getting their input. The chair invited 
speakers to take the lectern, but on occasion speakers or their 
representatives asked to remain in their seat to deliver their presentation.  
 
Overall, the OSC in question appeared good at involving external 
stakeholders and garnering their views. There was certainly an emphasis on 
engaging the broadest range of partners possible, usually within the LSP 
framework, but drawing in service users and others as required. However, 
the overall OS process itself had some noticeable flaws: 
 
1. Member input was very limited, with excessive deference to and 
reliance on the opinions and questions of the council officers and 
external stakeholders involved. This led to the impression that senior 
officers were „managing‟ the OS process, although ostensibly they 
were positively engaged and present in commendably high numbers. 
The fact that senior officers from the service under scrutiny were 
borrowed to act in the role of scrutiny support contributed further to 
this impression.  
 
2. There was perhaps too much emphasis on the „friend‟ aspect of 
„critical friend challenge‟ 1 (see p. 171). Whilst the OS challenge is 
meant to be constructive, there is nevertheless, an important role to 
play in ensuring that key decision-makers are held to account on 
behalf of the general public. This would involve, where appropriate, 
robust questioning, which was not apparent in the meetings observed.   
                                                 
1
 See the CfPS four principles of effective scrutiny: http://www.cfps.org.uk/about-us/ 
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The specialist model of scrutiny support  
The remaining three case study authorities (Authorities A, B and D) 
employed the „specialist‟ model of scrutiny support, with dedicated scrutiny 
officer/s facilitating the work of the OSCs. As mentioned, the right level of 
input from the scrutiny officer is a major factor in the effectiveness of OS.  
Too much influence / intervention dilutes the member lead; too little risks a 
lack of continuity and focus. Examples of both conditions have been 
observed throughout the research. In one authority (Authority B) the scrutiny 
officer „was scrutiny‟ in the words of a middle manager. This reflected the key 
role that this individual played in steering the process, advising (in reality, 
leading) on the process with consent received, when required, from the chair. 
The OS function was small and adopted a select committee-style approach 
to scrutiny reviews, with members employing semi-structured interviews with 
appropriate individuals when gathering evidence. The scrutiny officer 
developed questions for the committees which were taken to the members in 
pre-meetings before interviews took place. Members occasionally added to 
the questions, but usually relied on the scrutiny officer to come up with 
questions that would allow them to distil the appropriate information. 
Secondary questions were put by members following each „main‟ question.  
 
This approach demonstrates a type of synergy between OS members and 
their supporting officer/s which is borderline unhealthy. To develop the 
example further, members had nominal input into recommendations arising 
from reviews. A draft report and recommendations would be put to the OSCs 
and were duly agreed with no alterations. The scrutiny officer in this case is 
vital to the process as without the expertise and guidance they offer, OSC 
output would be low quality if not non-existent. The reality is that the scrutiny 
officer alone could save a lot of time by simply hearing the evidence 
him/herself and formulating recommendations. That was essentially what 
happened in one of the authorities; members acted mainly in a passive, 
legitimating role and very often contributed little of value. As a consequence 
of this, ownership of OS was firmly in the hands of one particularly strong-
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willed elected member, with whom the scrutiny officer negotiated where  
necessary. The remaining members were essentially „along for the ride‟.  
 
In this authority there were two key points that stood out: 
 
1. Members were unsure of how they could contribute to policy 
development and review, when often such complex and esoteric 
issues were involved. Members did not have the self confidence to 
represent the lay perspective by asking the „stupid‟ questions that may 
have justifiably been asked by the general public they represent. 
Member reticence in OSC meetings may have been in part down to 
their belief that they should be an expert on everything, when in fact 
there is often significant benefit in not being an expert when 
representing the concerns of their constituents, a vital part of the 
community leadership role in the context of OS:  
 
The scrutiny role puts elected and appointed public representatives in a 
strong position to ask questions that members of the public might 
otherwise not have an opportunity to raise. Those in leadership 
positions will welcome challenge and reflection which reflects public and 
community concerns. In their role as community leaders, scrutineers 
should take every opportunity to canvass public opinion and ensure that 
they do represent the public interest (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2007, 
p. 12). 
 
2. The attitude and capability of members working in their OS role was 
most likely both indicative and symptomatic of the culture of the 
authority as a whole, especially in terms of broader member 
engagement in the running of the council. 
 
One authority (Authority A) with greater dedicated scrutiny support was 
marginally better in terms of member lead, but was still over-reliant on the 
efforts of one or two committed OS members. Many members appeared not 
to truly understand why they were there or what they were meant to be doing. 
The OSCs were orchestrated by a single, overarching committee which 
managed the scrutiny process and received all reports before they 
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proceeded on to cabinet. Chairs of the subordinate committees were often 
resentful of this arrangement given the management committee‟s ability to 
reject or alter reports; one member once referred to it in passing as „the 
witches‟ coven‟. Although the subordinate committee chairs comprised the 
membership of the management committee, this attitude towards it was not 
uncommon, especially when a lengthy investigation culminated in a report 
poorly received by it.  
 
As with the previous example, scrutiny officers „primed‟ the members with 
questions before meetings in which witnesses were to be questioned. A 
major difference was that this was done almost surreptitiously by the officer, 
who would discretely place a list of proposed questions before the chair and 
suggest that he may like to ask them. Invariably the chair in question would 
rely solely on the officer prepared questions, having had no sight of them 
prior to the meeting.  Scrutiny officers drafted the reports and helped to 
develop recommendations, with varying degrees of input from different 
members. They also coordinated input from the different external 
stakeholders inputting into the OS process, building valuable networks and 
relationships in the process.  
 
When trying to attract interest from smaller and/or more ward based groups, 
members excelled, as often the necessary relationships were already 
developed and external stakeholders recognised many of the other members 
of the OSC, which in turn made them feel more at home and both willing and 
able to participate. This was beneficial, as a finding of the research has been 
that many of those interviewed encounter significant disincentives to greater 
participation in OS, not least in the fact that members all seem to know one 
another well (regardless of party affiliation),1 municipal buildings are remote 
and unwelcoming, and a lot of jargon and acronyms are employed in 
committee meetings, etc. In those circumstances, already being familiar with 
at least one member of the committee is a great help. The main points in this 
authority are: 
                                                 
1
 This was felt keenly by certain co-optees, who often felt like outsiders despite being a full 
member of the OSC. 
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1. Members (especially chairs) were often resentful of the management 
committee. To them it represented an extra tier of bureaucracy and 
prompted frustration when reports were subject to alteration by it.  
2. Interestingly, the authority in question had a very strong ruling group 
which enjoyed little opposition. The OSC chairs were all members of 
the ruling group, and still issues with the management committee 
occurred. It could be speculated that this is an authority in which OS is 
acting in the opposition role in the absence of a strong opposition 
group.  
3. Personal animosities between OS members of the ruling group were 
well known, as were animosities between certain executive members 
and key figures in the management committee, lending to this 
hypothesis. If verified, this could indicate challenges for OS functions 
in councils with relatively unopposed majority groups.  
 
A particularly well balanced member / scrutiny officer relationship can be 
observed in one of the case study authorities (Authority D), where great 
emphasis is placed on the OS process being member-led. The member-led 
culture permeates the OS process and impacts on how the function is 
perceived in the authority as a whole. This ranges from the scrutiny reviews 
undertaken by the committees, right through to the way in which OS is 
managed by an overarching committee populated by the chairs of the 
separate committees. It should be noted that there is a key difference 
between the management committee described previously, which had a role 
in monitoring the respective subordinate committees‟ output, and this, which 
is not a formally constituted committee and does not perform the monitoring 
role.  There is therefore, no observable animosity towards this management 
committee, which does not have the power to alter reports. Instead it acts in 
a coordinating capacity when a strategic lead is required for the OS function 
as a whole; it wi ll issue responses to consultations on behalf of OS as a 
whole, and it will coordinate the relationship between OS , cabinet and the 
council‟s senior management team.  
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OSC output is owned by the committee responsible for it, particularly by the 
OSC or OSC sub-group chair, who have a close relationship with their 
respective scrutiny officer. This relationship is fairly well balanced in terms of 
influence, with the ultimate power in the hands of the chair. However, the 
scrutiny officer in this case is consulted frequently and on matters of high 
importance. His or her opinion, depending upon personal factors, is 
esteemed by the chair, and is invariably a big part of any decision ultimately 
made. Ironically, despite the fact that scrutiny support is in less of a steering 
role (although there is still an element of this), there is large emphasis placed 
on recruiting high quality scrutiny support. Scrutiny support in the authority 
has traditionally been a rite of passage for its graduate trainees who are 
recruited in a highly competitive process every year. The graduate trainees 
bring intelligence and fresh ideas to OS; in return they get experience 
working with elected members and the opportunity to raise their profi le in the 
authority. Graduate trainees who have cut their teeth in OS support have 
frequently gone on to „better things‟, one example being an officer who was 
headhunted by a senior director to lead on a particular improvement project 
based on her performance in facilitating the scrutiny of his services.   
 
The emphasis on the recruitment of high quality scrutiny support is deemed 
necessary because of the generally high capacity of the members, who have 
commensurately high expectations of „their‟ officers. The fact that scrutiny 
support is not unduly influential also, perhaps counter-intuitively, means that 
they have to work harder and be more discreet when exercising the influence 
they do have. As the authority is upper tier, there are also a much wider 
range of interested parties with whom OS must engage, requiring capable 
individuals to build and develop the requisite relationships.  
 
Professional scrutiny officers? 
A current discussion in the field of OS support is whether or not it is desirable 
to „professionalise‟ OS support, with the Centre for Public Scrutiny 
orchestrating the debate. The main questions posed are: 
 
 Is scrutiny a „profession‟?  
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 Is there sufficient interest in a membership body for scrutiny and if so, 
what kind of body and what might it do? 
 Is CfPS the right organisation to support a membership body for a 
scrutiny profession? 
 What are the next steps and practical considerations?  
 
The debate escalated due to the findings of the CfPS annual survey 2008  
(Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2008) which revealed:1 
 65% local government scrutiny officers were interested in joining a 
membership body for scrutiny  
 Similar numbers were interested in joining a scheme to develop 
accredited professional standards for scrutiny.  
 There is great interest in attending OS training and development 
sessions (90% scrutiny officers, 66% members and 70-80% of other 
officers).  
 Over a quarter of members didn‟t see scrutiny as a profession, as 
opposed to only 2% of scrutiny officers.  
A survey question related to the perceived benefits of joining a professional 
OS membership body.  The top three benefits identified were receiving 
regular updates, access to formal development opportunities, and accredited 
recognition of skills developed through scrutiny: 
 Regular news about developments in policy and practice - 54%  
 Formal training and development sessions - 44%  
 Accredited recognition for skills gained to assist future career 
development - 35%  
 In-depth policy and practice analysis - 30%  
 Coaching and/or mentoring - 23%  
 Informal networking and learning from others in the field  - 22%  
 Discounts for general CfPS events and services - 19%  
                                                 
1
 The following section on the CfPS annual survey and the Supporting Professional Scrutiny 
Research project results are taken from the CfPS website: http://www.cfps.org.uk/scrutiny-
exchange/wiki/?id=39 
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 Private / distance learning focused on practical ski lls and 
competencies - 17%  
 Private / distance learning with an academic component - 14%  
 All are important - 29%  
The Supporting Professional Scrutiny Research project (see Dacombe, 2008) 
reported lower interest in a professional membership body (although did not 
ask this question directly) but found evidence that: 
 Scrutiny officers are very interested in networking opportunities, 
particularly as they can feel quite isolated if they work alone or are part 
of a small team  
 There is interest in developing practice in an accredited way, with a 
slight preference for NVQ level 5  
Five broad competencies for scrutiny officers were also identified:  
 Relationship Builder  
 Negotiator-Diplomat  
 Communicator  
 Project Manager  
 Research Analyst 
Although this has not been the focus of the doctoral research, the findings do 
not reveal an explicit desire or requirement for professional accreditation and 
status. What has been observed as a general requirement of the scrutiny 
support role is a portfolio of very well developed „soft‟ skills such as 
negotiation, relationship bui lding and project management. There is, 
however, an example of an interviewee quoted at length below on the subject 
of both the scrutiny officer role and the desirability of accreditation and OS 
qualifications: 
 
RB: So what is your role as a scrutiny officer? 
 
Scrutiny officer: I work for [...] council, I head [...] council overview and 
scrutiny function and my role is to ensure that we support, develop, give 
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advice, give information, enable, contribute to policy development 
through, through those different approaches in terms of officer support.  
 
My role also is about being politically sensitive, politically astute, and is 
about leadership. Because I think, I think from an officer perspective, 
you know, we talk about leadership and elected members ... But I think 
as an officer it is also important to have leadership. What that means for 
me Reece, it‟s about vision, it‟s about direction, it‟s about enabling 
people that you work with to be very clear about what needs to be done 
and how we‟re going to get there, in order to go, in order to deliver what 
I described earlier. A better place to live, where I can bring up a family, 
is the vision we have in [...]. But it‟s about, it‟s about championing 
through a leadership role the opportunities to contribute to an improved 
quality of life for local communities.  
 
So the role, the role is one of policy development, the role is one of 
enabling, the role is one of, of facilitation, the role is one of corporate 
cupid, because sometimes you‟ve got to put people together, you know, 
to talk. The role is one of conflict resolution, consensus building, the 
role is one of intelligence-gathering, the role is one of negotiation, the 
role is policy advice, and so on and so on and so on. Interesting thing 
about scrutiny officers I think, you know, quite happy to explore how we 
develop scrutiny officers and the kind accreditation, training they need 
because when you get people like yourself that embark on PhD, 
absolutely fantastic, you know ... how do we get onto the agenda 
opportunities for our colleagues to progress through local government. 
To have very clear career paths throughout the government, and to 
have education opportunity and access to qualifications that are 
accredited, that enable people to be competitive ... 
 
R - Would you see like an accredited body? 
 
Yes, that‟s what I‟m saying. Absolutely. I think, I think INLOGOV 
[Institute of Local Government Studies at the University of Birmingham]  
do some very good stuff ... But for me it‟s about creating opportunities 
for colleagues in order to develop skills, knowledge and practice. Now 
you tell me, what have we got? And I think we should do it for the North 
East actually, what have we got within the North East that allows and 
affords the opportunity for local authorities to say “Reece, go and do 
that course because it‟s going to make you a better practitioner”? Okay, 
I mean I accept that we have a whole range of training courses, project 
management, presentation skills, leadership, fine, but do we have a 
bespoke course? I don‟t think we do. Bespoke course for scrutiny 
officers that will enable them to develop their career and progress by 
developing skills, knowledge and, you know, techniques to working in 
what is a highly charged, highly sensitive political environment. 
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An interesting counter-argument is forwarded as part of the CfPS wiki 
debate. In the words of one scrutiny officer posting on the CfPS website:1  
Is scrutiny a “profession” in the first place? It's a job (or range of jobs?) 
in which certain aptitudes are an advantage but I'm not sure that it could 
be called a profession. Looking purely at local government for the 
moment: - how many scrutiny officers are there? (a few hundred, 
perhaps) - how long on average do they spend working in scrutiny? - 
what do they tend to move on to next? To be a “profession” I think you'd 
need a critical mass of people doing the job and more of a long-term 
career path within it. For example we only have two steps in the 
hierarchy (scrutiny officer and scrutiny manager). If the boss's seat isn't 
vacant, progression is likely to be either to another authority that pays 
scrutiny officers better or to another role that can use those talents. 
We've had scrutiny for 10 years now and I'd guess (cue for another 
CfPS survey) that for a great many people, scrutiny has been an 
episode in their career that they have moved on from to another role.  
The developing role of the scrutiny officer certainly warrants further 
investigation, given the integral part they play in the successful operation of 
OS.  
 
Scrutiny of the LAA partnership 
OS has received considerable new powers in the Local Government and 
Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, many of which were implemented on 
1st April 2009.2 Amongst the new powers was the ability to scrutinise Local 
Strategic Partnership (LSP) partners on their performance in relation to Local 
Area Agreement (LAA) targets. Two different ways of doing this can be 
observed in the case study authorities, the first in a unitary counci l area and 
the second in a two-tier area. The two models are described below. 
 
The informal joint committee model 
A LAA scrutiny system operating in a two-tier case study (Authority D) 
involves a joint committee (although the „committee‟ title is a misnomer, as it 
is not an official committee) comprising district and county council members. 
The chair of the committee is rotated between the districts and county council 
                                                 
1
 Posted on the CfPS website 12/5/09. See: http://www.cfps.org.uk/news/cfps-news/?id=110 
2
 Including Councillor Call for Action and the power for district councils to scrutinise the local 
county council  
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and has proven to be an effective way of demonstrating parity in the district / 
county council relationship. The committee has not been welcomed by the 
LAA partnership, which has resisted moves to constitute a formal joint OSC, 
which would now, with the powers introduced with the Local Government and 
Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, enjoy considerable powers in relation 
to it.  
 
The exact nature of the relationship between the scrutinised (the LAA 
partnership) and the scrutinisers in this instance is unclear, given that the 
normal OS arrangements in councils are underpinned by primary legislation1 
requiring an OSC to be established. The OSC is a committee of the council; 
simply put „[t]he authority of the scrutineers is vested in that corporate body‟ 
(Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2007, p. 2). The relationship in LAA scrutiny is 
less clear and is more consensus-based. Unfortunately, if the LAA 
partnership is recalcitrant towards the „informal‟ 2 joint committee, nothing can 
be done by that committee unless it is willing or able to formally constitute 
itself as an official joint committee (at which point it can exercise the powers 
granted in the 2007 Act). There is still the ability for individual councils‟ OSCs 
to request the presence of the respective LAA partner‟s representative to 
give account on their performance in relation to progress against LAA 
targets, but doing this in isolation is not furthering the cause of partnership 
working from the OS perspective, nor is it particularly helpful in terms of 
effective use of partners‟ time, which would be better spent addressing 
county-wide elected representatives rather than just, for example, an 
individual district council OSC.  
 
The joint committee model does not particularly focus the attention of the 
remaining district and county OSCs on external matters in the way that the 
alternative model of thematic alignment does. This does not mean that the 
individual OSCs would not have an external focus in their own right, but this 
focus may not necessarily involve the work of the LAA partnership itself. The 
work of the LAA partnership is vitally important and warrants public scrutiny, 
                                                 
1
 Local Government Act (2000) 
2
 Informal in the sense that it is not a properly constituted committee.  
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not least because of the millions of pounds spent in partnership; however, 
there may be a subconscious view amongst OSC members that LAA scrutiny 
is taking place in the joint committee and may therefore feature less on 
individual OSC work programmes as a consequence, despite the joint 
committee meeting infrequently throughout the year.  
 
The joint committee model may be the best option available in two-tier areas 
if joined up scrutiny of the LAA partnership is to take place. It is not without its 
weaknesses, and suffers from the same maladies as much partnership 
working in two-tier areas. In the words of one, then recently appointed, 
unitary council chief executive, „trying to bring together an area's priorities 
and service improvement in a holistic manner in a two-tier area is like trying 
to push water uphill‟ (Drillsma-Milgrom, 2009). Partners are overstretched in 
servicing each district level LSP, Community Safety Partnership, etc. and 
undoubtedly duplication will occur. There is a strong argument for OS activity 
to be done in partnership in two-tier areas for that reason alone, to reduce 
the burden on already overstretched public agencies.   
 
The thematic alignment model 
In this arrangement the council‟s (Authority C) OSCs have aligned broadly to 
the LAA themes, allowing a greater focus on external, cross-cutting issues 
and raising awareness of the LAA and its priorities. Focusing externally in 
such a way facilitates external scrutiny and helps to prevent the excessive 
inward-looking observed in the upper tier council which aligned its OSCs to 
its own services. Aligning to the LAA themes is also more in keeping with the 
ever-prevalent partnership ethos and the now defunct requirements of the 
recently introduced Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA), which was 
more concerned with outcomes achieved in partnership than processes.  
 
The council has been able to adopt this approach because it is a unitary 
authority, which means that the imperative to work in partnership with district 
councils in scrutinising the LAA is not present. In many ways this has 
simplified the process and resulted in a framework for holding LAA delivery to 
account with minimal extra demands on scrutiny officer and member time. 
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This is in contrast to the joint committee model which has implications for 
member and officer capacity. An added benefit of the thematic alignment 
model is the way in which partnership scrutiny and the concomitant external 
focus it brings adds to the competency of OS. Members are able to exercise 
greater influence over a wider range of issues and agencies on behalf of their 
constituents and the awareness of OS rises, among other benefits, resulting 
in a strengthened community leadership role for members. In terms of 
outcomes, elected member involvement and oversight of the work of 
partnerships and their component agencies would hopefully, if successful, 
result in a greater citizen-centred approach, transparency and more effective 
„bottom up‟ accountability.  
 
Children‟s services are a prime example of why the appropriate OSC would 
wish to look externally. Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 places a duty on 
a multitude of public agencies to safeguard children and young people. Local 
Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) are required to check that the 
processes to fulfil this requirement are in place. Any proactive OSC with the 
children and young people remit would wish to acquaint itself with the 
activities of partners in this regard. There is also a role to be played in 
relation to the LSCB. The Children‟s Trust (formerly Children and Young 
People‟s Strategic Partnership) engages a variety of external partners and is 
a vital element of the broader LAA framework. It has an important strategic 
role in developing the Children and Young People‟s Plan which is meant to 
join up local services for this demographic. The nature of the work means 
that it should not go unchallenged, and OS is in an ideal situation to 
challenge. The partnership agenda and new powers for OS mean that to 
ignore the world beyond council services is no longer an option.   
 
Joint overview and scrutiny / scrutiny networks 
The pinnacle scrutiny network is the National OS Forum, which comprises a 
representative scrutiny officer and member from each of the regional OS 
networks and is coordinated by the Centre for Public Scrutiny. The forum 
leads on topics such as the aforementioned „professionalisation‟ debate, 
plays a lobbying role, and coordinates national OS responses when required 
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(such as in the case of the recently issued consultation on proposed OS 
powers in relation to petitions). Beneath the National Forum are regional 
networks which are active to varying extents, if they exist in a given region at 
all. The regional forums will discuss joint events such as conferences and will 
share good practice. There is also the example of a regional scrutiny network 
that worked closely with the then soon to be abolished Regional Assembly to 
discuss how the regional scrutiny network could fill the gap in terms of 
Regional Development Agency Accountability. The same forum also played a 
role in disseminating information about the arrangements which were 
subsequently put in place,1 a rather convoluted nationally applied framework 
involving the Regional Minister, a regional select committee and a regional 
grand committee (Maer, 2008). The main piece of work which will occupy 
many regional scrutiny networks in the future is the accountability and 
scrutiny of the nascent Multi Area Agreements (MAAs), although coalition 
government policy on regionalisation may impact on the continuation and 
introduction of new MAAs.  
 
Two of the case studies (Authorities B and D), each in a two-tier area, 
provided examples of joint working in OS and illustrated quite unique 
attitudes towards it. The underlying relationships in each case were tenuous 
and subject to many complicated interpersonal, professional, political and 
organisational factors. It can be stated confidently that significant research 
could be conducted on cross tier relationships in this context.  Although the 
relationships were ostensibly positive, in some cases there was an 
underlying mistrust, variable in magnitude depending upon the topic/s under 
discussion, usually directed towards the county council scrutiny officers. 
There is an important qualification to this observation: in the case of one of 
the county-level networks (Authority B) the LGR process was underway and 
there was widespread unease about the allocation of roles within OS in the 
new authority. Scrutiny networking in this context is described below.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Now abandoned following the 2010 general election  
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Proactive scrutiny networking 
(Authority B) Meetings were (the area is now single tier following 
reorganisation) convened on a regular basis with venues and chairing 
responsibilities rotated among the participating councils. A companion OS 
member network met less frequently and existed primarily to receive the 
findings and conclusions of the scrutiny officer network. The findings of both 
were, where necessary, fed upwards to the regional network which met less 
frequently and was facilitated by the local Regional Employers‟ Organisation 
with significant input from certain of the top tier or unitary authorities in the 
region. The primary reason for the seemingly top tier / unitary prevalence in 
this regard appears to be a general lack of scrutiny support capacity in the 
district councils, although there were occasions when district staff overcame 
the capacity issue and contributed to the administration and business of the 
regional network. Similarly, the county-level network was dominated by the 
county council staff, with the acquiescence of district colleagues. The general 
feeling was that the resources and strategic overview of the county council 
meant that it was better placed to coordinate, as district scrutiny support was 
often stretched to the limit supporting their own OSCs, whereas the county 
had the benefit of dedicated scrutiny support. Often the districts employed 
the committee or integrated models of scrutiny support, models more 
frequently found in districts than other types of authority (Centre for Public 
Scrutiny, 2008, p. 6).  
 
The aforementioned LGR context introduced a dynamic into the network 
which galvanized partnership working in the early to late-middle stages of the 
run-up to the new unitary authority‟s Vesting Day (1st April 2009). Whereas 
before, partnership working in the sense of collaboration on projects, rather 
than simply sharing work programmes, etc., had been inconsistent and rare, 
the impending reorganisation motivated scrutiny officers to get involved. This 
involvement culminated in a relatively large event for external stakeholders, 
designed to introduce them to OS at the developing unitary authority. This 
event involved the district scrutiny officers in a facilitative role, with each 
supporting the conference sub groups as they considered different aspects of 
the OS process. To a large extent this high point of partnership working was 
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the beginning of the end of the network in any substantive sense, occurring 
as it did so late in the run-up to Vesting Day. This was one example of some 
of the closer partnership working which occurred in the final days of the two-
tier councils. The question remains as to whether such a high degree of 
partnership working could be achieved outside of the LGR context, 
compelling people as it did to work closer together. There is also the question 
of whether frequent network meetings and close collaboration for the sake of 
it are worthwhile. A lot of the business discussed in the network meetings 
was not especially important or necessarily worthy of scrutiny officer time. A 
more detached and arguably more pragmatic approach to scrutiny 
networking, not driven by LGR, encountered by the researcher is described 
below.  
 
Ad hoc scrutiny networking 
The county-level scrutiny network (Authority D) existed in a vacuum, as 
opposed to the now defunct case study described above. At the time of 
writing there was no regional network to feed into; instead a representative 
fed into the National Forum.1 Substantive items of business, such as a district 
/ county scrutiny protocol were discussed on an ad hoc basis, resulting in 
fewer meetings and less of a drain on scrutiny officer time. The joint 
committee which scrutinises the LAA partnership is a common interest for all 
of the officers concerned, and is a frequent item for discussion. More 
recently, a working group of the network was formed to develop a joint 
conference for the county area, principally aimed at inducting new county 
councillors following the June 2009 elections, but also to engage partners in 
developing cross-tier OSC work programmes.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that a regional network for the area is now in development.  
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8.  Conclusion 
 
New political management arrangements in local government were packaged 
with a broader array of reforms intended to strengthen governance and 
democracy in the UK (Morrison, 2001). At the national level, the primary 
components of this democratic renewal agenda included reform of the House 
of Lords, devolution to Scotland and Wales, and an attempt to introduce 
elected government to the English regions. New electoral systems for the 
Scottish and Welsh devolved administrations were intended to make voting a 
more attractive proposition, with more representative assemblies the prize for 
the electorate. Reform of the Lords was designed to weaken the hereditary 
principle by introducing greater meritocracy with larger numbers of life peers.  
 
A general desire to bring government closer to the people was grounded in 
New Labour‟s preference for stronger communities and enhanced social 
capital. These ideas were adopted and developed by the party in the 
ideological vacuum created by the decline of the left and the eventual 
abolition of Clause Four. At a local level the philosophy manifested itself in 
the new political management arrangements for local authorities, each of 
which created a clearly defined executive body. This executive body was to 
be held accountable for decision making, so that the complex co mmittee 
arrangements that existed under the old arrangements could not be used to 
mask accountability and abrogate responsibility for policy errors.  
 
OS was the democratic check and balance put in place to counter the new 
concentration of executive power in local government. The powers required 
to hold the executive to account were put in place in the Local Government 
Act 2000, which introduced the new arrangements. Despite this, a large 
cultural shift was required to prevent members from acting in a party political 
manner within an OSC. The change required from some of the longer serving 
councillors must have been quite significant, as the behaviours necessary for 
the effective functioning of OS were inimical to the tribalism and partisanship 
of party politics under the old committee system. Following several local 
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elections and the accompanying influx of new councillors, the picture for OS 
is quite different, albeit varying across the case study authorities, with some 
operating very effective OS arrangements, whilst others‟ are less so. 
Members are now either adapted to working through OS, or have no 
experience of any other system. Scrutiny officer support has strengthened, 
with many scrutiny officers able to share good practice, having moved 
between authorities on several occasions. The Centre for Public Scrutiny has 
played a big role in developing libraries of OS reviews, supporting local and 
regional OS networks, and in providing expertise and consultancy services 
as required. It latterly (and controversially) moved into a greater lobbying role 
in the run-up to the 2010 general election, prompted by a Conservative Party 
pledge to allow authorities a comprehensive choice over how their political 
management arrangements are structured. This has already led some 
authorities to state that they are to abolish the executive / non-executive split 
and with it, presumably, OS arrangements. 
 
The external OS role first legislated for in the 2000 Act has, in a piecemeal 
fashion, been extended and strengthened over subsequent years. Whilst 
internal OS gradually embedded itself with varying degrees of success, 
external scrutiny lacked any legislative recourse should external bodies fail to 
cooperate. In reality, this wasn‟t to prove a great issue, as public 
organisations don‟t appear to have shirked local authority OS to any 
noticeable extent. Obviously there have been exceptions, with some notable 
examples occurring between local governments in two-tier areas, but 
generally recourse to (now existing) legislation was, and is, never genuinely 
considered to be an option. This is because many see heavy-handedness as 
a failure when organisations are expected to be working together 
productively for the common good. The long term damage to working 
relationships is deemed by some to be too great a price to pay for legally 
enforced partner cooperation with OS, which would probably be, in those 
circumstances, tokenistic.  
 
A then central government desire to hold council partners to account through 
OS manifested itself in dedicated statutory powers in a range of 
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parliamentary Acts. The response from the case study OS functions has 
been, in general, to rename OSCs and realign their terms of reference to be 
more outward facing; to bui ld relationships with external bodies; and, in two-
tier areas, to develop protocols ensuring that the different councils‟ OS 
functions don‟t duplicate effort and increase burdens on partners 
unnecessarily. In some cases, councillors have shown themselves to be very 
well suited to external scrutiny. This is predominantly where they are involved 
in a range of other bodies other than the council, and are in a position to be 
able to draw upon knowledge, expertise and contacts gained in those 
different contexts. An important caveat is that many OS members are 
concerned about extending the scope of OS to cover partners to a greater 
extent; this is grounded in fears that it may raise expectations amongst 
constituents, when OS is in fact powerless to enforce change.  
 
Members are ideally placed to bring a range of external stakeholders into the 
OS process. This is true of external stakeholders as witnesses and as co-
optees onto OSCs or their subgroups. Again, this is attributable to the 
broader community role that non-executive members are able to play. The 
range of contacts developed and the knowledge of the governance 
arrangements and issues facing partner bodies is invaluable in their OS role. 
It is important to note that, to external stakeholders, the democratic mandate 
of elected members was not a particularly important factor in legitimising the 
role of OS. There are a number of possible explanations for this. It can be 
speculated that members were seen as „lay scrutineers‟ rather than elected 
representatives, although this could be simply a matter of context. 
Furthermore, members tend to approach external stakeholders with regard to 
a particular element (OS) of their (members‟) broader role. Were the 
councillors to approach the external stakeholders with a ward / divisional 
concern, it is likely that the external stakeholders would be more mindful of 
the electoral mandate. It could also be argued that councillors are seen to 
have a single discrete role amongst a range of actors at the local level. Their 
electoral legitimacy in this case enjoying no greater status than the 
professional legitimacy accorded to senior officials (see p. 216). Broader 
global trends over the last approximately thirty years may lend purchase to 
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the latter view. One of the most relevant of these trends is the new public 
management, which has privi leged managerialism, non-state provision and a 
reformed, arm‟s-length role for elected representatives (Hughes, 2003; 
Massey & Pyper, 2005; Stoker, Unknown).  
 
Globalisation has meant that the liberal democratic nation state and its 
elected representatives are marginalised in the face of strengthening regional 
blocs and economic forces. More unique to the UK is the centralised political 
system, with only limited powers and freedoms for local government; an 
issue exacerbated by very low turnouts in local elections, and the fact that 
abundant regulations directly affecting local service provision are continually 
emerging from Whitehall. This leaves public sector officials working 
essentially to civil servants and government ministers, rather than local 
politicians. All of these factors in combination work to undermine the role of 
the local counci llor, leaving him or her working hard to pitch their unique 
electoral legitimacy against the qualifications, professional kudos and 
intellects of managers occupying top positions in the public sector .  
 
OS is able to enhance its own legitimacy by using external stakeholders to its 
advantage. The research has shown that professional external stakeholders 
are brought into OS processes (OS reviews in particular) to sit alongside 
members almost by default. Therefore external stakeholders are involved in 
OS processes in two capacities: 
 They are subject to OS 
 They are carrying out the OS in partnership with elected members  
 
Increasingly, situations are arising in which the boundaries between the two 
capacities are blurred. A factor in this is the increasing separation of OS roles 
into two compatible but, in practice, distinct activities: 
 Holding to account  
o Aimed at the council executive / senior officers  
o Formal committee sessions  
o Traditional committee layout 
o Clear role delineation (chairman, scrutiniser, scrutinised, etc.)  
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o Less scope for external stakeholder involvement 
 
 Prompting service improvement   
o Aimed at relevant service providers across the board  
o Informal sessions 
o Random / interspersed layout 
o Less clarity in role distinction 
o Greater scope for external stakeholder involvement  
 
A predominant view was that „service improvement‟ was the practice through 
which OS could make the most difference, especially when drawing upon the 
testimony of service users in the development of evidence bases and 
recommendations.  
 
OS as a deliberative forum 
A primary concern of the thesis is the extent to which OS is becoming a site 
of a more deliberative style of democracy. The examination of the data in the 
„external stakeholder‟ sub-chapter (see p. 183) revealed the large variety 
within the external stakeholder concept. The duration of the engagement with 
OS processes, organisational culture, interpersonal factors and a range of 
others combine to form a powerful imperative to make OS as flexible and as 
inclusive as possible, to allow members to draw upon the broadest possible 
range of expertise.  
 
It has been mentioned that professional external stakeholder involvement in 
OS processes has become almost the default position, most particularly in 
OS reviews. To access the expertise and legitimacy accorded by the 
involvement of selected external stakeholders, OS across the case study 
authorities has opened itself up and adopted more flexible working practices, 
especially in smaller OSCs (fewer than approximately eight members) and in 
working groups of larger OSCs. To refer to these practices as deliberative is, 
usually, entirely accurate, given that conflicting views are aired, debate is 
undertaken and common ground is reached, all in pursuit of the common 
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goal of service improvement. The most successful OS groupings have 
foregone confrontation and have instead adopted an inclusive and 
collaborative way of working. The exception to this is in dealings with the 
council executive, where all of the characteristics highlighted under the 
„holding to account‟ bullet point, above, are emphasised. In this case the 
characteristics are less about reconciliation, or service improvement 
(although this features to an extent). Instead, the focus is on asking the tough 
questions that residents themselves would pose, if they had the knowledge 
and inclination. This is a valuable activity in itself, but measuring the value 
that it brings is challenging, and cannot be reduced to a simp le economic 
assessment. The value brought by the „service improvement‟ element of OS 
activity is easier to quantify, but is still very challenging to ascertain in 
financial terms and / or in terms of outcomes. If recommendations are 
accepted, and if they are implemented successfully (which is by no means 
assured), it may be possible to ascertain the amount of value added by OS, if 
the OS group is allowed to take the credit. This is not something that OS can 
necessarily influence, as it is very easy for either the executive or 
implementing officers to claim that it was going to be done anyway.  
 
The importance accorded to the service improvement element of OS work 
has led to a focus on the work of officials rather than executive politicians. 
Research across the case study authorities has shown that it is mainly 
officers that are requested to attend OSC meetings to discuss often quite 
esoteric matters in relation to the services they are providing. In some 
instances the lack of attendance by executive members was seen to be 
unacceptable, and OSC chairs actively pushed for their attendance. Other 
authorities were not concerned and were content to stay officer-focussed. 
The corollary of an officer-focus is that OS has become a highly technical 
exercise that has neglected matters of high policy. Only very rarely were 
fundamentally „political‟ questions addressed to executive members. To 
elaborate, a question of this type might address the manifesto commitments 
or ideological principals of the ruling group. For example: 
 „How will you prevent your commitment to protect service X from 
impacting adversely on service Y?‟ 
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 „What is your overarching vision for the area and how will you achieve 
it?‟ 
 „Should the council be providing these services, or should we be 
outsourcing them?‟ 
 
Questions instead tend to focus on the minutiae of service delivery, and in 
doing so, hold the officers responsible to account. There are two possible 
conclusions that can be drawn from this: 
 OSCs are failing to hold the executive fully to account; i.e. the 
technicalities of service delivery, and therefore service directors, are 
being held to account, but the overall political vision and programme of 
the ruling group are being neglected. It could be argued that service 
directors are a proxy for the executive member in this regard. 
 
 The alternative is that the executive has no prevailing political vision 
and programme; therefore there is no impetus or necessity for OS to 
hold the executive to account. If this is the reality then it severely 
undermines the case for political executives in local government and 
more broadly, the whole purpose of voting in local elections. Why 
bother to vote when the party you select has either no manifesto or 
lacks the will to see it implemented properly?  
 
This final conclusion is worthy of extensive research in its own right, and is 
beyond the confines of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is a question of 
fundamental significance, not only to the role of OS, but to the whole purpose 
and operation of local democracy.  
 
OS as a technical exercise 
That OS has become a largely technical exercise has also meant that the 
general public has only been involved to a very limited extent, whereas other 
external stakeholders with greater knowledge and expertise are involved 
frequently and substantively. The possible exception is in health OS, where 
proposed major alterations to NHS services (a definition that includes 
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closures) can lead to great general public interest in the issues being 
discussed within the OS process (not an interest in the OS process itself). It 
can be assumed that members of the general public, if they were inclined to 
participate, would be put-off by the emphasis on complicated detail, 
convoluted statutory requirements and the use of bureaucratic language in 
reports to OSCs; all symptoms of the technical focus of much OS business. It 
was noted in the opening of this thesis that OS processes incorporate the full 
cycle of OS activity (see p. 45), including initial development of work 
programmes, the actual practice of OS, and the tracking of any 
recommendations produced. At any of these stages, and across the case 
study authorities, there was very little general public involvement discussed 
or observed.  
 
The technical focus of OS is likely to entrench as external OS develops. The 
highly complex world of modern public policy means that there are few issues 
in localities that are not subject to a complex web of intervention, likely to 
involve central government, quangos, the voluntary sector, as well as local 
government and its statutory partners. Each of these organisations will have 
its own „language‟, will be subject to complex demographic and budgetary 
considerations, will have its own discrete policies on given issues, and will 
exhibit a particular organisational culture that may help or hinder efforts to 
scrutinise the organisation in question. OS groupings will be addressing the 
agents of these organisations, professional officials of great similarity to their 
local government counterparts, but without the direct experience of working 
with local politicians. In sum, these factors will mean that OS groupings 
undertaking external OS will have to adapt to the technicalities they are 
presented with. There will be even less scope for local executive member 
input, and therefore OS will divert its attentions to an ever increasing extent 
away from the local political executive, towards the organisations external to 
the council that are delivering what are, essentially, centrally controlled public 
services.  
 
External stakeholders will become ever more important as lay scrutineers 
(scrutiny members) attempt to understand and suggest improvements. It is 
 260 
 
likely that their expertise or firsthand knowledge of receiving the service will 
provide vital inroads into the topic at hand. It is highly likely that the same 
external stakeholders that are contributing evidence to the OS grouping will, 
in the context of an OS review, also be joining the group in weighing up the 
evidence, quality assuring conclusions and even questioning peers on 
matters of service delivery. This will only be possible in „service improvement‟ 
mode, with its more fluid attitude and „softer‟ role delineation (see p. 187). In 
this setting the emphasis is less on point scoring and more on making things 
better for residents. It is perhaps this that prompts many members (and OS 
officers) to state that this is the most enjoyable and rewarding type of OS 
work. To make best use of external stakeholder expertise it may be that OS 
review groups aim to enhance the most effective deliberative elements of 
„service improvement‟ mode. This could involve an intentional focus on 
providing a deliberative ethos within OS review group meetings. It could be 
realised by quite simple means such as interspersing review group attendees 
so that there aren‟t contingents of elected members or external stakeholders 
sat together. Table and chair arrangements can be engineered to create a 
more collaborative ethos. Review group members can take the time to 
introduce themselves and explain their role. All of these and more are 
already being practised by good quality OS groupings, although more 
ambitious deliberative methods have not yet been observed. These might 
include moving away from a complete reliance on the question / answer / 
deliberate approach most commonly observed, and move towards a different 
type of gathering. Such gatherings might take on a problem-solving approach 
and involve numerous stakeholders ranging from service users though to 
strategic level service providers. Very discrete issues within a broader topic 
could be examined in this way, with the findings from such events being used 
as jigsaw pieces to fit together, the ultimate output being a strategic overview 
of the topic in hand. The benefits would be twofold: 
 Participants can take immediate action based on the findings of the 
problem solving event 
 The OS review group gets a snapshot of a particular issue, which can 
be fed into wider findings about a more strategic topic under review. 
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An example of this could be an OS review into public transport provision. 
After scoping of the topic and initial investigation, it could be found that there 
are serious issues around: 
 The safety of bus stops during the evenings 
 Bus services in rural villages 
 Connections between small to medium-sized population centres 
 
Small problem-solving events are held on each of the topics. The mandate 
for the events is provided by the evidence heard by the OS group during its 
scoping of the topic and subsequent initial investigations. The relevant 
stakeholders meet and deliberate with each other and the OS group on the 
issue in hand; hopefully, solutions emerge as a result of each event. As the 
review progresses and the events take place, the review group is able to feed 
the knowledge garnered from previous deliberations into subsequent 
sessions. What emerges is an excellent overview of some of the key issues 
within the broader topic of „Public transport provision in area X‟. The OS 
group makes a valuable contribution in drawing the separate strands together 
into a single strategic overview of the topic. „Quick wins‟ may also have  
accrued throughout the review as a result of the problem solving sessions 
held as part of the evidence gathering for the review. These could include:  
 The safety of bus stops during the evenings 
CCTV operators now prioritise bus stops. An investment in more 
effective lighting is made. 
 Bus services in rural villages 
A voluntary group agrees to share the usage of its minibus with elderly 
residents in a community transport scheme. 
 Connections between small to medium-sized population centres 
Bus companies agree to better align timetables. 
 
The final report of the OS review group draws the separate strands together 
into an overarching picture of public transport provision in the area. The 
„quick wins‟ can also be described, demonstrating the immediate value of  
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OS. Recommendations are grounded on a solid evidence base which has 
been tested in deliberative processes. This avoids the charge of one-
sidedness that is often levelled at OS evidence bases. This is an ambitious 
approach that would develop on the best aspects of OS groups in „service 
improvement‟ mode. Significant benefits could be derived simply by 
incorporating one or two such deliberative events into the OS review process. 
Across the case study authorities members have stated their willingness to 
engage with a broad range of external stakeholders, citing plurality of 
expertise and opinion as the principle benefit for OS. This type of approach 
could be used to extend and increase the quality of this engagement.  
 
8.1 Deliberative work programming 
Other OS processes could also benefit from enhanced deliberation. Work 
programming is of fundamental importance to the OS process, ensuring that 
work throughout the year is targeted and is able to make a difference. OS 
functions rely on a range of sources for work programme material. At the 
minimal end of the spectrum, non-executive member concerns are reflected 
broadly in the work programme. At the opposite end of the spectrum, OSCs 
conduct consultations with a broad range of external stakeholders, cross-
reference these with member concerns, and utilise the knowledge and 
expertise of internal stakeholders (such as executive members and senior 
officers) to create a well targeted and relevant programme of work.  
 
Work programmes are subject to revision throughout the year as priorities 
change and lower-level issues arise and subside. Inevitably, there is an 
element of trade-off involved and there may be contention, especially when 
balancing member concerns with the broader strategic issues facing the 
authority (the two are not always compatible). These issues bring into sharp 
relief an inherent dilemma within OS processes: members are elected to 
represent a specific ward or division, but in their OS role they are expected to 
abstract and take a strategic approach which encompasses the whole 
municipality. This is perhaps more difficult for unitary or county council 
members with a far larger area to consider. District council members in rural 
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areas need to link the issues in their ward to a broader municipality that is 
much smaller in scale with generally less diversity of need. As an example, 
the district of South Cambridgeshire is generally affluent across wards 
(although there are exceptions). At county level OS members have to 
consider a far more diverse socio-demographic which, remaining with 
Cambridgeshire as an example, ranges from the generally affluent South 
Cambridgeshire district, through to relatively deprived Fenland district.  
 
The nature of many district council services also means that nuances 
between wards are less pronounced. For example, counci l housing must be 
delivered to the Decent Homes Standard district-wide. However, exceptions 
at district level may occur, predominantly in urban areas, where fairly 
significant variations can occur across wards as a result of investment in 
larger economic centres to the detriment of surrounding areas. It can be 
stated fairly accurately that larger authorities, tending to be counties or 
unitaries, may have greater difficulties in creating consensus over OSC work  
programmes. Where difficulties occur, there could be scope for greater use of 
deliberative methods involving a broad range of external stakeholders. Given 
that so much is delivered in an area by agencies other than the local 
authority, it is clear that to implement effective external OS requires the input 
of as many of these bodies as possible. They fall into the following broad 
categories: 
 
 Top-down sources 
Includes political executives and senior officials across voluntary, 
private and public services, at any level of government or 
administration 
 Bottom-up sources 
Service users, community groups and the general public  
 
Top down sources provide knowledge, networks and decision-making power. 
Bottom-up sources have real world experience of either directly receiving the 
service, or in the case of non-service users, experiencing the residual effects 
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of the successful / unsuccessful delivery of the service. Downsides exist to 
over-privileging either perspective. However, to gain a rounded perspective 
of the issues facing an area, some way of receiving and balancing the views 
of each has to be determined. One of the major pitfalls in attempting to 
garner the widest range of views possible is the question of what constitutes 
representativeness. For example, would the views of the organisation 
Sustrans be representative of all cyclists? Similarly, would one statutory 
sector public health specialist agree with another on every aspect of an 
area‟s health requirements? The voluntary sector provides a useful example 
of this issue, comprising as it does of numerous organisations of hugely 
varying remit, size, resources and capacity. Any one of these organisations 
could lay claim to a more accurate assessment of a given issue within an 
area, but which should prevail? The main voluntary sector infrastructure 
organisation in one of the case study areas may provide a partial solution to 
this issue in its development of a voluntary sector forum. This body would 
have representatives decided upon by the constituent organisations; 
therefore, if an OSC sought to elicit voluntary sector input on a particular 
issue, the first port of call would be the forum, which would then determine 
the body best placed to attempt to portray the myriad views of the sector on 
the issue. This wouldn‟t address completely the issue of representativeness, 
but would at least be a step forward.  
 
If OS can secure an approximately representative cross-section of top-down 
and bottom-up opinion, it can begin the process of sifting and prioritising 
issues. The simplest approach would be to establish the recurring issues and 
decide as a group of OS members which to prioritise. A more deliberative 
approach would involve a broader group of broadly representative 
stakeholders taking ownership of the OSC work programme, each 
contributing their views and hopefully demonstrating willingness to get 
involved in the topic as investigations commence. The most effectively 
targeted OS functions will be doing this already, in one form or another. 
Deliberative work programming events of a similar nature were hosted by two 
of the case study authorities. Conferences were convened that involved 
external stakeholders and non-executive members from the counties and 
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districts concerned. After the usual presentations and question and answer 
panels, the World Cafe methodology (renamed in this context as „Scrutiny 
Cafe‟ was employed to ascertain the pressing issues facing the area within 
each Local Area Agreement (LAA) theme. These were chosen as they 
reflected a common framework which all present could relate to. Each LAA 
theme was assigned its own table and accompanying voluntary and public 
sector representatives. At twenty minute intervals non-executive members 
moved from table to table, ensuring a random distribution. The voluntary and 
public sector representatives at each table were „anchors‟ for the debate, and 
remained in place throughout. Discussions were facilitated by scrutiny 
officers, who drew the debate back towards how OS could intervene. After 
the event, scrutiny officers also played a key role writing up the findings from 
the cafe table which were then circulated to non-executive members. This 
type of event differs from orthodox involvement / consultation mechanisms in 
that an emphasis is placed on informality and two-way discussion. Small 
touches contribute to this. For example, a „cafe‟ environment is created by 
providing drinks and biscuits at each table that are replenished frequently, 
ideally throughout the event. Participants write on paper table cloths rather 
than on notepads, leaving their thoughts in writing for others to add to, if they 
so desire. The end result of a Scrutiny Cafe used in this way is a properly 
evidenced and targeted work programme, which has drawn upon the views 
of numerous internal and external stakeholders. This, in turn, mandates the 
OSC work programme and ensures that it is focussed on the areas where it 
can make the greatest difference.  
 
8.2 Quality assuring OS outputs: the role of deliberation  
An ongoing theme of the thesis has been the value that broad ranging and 
truly substantive external stakeholder engagement can bring to OS 
processes. Benefits include stronger evidence bases and more legitimacy for 
OS. If a significant range of opinions has been considered and cross-
referenced and other evidence triangulated, it can be reasonably assumed 
that a decent quality output (usually a written report and recommendations) 
will result. To ensure that a higher quality output is produced, it is fairly 
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common practice for the report to be circulated amongst a group of 
stakeholders for comment. If remarks of sufficient significance are made, the 
review group will reconsider their findings if it desires. Building this quality 
assurance phase into the OS review process can ensure better quality 
recommendations and better use of time; it also adds significantly to the 
evidence base and tests any assumptions being made by the OS group.  
 
Building quality assurance into the evidence gathering stages of the OS 
review can be achieved by testing findings with service users in particular, 
ideally in a manner that is conducive to their enjoyment and allows them to 
contribute to the discussion. In an age of consultation and stakeholder 
engagement, OS groupings can piggyback on existing engagement 
mechanisms. Established groups of young people, brought together by youth 
services teams, have equivalents in residents‟ associations, patients‟ groups, 
carers‟ associations, etc. The only pitfall is the issue of „representativeness‟, 
so wherever possible countervailing views should be sought or ideally 
brought together to deliberate. Other risks to the approach include how to 
involve service providers in the debate and whether they should be involved 
alongside service users. The pragmatic response is to judge the situation on 
its merits and proceed after careful consideration. It may be that the default 
position would be to involve the two separately, as their input will be sought 
for two different reasons: 
 Service users  
Will be assessing the validity of the OS review findings in terms of its 
diagnosis, prognosis and recommended course/s of action 
 
 Service providers  
Will likely pose an array of questions around the proposed 
recommendations, including whether they can be implemented, whether 
they are affordable, and whether they will make a difference.   
 
It has been stated in this conclusion that OS is a highly technical exercise; a 
situation that is likely to consolidate and extend as OSCs focus increasingly 
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on the work of council partners. The privileging of the technical over the 
political (senior officers over executive members for example) exacerbates 
this, and may mean that service user involvement is the hardest challenge to 
address. General public involvement has been shown by the research to be 
almost entirely absent from OS processes across the case study authorities, 
although the involvement of service users does take place to varying extents. 
Therefore, service users are probably those citizens best targeted by OS 
functions, as general public involvement will likely add little to the service 
improvement mode of OS, and will be very difficult to elicit or maintain.  
 
For that reason, the quality assurance of OS findings / recommendations 
would be best undertaken in a deliberative forum involving service users and 
OS group members. The service users would represent as broad a range of 
views on the topic as possible and would reside, ideally, in different 
geographical areas for triangulation purposes. Feedback from the sessions 
would go on to inform the review further via the development of new lines of 
enquiry, new contacts to interview or sites to visit. The resulting draft 
recommendations and developing findings could go through further such 
processes, eventually reaching a stage where highly evidenced, well targeted 
and implementable recommendations are produced. These 
recommendations would enjoy the legitimacy accorded by expert, lay 
(member) and service user input. The iterative nature of their development 
would result in „no surprises‟. The ultimate benefit would be that the 
recommendations would have a far higher likelihood of acceptance and 
implementation, due to the fact that all are bought into the process, 
recommendations are genuinely evidence-based, and the service user 
involvement at every stage has kept the review outcome-focussed.  
 
8.3 Overview and scrutiny: the future 
OS in local government faces a period of uncertainty following the 2010 
general election. This is due to a Conservative Party commitment to allow 
local authorities to choose their own system of political management; a direct 
challenge to the Local Government Act 2000, which for most authorities 
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allowed a choice of three. The principal behind this move is localism and a 
view that locally elected representatives are best placed to decide 
independently on these matters. The Liberal Democrat communities 
spokeswoman has recently backed this principle (Smulian, 2010, p. 13).  
 
The long-term prognosis for OS is, therefore, uncertain given that both 
coalition partners intend to give councils the freedom to decide on their own 
political management arrangements. The coalition proposals would, in 
principle, allow a return to the committee system, which many councillors see 
as a more inclusive way of conducting local government business. However, 
the research has shown that many OS chairs are staunch advocates of the 
current system and many more will remain ambivalent. Some councils ha ve 
already declared their intention to move away from the executive / non-
executive split, although this need not necessarily involve the scrapping of 
OSCs. Fourth option authorities have operated the committee system 
successfully alongside OS, with the prevailing view in the fourth option 
authority case studied being that policy committees offered an extra layer of 
scrutiny that complemented OS very well. The type of OS that was 
undertaken by this authority was almost uniquely comprised of scrutiny 
reviews, the type of OS activity which is most likely to be viewed as valuable 
to the authority and the broader public.  
 
The monitoring role was almost unnecessary given the lack of concentration 
of executive power and the party political scrutiny undertaken in policy 
committees. For some members, holding the executive to account in a non-
party political manner, as is expected in an OSC, is counter-intuitive when 
they have been elected on a party political platform. Therefore, perhaps the 
best option is to accept that the best type of executive accountability is 
exercised through the party group sat in policy committees. The service 
improvement role is likely to be best served by non party-political working 
through OSCs.  
 
Few localists would question the right of a local authority to choose its own 
political management arrangements, but there may be a case for coalition 
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policy to reflect the value that OS in many authorities has provided. This 
could involve legislating for some kind of non party-political body to adopt the 
service improvement function (via the conduct of scrutiny reviews, etc.) in all 
local authorities, regardless of the executive arrangements that are put in 
place. This could lead to many authorities moving back to the committee 
system for decision-making with the statutori ly required retention of an OSC/s 
in service improvement mode. Anecdotally, it would seem that the members 
that have advocated a return to the committee system have done so on the 
basis of a desire for more inclusive decision-making, rather than dislike or 
disillusionment with OS. This would appear to replicate Conservative Party 
thinking on the matter, as the parliamentary group lent its support, very late in 
the life of the current parliament, to a now defunct private member‟s B ill 
which would have strengthened OS considerably.  
 
Revised political management: senior officer views 
It is hard to generalise on senior officer advice to elected members on the 
matter of political management, should the opportunity to scrap executives 
emerge. Personal experience of senior officer involvement in political 
governance arrangements (not related to the executive/non-executive split) 
revealed a reticence on behalf of senior officers to advocate one particular 
arrangement. This could be attributed to a desire to keep this element of the 
authority‟s internal business member-led, and/or a reluctance to expose 
himself should an officer-recommended arrangement fail. If senior officers did 
have a stance on the executive political management arrangements of their 
authority, it could take one of two forms: 
 
 A desire to retain an executive system 
This would probably be grounded in the relative speed and efficiency of 
existing political decision-making. Rather than navigate a range of policy 
committees, cabinet members / leaders / elected mayors can be 
consulted before senior officers act. Under the cabinet system (the 
predominant arrangement across local government in the UK) this is 
particularly useful where cabinet members have considerable delegated 
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powers over services. In an elected mayoralty, access to the mayor may 
prove more problematic for senior officers wishing to act quickly.  
 
 A desire to reduce the burden of attending / servicing OSCs  
In some instances the burden placed by OS may not be justified in terms 
of the value it brings. Where this is this case, it would be understandable 
for senior officers, if asked, to advocate against the continuation of a 
system of OS. Senior elected members on the executive would in many 
cases wish to retain the concentration of executive power (although there 
are likely to be many exceptions). The reasoning behind is likely to be 
grounded in proximity to senior officers; speed and efficiency of decision-
making; and personal prestige, to varying extents. The atti tude of the 
broader ruling party group is undoubtedly important in colouring the 
attitude of the executive. If non-executive members enjoy freedom from 
the party whip, and / or resent their exclusion from direct decision-
making, they may be willing to move against the executive if necessary to 
effect change.  
 
Opposition political groups will also have a role to play in deciding whether to 
switch from an executive system of political management. Where 
relationships between political groupings are good and collaborative, it 
seems logical to suggest that there may be a slightly better chance of 
adopting alternative arrangements, if advocated strongly by the opposition. 
However, where inter-party relationships are good, it is quite likely that OS in 
the authority will also be strong, which will act in favour of retention, 
regardless of the ultimate choice of executive arrangements.  
 
Indeed, strong OS itself wi ll be a major factor in whether authorities decide to 
retain it. In this regard the picture is mixed, as the diversity of local authorities 
has led to a similar diversity in the effectiveness of OS. Where authorities 
resource OS correctly and adopt an open approach to governance, it has 
made a positive impact. However, OS is a relatively new development and in 
some instances the culture change required to allow OS to have an impact 
has not had sufficient time to embed. In addition to this, a finding from a 
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comprehensive study of Regional Assembly scrutiny, equally applicable to 
local authority OS, is „the extremely difficult, if not impossible, task of 
identifying the precise impact of “influence”‟ (Ashworth et al., 2007, p. 207). 
This has significant implications for OS functions seeking to advertise the 
difference their interventions have made.  
 
Perhaps ironically, it appears to be politicians who have embraced OS to a 
greater extent. This can be evidenced by the fact that the acceptance of 
recommendations (by the council‟s executive) tends to far outstrip the 
implementation of recommendations (by lead officers). It can be speculated 
that this is due to the flux in membership of the executive, with many longer 
serving councillors having moved from the non-executive ranks into those of 
the executive (and back again in some cases). The current tranche of senior 
officers (at a level of seniority to be subject to the regular attention of OS) 
would have been promoted through a system with no requirement to pay 
heed to, or implement the recommendations of OSCs. Some will have 
embraced the contribution of OS where properly evidenced and intelligent; 
others will have proved more resistant to a perceived dilution of managerial 
power. It is entirely plausible that as existing junior and middle managers 
operating in the context of OS adopt senior positions over the coming years, 
a culture change will mature and embed, which will in turn make officer 
structures generally more amenable to OS intervention.  
 
Retention of current arrangements 
There would be authorities that choose to retain their existing political 
management arrangements regardless of any opportunity to change. These 
authorities would be the ones in which OS has achieved the difficult balance 
of challenging robustly without alienating key stakeholders. It will be able to 
alter policy via the exercise of influence and play a broader role in the 
governance of an area. Where such authorities retain OS, the emphasis of 
the function will have to change in order to stay abreast of a rapidly changing 
public policy arena.  
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The parlous state of public finances will require an increasing focus on 
budget scrutiny and value for money. A recurrent theme of the thesis has 
been the requirement for OS to adopt a much greater external focus; 
however, external budget scrutiny will be challenging to develop. Many 
authorities have struggled to develop effective internal budget scrutiny, so 
extending it to concerns beyond the direct remit of the local authority will add 
considerably to the challenge. A key risk will be the duplication of effort, 
where each public sector body has existing arrangements to ensure financial 
probity. However, OS of an external organisation‟s budget would be less 
focussed on financial controls and assurance, and more on the policy 
thinking behind budgetary decisions and outcomes delivered. In some cases 
there may still be a duplicative element which would have to be reconciled, 
although potential long term developments in the public sector may render 
this a moot point. If the thinking behind initiatives such as Total Place bears 
fruit, area-based shared budgets, joint commissioning and collaborative 
procurement could become the norm, rendering an organisation-focussed 
budget scrutiny obsolete. Instead, the focus would be on ensuring that the 
best possible outcomes were being delivered by the strengthened Local 
Strategic Partnerships (or similar) via their budgeting decisions.  
 
This development could strengthen the role of councillors in general, 
extending their reach beyond the rather limited scope of local government 
and into the realms of the broader public service. A degree of member 
intransigence encountered in the research may yet prove problematic to the 
achievement of this; as previously mentioned some councillors are 
concerned about raising the expectations of their constituents, only to leave 
them unfulfilled due to a lack of enforcement power on behalf of OS.  
 
In two-tier areas the challenge facing enhanced external OS is greater still. 
The need to work collaboratively across the tiers and the delineation of local 
government service responsibilities complicates matters further. It means that 
effective partnership working between the respective OS functions is a 
fundamental requirement, as so many issues of concern to OSCs involve 
other councils‟ remit. An example would be the issue of recycling, which 
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would almost certainly involve an OSC referring to both the waste collection 
authorities (usually the local district councils) and the waste disposal 
authority (usually the county council). Invariably, good practice would dictate 
a collaborative effort between OS functions across the tiers, although this 
type of partnership working was not especially advanced in the two-tier areas 
researched. On occasion one or two members would be co-opted to sit on 
the other council‟s OSC or working group. This did deliver a variety of 
collaborative working, but a recently initiated project in one of the two-tier 
areas is to take this approach a step further. In joining together to review a 
specific district‟s educational attainment, the county council and relevant 
district council‟s OSCs are agreeing a joint terms of reference (ToR) for a 
scrutiny review. The relevant OSC in each authority will discuss and agree 
the ToR before assigning three members each to a joint working group of the 
two OSCs. It has been agreed that a district member should chair the group, 
and that the final report of the group should go via both OSCs for final 
agreement. Recommendations can then be issued to the appropriate 
agencies, with both OSCs responsible for tracking their implementation. The 
benefit of this approach is that there is a larger supporting resource for the 
review as officer support from both authorities can be provided.  It enables 
the complementary knowledge of the two sets of counci llors together to 
review the subject; the district members provide the local knowledge of the 
area‟s particular needs and the county members bring knowledge of 
education and children‟s services more broadly. It is hoped that this new way 
of working will pave the way for future joint OS reviews of this variety.  
 
Broader trends in the public sector, accelerated by the recession, have 
added impetus to this type of effective collaboration between OS functions in 
two-tier areas. The first is the need to demonstrate more efficient working in 
general, meaning less duplication and better sharing of knowledge and 
resources. The latest round of new unitary councils have meant that the onus 
is now firmly on two–tier areas to demonstrate greater efficiency. Indeed, 
there are convincing moral and business cases for this. The recession has 
meant that the funding of public services will be compromised severely in 
coming years. This in turn has meant that, alongside the rest of the public 
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sector, OS functions will be expected to adhere to the mantra „do more with 
less‟. Ultimately, such working may be the precursor to a more radical model 
of OS support, which would involve an OS support function located outside of 
the council‟s line management structures, possibly funded through the Local 
Area Agreement and used as a shared resource by partners to support 
currently existing bodies such as district and county council OSCs, Police 
Authorities, NHS Local Involvement Networks, or their future equivalents. 
The advantage of this would be a cost saving, more joined-up working across 
public sector scrutiny and, importantly, freedom from the ever present risk of 
managerial interference compromising the neutrality of OS support.  
 
The likelihood of this happening is, for now, rather slim given the requisite 
change in culture that would be required has yet to occur. However, the 
recession and Total Place initiatives, or similar, may galvanise the debate 
and force change. Such a change in the situation of OS support is of course 
predicated on a willingness to continue to fund dedicated OS officers in the 
lean years ahead. This willingness would have to extend beyond decision-
makers in local government to those in partner bodies. The overarching 
partnership organisation would have to agree that such a resource would be 
valuable in terms of providing accountability and stimulating service 
improvement.  
 
This as an option is bolstered slightly by the relative cheapness of such a 
resource in the wider context of a devolved area-based budget without any, 
or minimal, ring-fencing. For example, the Total Place pilots have 
demonstrated the extent of public spending in the areas concerned. This 
ranges from £2.2 billion in Lewisham to £22 billion in the Manchester city-
region (DCLG & Treasury, 2010, p. 17). A shared scrutiny support body 
would cost considerably less than .05% of Lewisham‟s total public spend 
(based on a £1 million budget) and the savings that such a body would help 
to identify would most likely make it at least cost-neutral. Even if only a 
relatively small proportion of this „area budget‟ was delegated to local 
agencies there would still be more than sufficient resource to cover the cost 
of a scrutiny unit as a shared service.  
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A hybrid system: the future? 
This option could be the best possible compromise if local authorities chose 
to move away from an executive system of political management. It would 
allow for a scrutiny review role, therefore retaining the best of the outgoing 
OS system, to operate alongside a more inclusive system of decision-
making, with diffusion of executive power, in the form of a committee system 
of decision making. It would be most similar to fourth option authorities that 
operate both OS and party political policy committees.  
 
The two OS roles that the thesis delineated, monitoring and service 
improvement, are merged into a member-led scrutiny review process, with a 
particular emphasis on service improvement. This would utilise, primarily, the 
strongest element of the current system of OS, the scrutiny review. Some of 
the main elements of the monitoring role are subsumed in the debates in 
policy committees, where all members are engaged in decision-making and 
the party political element is not artificially eschewed.  
 
If preferred, separate bodies could be set up to look in-depth at developing 
policies, or the scrutiny review function could develop evidence-bases and 
recommend changes to developing policy back to the relevant policy 
committee. The remaining time available to the function (ideally, at least 80 
percent) would be devoted to scrutiny reviews with a predominant external 
focus and an emphasis on deliberative methods to develop 
recommendations. The expectation would be that the scrutiny review function 
would be non-party political and concerned with the development of quality 
services.  
 
8.4 Theoretical conclusions 
The literature review explored several of the main ideas of relevance to OS in 
practice and as a concept, to ground it in the broader democratic theoretical 
body of which it is very much a part. Throughout, OS has also been viewed 
as one element of a broader democratic renewal agenda (see p. 89) which 
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was intended to galvanise public interest in matters of government, policy 
and society. The thesis built on the premise that OS is a function of 
representative democracy especially suited to broader engagement due to its 
flexibility and many other factors (see p. 115). For this reason it was argued 
that OS had, to an extent, the potential to facilitate participatory democracy, 
especially in its deliberative forms. Although, the findings of the thesis have 
shown that, at least in terms of involving the general public systematically, 
OS and the broader political management arrangements of which it is a part 
have failed.  
 
This failure is attributable, in part, to the fact that the OSC is a very modern 
incarnation of a long-established representative democratic unit: a committee 
of elected representatives and as such, it is fettered by elements of that 
system that make it inimical in many ways to popular participation, including 
arcane procedures and formalities.  As Silk and Walters state, „[t]here have 
been select committees for hundreds of years‟ (1998, p. 208) and in that 
sense OS was not a fundamental departure from the way in which executives 
have traditionally been scrutinised, as OSCs themselves have much in 
common with select committees. The „hard‟ role delineation (see. p. 185) that 
emerged from the data perhaps best indicates that this historical tradition is 
manifesting itself in elements of OSC practice, primarily in the monitoring / 
holding to account role mainly undertaken in formal committee session.  
 
OS has, however, been genuinely innovative in reviewing services and 
making recommendations for improvement. This type of work generally 
involves the relaxation of formality and due process, more inclusive, „softer‟ 
role delineation (see p. 187), and is undertaken in smaller flexible units often 
referred to as Task and Finish Groups, or Working Groups, etc. The 
deliberative style that these sub-groups frequently adopt is certainly a new 
way of conducting representative democracy, and in that sense OS is playing 
a part in democratic renewal. Whilst this research has shown that these 
deliberative processes involve predominantly expert stakeholders, there is 
evidence that general public (especially service user) involvement is being 
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secured to a greater extent than in formal OSC sessions, although the 
numbers of those involved are still not especially high.  
 
Where OSC sub-groups in particular have succeeded is in bringing together 
a range of opinions and ideas in a deliberative setting, allowing elected 
representatives to bring their local knowledge to the fore, arbitrate, evaluate, 
and ultimately develop strong recommendations for service improvement. 
The thesis has argued that herein lays the best that OS has to offer, and the 
deliberative elements of this work must predominate and develop in the 
manner suggested (see p. 252) if OS is to continue making a contribution in a 
complex local governance environment concerned with increasingly 
challenging policy issues.   
 
8.4.1 A grounded theory 
The research findings can be drawn together into the relatively succinct 
grounded theoretical statement: 
 
OS processes have enhanced local governance in terms of furtherance of 
the democratic renewal agenda (DRA) insofar as it has empowered the non-
executive councillor role, broadening non-executives‟ sphere of influence 
beyond the local authority, underpinned by statutory powers that have 
accrued, in an albeit piecemeal fashion, over a ten year period. Councillors 
have demonstrated a willingness to hold organisations external to the council 
to account through OS, although some concerns remain around managing 
expectations of constituents when OS cannot enforce change. General public 
engagement, as required by the DRA, has not been well served by OS 
processes as a result of them being fettered by statutory requirements and 
local authority cultural imperatives as to how to operate as units of 
representative democracy – i.e. formal committees with „hard‟ role 
delineation. This emphasises the councillor as a political figure and hampers 
the potential for public engagement due to negative perceptions of politicians 
and political process. Formal committee procedures and practice are often 
viewed by the lay public as intimidating, which has acted as a barrier to 
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general public engagement, as have councillor perceptions and a lack of 
willing participants volunteering themselves. Therefore, where public 
engagement is sought it is best elicited through the committee sub-group 
which operates in a less formal manner with „softer‟ role delineation.  
 
The issues around formal committee procedures and practice that render 
them less effective in terms of engaging the general public have a less potent 
effect on professional and expert stakeholders who are often more 
comfortable giving account in a formal setting; this, in part, has led to a 
greater reliance upon expert external stakeholder engagement in OS 
processes, but predominantly this prevalence of experts is attributable to the 
highly complex nature of the policy issues facing local public agencies today, 
and the high esteem and legitimacy accorded to expertise in an era shaped 
by new public management and evidence based policy making. In this 
context, expert testimony is essential to OS functions legitimating 
recommendations for service improvement upon a strong and 
comprehensive base of evidence.  
 
All external stakeholder engagement – if service improvement rather than to 
hold to account is the goal - is best secured through less formal sub-group 
work in which there is more of an emphasis on reciprocity, team work and 
problem solving. For this reason the „service improvement‟ aspect of the OS 
role is usually best undertaken in informal committee sub-groups, which have 
been observed to be more deliberative in terms of their levelling-up of 
relationships (mutuality), inclusiveness, reciprocity and more consensual 
(rather than „us and them‟) ethos. The monitoring role, which is 
predominantly concerned with transparency and accountability, is best 
undertaken in formal committee session with „hard‟ role delineation and the 
necessary due process, including the production of formal agendas and 
minutes to aid democratic oversight. When separating OS into respective 
service improvement and monitoring roles. The ability of OS to make a 
difference, in the sense of driving improvement or holding effectively to 
account, is contingent upon its ability to leverage the system / executive 
through the effective exercise of influence. This involves the avoidance of 
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„accountability fatigue‟, whereby individuals / services have been held to 
account already by other means such as external inspection and OS 
intervention at that stage is duplicative and unlikely to be of value. It also 
involves the need to strike a careful balance when implementing the „critical 
friend‟ conceptual approach, emphasising „critical‟ or „friend‟ on a case-by-
case basis, although it can be theorised that the latter is better suited to 
„service improvement‟ work predominantly undertaken in committee sub-
groups, whilst the former is better suited to „monitoring / accountability‟ work 
undertaken in formal committee session. Finally, it needs to ensure that its 
work is timely and well planned, so that OS is seen by service managers / 
sponsors to be part of the solution rather than a burden.  
 
Implications for the deliberative democracy literature 
The OS processes observed during the research, and interview testimony, 
would suggest that deliberative democracy is evident in certain elements of 
broader OS work to varying extents. It tends to occur in smaller group work 
when engaged in „service improvement‟ activities, often during the process of 
an OS review. Where these deliberative activities occur, they rarely address 
much of the criticism levelled at deliberative democratic processes in the 
literature. For example, elements of Josie Brooks‟ concerns around the risk 
of exclusion in deliberative processes based on gender, education or 
ethnicity (1999, p. 53) – referred to by Fung (2004, p. 108) as the „strong 
egalitarian‟ critique - are vindicated to an extent; certainly, the general 
reliance by OS on the more highly educated and articulate to give account 
can skew evidence bases in favour of the views of this demographic.  
 
Little effort is made to secure the views of less highly educated people 
because there is an assumption, and the reality is – as described throughout 
the thesis – that expertise is significant; this relegates the voice of the less 
highly educated and poses a major challenge to OS processes. The 
exception is when the views of a specific group of service users are sought. 
When accessed, depending on the nature of the service used, those 
expressing views will have varying degrees of educational attainment. For 
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example, a group of library service users could be expected to represent a 
relatively high level of educational attainment (although this would not always 
be the case). However, groups of children, people with learning disabilities 
and others will present levels of educational attainment deviating significantly 
from the norm that OS processes have to work hard to accommodate, if their 
views are to be elicited successfully. Indeed, where the views of those with 
low levels of educational attainment are sought, it may be that deliberative 
processes are less suitable. Other means may have to be used that avoid the 
rigour and as a corollary, the exclusionary potential of a deliberative session. 
An attempt to elicit the views of a young person with learning disabilities was 
observed in Authority C. This involved the OSC chair inviting the young 
person to speak in a formal committee session with the support of his carer. 
Whilst the young person addressed the OSC very ably, it does prompt 
reflection on whether this was the best way to consult with this individual and, 
if not, which engagement methods would be more appropriate?   
 
Gender bias was seen to be less of an issue in deliberative OS processes 
than in other deliberative systems, simply because a lot of the input to the 
former is by mid to senior ranking public sector officials, and members of this 
group observed during the research were not predominantly male. Other 
external stakeholder input to deliberative OS processes was also not 
overwhelmingly male, nor was the composition of the member working 
groups. It is difficult to conclude that deliberative OS processes overcome 
barriers to involvement in other deliberative forums such as citizen juries, 
where certain voices may predominate; but the profile of those generally 
involved in OS deliberation mitigates the issue to some extent. Were greater 
general public engagement in OS processes ever to be secured, the issue 
would certainly be more acute due to the fact that a greater mix of 
participants would be secured - with perhaps a generally lower regard for 
matters of inclusion - and inequalities present in wider society would present 
microcosmically in the OS process.  
 
Margaret Kohn‟s notion of a socially constructed „reasonableness‟ as a block 
to effective deliberation (Kohn, 2000, p. 409) has been discussed at several 
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points throughout the thesis. „Reasonableness‟ benefits the status quo and 
those in positions of power. The prevalence of senior officials in deliberative 
OS processes could lead to an entrenchment of existing „reasonableness‟, 
which could be said, in the OS context, to be based upon behavioural, 
hierarchical, organisational cultural and professional norms. When such 
norms are also accepted by the arbitrating figures in the deliberative OS 
process - the elected members - it can provide a significant barrier to 
completely open deliberation, as certain topics would be automatically 
considered illegitimate or incredible. To combat this, elected members can 
play a vital role in, wherever possible, rejecting the orthodoxy and embracing 
the lay perspective. Truly unorthodox ideas generated by deliberative 
processes, for example that would result in significant alterations to 
governance or management arrangements, however credible, could be 
dismissed simply because they infringe the aforementioned behavioural, 
hierarchical, organisational cultural and professional norms. This is 
particularly likely to be the case if the idea makes power brokers look 
incompetent or complacent. The ability of deliberative OS processes to 
address the scourge of „reasonableness‟ is in large measure dependent upon 
the independent mindedness of elected members and their willingness to 
challenge the orthodoxy.  
 
„Enclave deliberation‟ (Sunstein, 2003) can result in polarisation of opinion 
amongst those holding similar views and subject knowledge that debate and 
examine issues within their field on a very frequent basis. This phenomenon 
is directly applicable to the external stakeholders engaged in OS processes, 
where they are part of a closely-knit group of specialists in their field. 
Communicating with fellow specialists can result in the creation of an enclave 
in which ideas on their shared specialism become solidified and self-
reinforcing.  
 
As mentioned earlier in the thesis, deliberative enclaves can be easily 
developed within OS processes, particularly where party politics have not 
been sidelined for the purposes of effective OS. Where this is the case, 
membership of a party group enclave can result in individual members 
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adhering rigidly to group opinion, to the detriment of the supposedly non-
party political deliberative OS process. As Professor Steve Leach states: 
„Effective overview and scrutiny requires a lesser degree of constrai nt on the 
public contributions of individual group members, and a greater acceptance 
of the value of open discussion, especially about alternative means for 
achieving a given end‟ (2009, p. 19). This would certainly be compromised if 
deliberative enclaves were to manifest along party group or other lines, within 
OS processes.      
 
Given the unavoidable presence of party politics in OS processes (as most 
councillors are political party members), albeit to varying extents, it is 
perhaps more prone to falling afoul of enclave deliberation than other 
deliberative mechanisms, although members are commendably aware of the 
need to forgo party loyalties for OS to be effective. Other deliberative 
processes that bring together strangers to deliberate on specific matters will 
not have existing enclaves in place (although they may form independently 
over longer term periods of deliberation), as they are in deliberative OS along 
party political lines. Member awareness of the need to work against party 
loyalties may not be sufficient as adherence to party policy is accompanied 
by other powerful imperatives to act as a party politician. These include the 
fact that their electorate asked for, for example, a Conservative Party 
representative, and would then expect their counci llor to ensure that 
Conservative policies are applied. Loyalty to one‟s constituents would add a 
different dimension to the need to have regard to the party enclave and its 
policy conclusions.  
 
The elected member role: the future 
The elected member role faces pressure and incursion from several factors. 
Taken in combination, these factors lend to a broader conclusion that 
councillors must demonstrate the value that they can bring to a complex, 
networked and professionalised world of public policy. The onus is also firmly 
upon the individual councillor to be proactive in the face of these pressures, 
as there is a distinctive and highly valuable array of tasks for the councillor to 
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perform for the greater good of local areas, if he or she is willing and able to 
undertake them. Pressures and incursions facing the elected member role 
include:  
 
 Excessive workload   
Committee membership, surgeries and ward / divisional case work sit 
alongside political party duties such as canvassing. These can combine 
rapidly into an excess of work which results in councillor time being 
spread too thinly. Only highly effective time managers can maintain 
simultaneously both consistent effectiveness and large workloads.  
 
 Voter apathy  
The elected member role is unique because of its democratic mandate; 
councillors, rightly, enjoy significant leverage that is underpinned by their 
popular support and representative function. This is weakened when, as 
is often the case, turnouts in local elections are low.  
 
 Managerialism / professionalisation 
An argument put throughout the thesis has been that managerialism and 
professionalisation pose challenges to the elected member role. As 
increasingly difficult cross-cutting issues such as climate change bedevil 
policy makers, professionals and experts increasingly come to the fore in 
decision making, as it is they that have the time and the specialist 
knowledge of the science and the complex legislation and directives 
around the issue. Elected members have a vital role to play in keeping 
policy grounded and shaped to meet the concerns and interests of local 
people, but the onus is on them to exercise leadership, to work together 
with experts, and prove the value of the lay perspective in these complex 
and esoteric debates.  
 
 Local governance 
The council is but one agency in a web of local governance. Areas are 
shaped in large part by organisations outside of the direct control of 
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elected members. This obvious constraint on their competency directly 
impacts on the capacity of the councillor to see implemented his or her 
party‟s programme for the local area. Pledges to reduce anti-social 
behaviour, for example, are automatically limited by what the local 
authority can do alone or in partnership with other agencies. The ruling 
party on the local counci l cannot set the reduction of anti-social behaviour 
as the priority of the local constabulary, nor can it do anything other than 
influence the local Community Safety Partnership to take up this priority. 
Indeed, partnerships themselves are imperfect arrangements for various 
reasons, and therefore elected member influence through them is further 
compromised.  
 
 Centralism 
Centralism has a particularly pernicious effect on the councillor role. This 
is especially so when successive central governments have been willing 
to reduce or forgo council involvement in local service delivery, as with 
education, for example (Hollis et al., 1992). Equally impactful on the 
councillor role is the centre‟s willingness to issue directives and 
regulations that senior council officers must adhere to. The effect of most 
directives is to reduce the scope for executive member competency as an 
executive member cannot enact change that conflicts with central 
government directive: the latter must prevail, or the authority risks falling 
afoul of the doctrine of ultra vires, with legal challenge potentially arising 
as a result. The broader impact is that local politicians‟ decision making 
competency is reduced as national politicians‟ and officials‟ is increased.  
 
In the face of these pressures councillors cannot be reliant solely on 
representative democratic legitimacy to underpin their mandate to govern; 
instead, they must seek out other legitimacies such as that bestowed by 
substantive engagement with external stakeholders of the council. By 
augmenting the democratic mandate with participatory democratic legitimacy, 
members will find themselves in a stronger position to effect change across 
the web of local governance. Using the vehicle of OS, members can achieve 
this by implementing a more deliberative style of local democracy which 
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encompasses a diverse spectrum of opinion brought together in a spirit of 
reciprocity, with councillors using the process to construct robust evidence 
bases upon which recommendations can be built. This type of influencing 
through evidence based recommendation may be the future of local 
democratic governance beyond the confines of council services, in a world in 
which democratic legitimacy exists alongside competing legitimacies for 
control of public services.  
 
8.5 Overview and scrutiny: future research 
The OS research agenda is potentially wide-ranging, given the scope of and 
expectations placed upon the developing external scrutiny role. Certainly, 
there will be scope for research on member / officer relationships as the 
partnership agenda accelerates. A particular focus of this would be the extent 
to which partnerships are involving elected members in their business; this 
will pose important questions around the role (or even need) for locally 
elected politicians in an increasingly partnership-dominated environment.  
 
Another valuable area of research would focus on those councils that choose 
to reject OS wholesale, and return to some form of policy committee system. 
Useful lines of enquiry within this would include the extent to which elected 
members are empowered (or perceive themselves to be empowered), the 
practice of accountability under newly introduced arrangements, and finally, 
how well policy committee arrangements (or similar) function in a partnership 
and „area-based‟ service delivery arena.  
 
Officers should not be neglected when researching political management 
arrangements. Theirs is a vitally important role which, at senior levels, is 
inextricably linked to the political arrangements in place. How encumbered or 
otherwise officers feel, the extent to which they feel political arrangements 
are effective, and the strength of the political leadership exhibited are all key 
questions. Overall, any further research on OS and/or its replacements 
needs to consider the role of elected members in an increasingly complicated 
public policy arena in which the lay person‟s voice is in the minority. Fields 
 286 
 
such as scrutiny of finance or performance, in a democracy, must have the 
input of everyday people and/or their representatives. Local authority OS is 
one way of achieving this which is powerful due to its legislative 
underpinnings and democratic mandate. This does not mean that future 
scrutiny arrangements need take this form or be any less effective. However, 
what must be ensured is that future arrangements are fit for the purpose for 
which they are intended: to provide improved services, transparency and 
democratic accountability.  
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Appendix A: Interview questions 
In all cases questions were very roughly adhered to, so the following should 
not be read as a definitive statement of the topics considered. 
 
External stakeholder interview 
 
1.  Briefly describe your role within your organisation 
 
2.  How did your involvement with […] council come about?  
 
3.  What were your initial thoughts and expectations when you were asked 
to participate in overview and scrutiny? 
 
4.  How would you describe your involvement so far?  
 
5.  Did you hope to achieve anything by being involved? 
 
- Has your involvement in overview and scrutiny helped to 
achieve this?  
 
6.  Do you think that you make an impact on the proceedings? [Example]  
 
7.  In what way could your impact be improved? 
 
8.  Do you feel any different about local democracy following your 
involvement? 
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Member interview 
 
1.  How long have you been a councillor? 
 
2.  What are your responsibilities as a councillor? 
 
3.  What made you become a councillor? 
 
4.  What is the role of local authority overview and scrutiny? 
 
5.  Has it been a successful development in your authority?  
 
6.  Does scrutiny provide you with a fulfilling role? 
 
7.  What do you understand by the term „external stakeholder‟?  
 
8.  Do you feel able to forward the views of external stakeholders through 
scrutiny? 
 
9.  Do you feel that the concerns of stakeholders are addressed through 
scrutiny? 
 
10.  How do you think that the views of stakeholders could be better 
addressed through scrutiny? 
 
11.  Is there a role for greater participation in scrutiny by external 
stakeholders? 
 
12.  Do you feel that participation would be a priority for them? 
 
13.  Is their participation a priority for you? 
 
14.  Can you provide an example of external stakeholder participation?  
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15.  To what extent were they engaged in the review (suggested a topic, 
attended a meeting, etc.)? 
 
16.  How often did they attend? 
 
17.  How would you describe their input (consultative, deliberative, co-
optee)? 
 
18.  Did the participation add to the review? 
 
19.  Generally, how has past external stakeholder involvement in scrutiny 
came about? 
 
20.  At what stage in the scrutiny process are external stakeholders 
generally involved (work programme stage, witness, following up on 
recommendations)? 
 
21.  Has your local authority ever assessed or evaluated external 
stakeholder involvement in scrutiny? 
 
22.  Has your local authority any plans to enhance external involvement in 
scrutiny? 
 
23.  What impact will the recent local government White Paper have on 
scrutiny (CCfA, etc.)? 
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Scrutiny officer interview 
 
1.  What is the role of local authority overview and scrutiny? 
 
2.  What is your role as a scrutiny officer? 
 
3.  What do you understand by the term „external stakeholder‟?  
 
4.  Do external stakeholders ever play a role in scrutiny, and if so, how 
does their involvement come about? 
 
5.  At what stage in the scrutiny process does external stakeholder 
participation usually take place (work programme, evidence gathering, 
follow up on recommendations, etc.)? 
 
6.  To what extent do external stakeholders engage voluntarily with 
scrutiny? 
 
7.  How is external stakeholder engagement promoted? 
 
8.  When external stakeholders have been involved in scrutiny in the past, 
how would you describe their input into the process? 
 
9.  How do you view external stakeholder engagement in terms of its 
impact on the scrutiny process? 
 
10.  What impact will the recent local government White Paper have on 
scrutiny (CCfA, etc.)?  
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Appendix B: Email interview with the chief executive 
of a LBC  
 
The chief executive in question occupies a prominent national position in his 
profession and in 2009 published an article on the subject of the politicisation 
of senior officials. This was of particular relevance to the thesis in terms of 
exploring whether OS functions should be addressing senior officers or 
executive members.  It got to the heart of the perennial issue of who leads, 
members or officers: 
 
Is it fair to say that the chiefs who had worked for a long period with 
Conservative majority groups became associated with Conservative 
policies?  
 
Yes, became associated in the minds of politicians in other parties. They 
might or might not have been supporters of these policies. Something similar 
happened in the early „80s, mainly in London but also notably in Liverpool 
and elsewhere. councillors were elected, in this case from the far-ish left, and 
they considered the senior managers they inherited as being out of touch 
with what they wanted. In London, a lot of that was expressed around moves 
to equal opportunity. In my view, there were a lot of „old guard‟ directors 
around and some of us appointed to replace them were better equipped for 
modern local government, but others were political stooges, and that led to a 
clampdown in the legislation that Thatcher passed.    
 
... if chief executives are getting removed because of an association 
with a political party, does this mean they have a greater policy role 
than the traditional view would suggest, or were there any other factors 
involved?  
 
Yes, that's the traditional view and you can still hear some councillors say 
proudly that „we are a member-led authority‟, but usually these are the places 
where it is more myth than reality and where there is resentment of senior 
management. You get it now in the diminishing number of unreconstructed 
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councils and even then usually only from a diminishing minority. What is 
policy? Where does it start and finish? If councillors have a clear vision of the 
place they want to create but are not sure what changes/po licies are needed 
to get there and the top management team comes up with proposals, talks 
them through, and then, maybe with some modification, they are adopted by 
the administration, who has made policy? What happens when there is a 
clear political policy but it is un-implementable but a modified version can go 
ahead? Whose policy was it?   
 
Anyway, you are confusing appearance and reality. The removal of the chief 
executives is done [because of] a perceived association with a political party. 
By working closely with an administration, guiding them well, implementing 
their policies effectively so they are re-elected over a lengthy period and 
during that time often having to defend in public what the council is doing, a 
situation is created where an incoming changed administration might think 
that the chief executive, etc. are in the pockets of the outgoing administration, 
i.e. new opposition and [therefore untrustworthy], or they might think the staff 
hold those political opinions and want staff more sympathetic to their own 
viewpoint.  
 
We are talking here about guilt by association - think of the purges, the 
McCarthyite committee, etc. Incoming politicians can be zealous and just as 
unreasonable and ruthless. There is even some right on their side. It is easier 
to advise on and implement policies that you support or at least are 
indifferent to. I dare say that if the BNP took over this council they would be 
right that I'd struggle to understand some of their thinking and to assist them 
as they'd expect. It doesn't mean I'm a supporter of the current political 
administration, just not keen on [the BNP] and so less well equipped for the 
role in the changed circumstances. In the USA they accept that and the staff 
change when the administration changes. I can live with that, but we are 
supposed to live by the continuity of the staffing principle.  
 
I've seen research which suggests that with the advent of special 
advisors and the concentration of power in No. 10, senior civil servants 
 293 
 
actually spend less time now on policy matters (advising ministers, 
etc.) and more time on management. My opinion is that that would 
appear to be the opposite of what's happening at a local level, where 
senior officers / chief execs are spending more time advising cabinet 
members / leaders on matters of policy. Is that an oversimplification?  
 
You could say that when the Next Steps agencies were set up many senior 
civil servants needed to spend even less time on management and so could 
spend more on advice, although I suspect they didn't alter much, i.e. they 
had never managed much compared with us in local government. No doubt 
the trends you mention have eroded the influence of some but overall I think 
they sti ll are heavily involved. Ministers are full time and paid. Most senior 
councillors, still, are part time and receive little remuneration. Civil servants 
need only consider the government constitutionally whereas we are legally 
obliged to serve the whole council, i.e. to give the opposition some attention 
too. It remains the case that we are much better than the civil service at 
running things and they are better at providing policy papers and advice. 
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Appendix C: Policy making in the leader / cabinet system
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